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Abstract 
This thesis is concerned with the problem of construction of the logical structure 
of a persuasive discourse. A persuasive discourse can be defined as a monodirec-
tional form of communication, generated by a speaker in order to convince a hearer 
about the validity (or fallacy) of a specific belief. 
The construction of the structure of a persuasive discourse is realized, in this 
work, through the adoption of two basic elements: a belief system and a planning 
system. The planning system is used as a tool for the automatic generation of the 
discourse structure (or plan), obtained through the decomposition of the assigned 
(communicative) goals of persuasion, aimed at producing specific effects on the 
hearer's beliefs. The belief system is adopted in order to endow the planning 
process with a formal language of beliefs for the representation of such goals, and 
with the mechanisms which govern the propagation of their (expected) effects on 
the rest of the hearer's belief state. 
The main results presented consist of the formalization of a paradigm for speci-
fication of belief systems, and of a method — whose correctness is formally proved 
— for their integration with planning systems. The formalization of a belief system 
for discourse structure representation (defined in accordance with the theoretical 
paradigm) is also given, together with the description of its implementation and 
integration with a specific planner, which resulted in the actual completion of a 
system for the automatic generation of persuasive discourse plans. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 The Method 
The spirit of this investigation has been guided by the fundamental criterion of 
usefulness: the main goal of this research has been identified with the intention 
of producing results which could be used for solving actual problems in a specific 
area; moreover, the contents of the thesis have been restricted to material which is 
believed to be useful for the specific goal which has been chosen. 
By taking this 'pragmatist' point of view, the ideas, terms, definitions and 
results which did not satisfy the criterion of usefulness have been eliminated from 
the analysis. On the other hand, the elements which form the various parts of the 
thesis have each been included for a specific reason, which has been made clear in 
the explanation and which constitutes a contribution to the overall purpose of the 
work. In accordance with this criterion, whenever an assumption has been made, 
its adoption has been explicitly stated and motivated. 
Nevertheless, the contents of this work still constitute the expression of personal 
and possibly fallible reasoning. In order to facilitate the process of analysis and 
validation of the results presented, any claim which has been put forward in the 
course of the discussion has been justified, either informally (e.g. by referring to 
results obtained by others, in which case the sources have been explicitly stated), 
or formally (i.e. by adopting formal methods for the representation and proof of 
the claims), or empirically, that is, through the analysis of results of practical 
experiments, or, finally, through any combination of these methods. 
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1.2 Introducing the problem 
Communication in natural language has been and still constitutes one of the most 
characterizing and complex activities of human beings: regardless of whether it is 
spoken, written on paper or encoded on electronic support, natural language (NL) 
represents the primary means adopted by people in order to transfer information 
from one individual to another. 
During the last two decades, the need for the development of a user-friendly 
information society has produced an increase of interest towards the problem of 
man-machine communication. The applications of this area of research include in-
terfaces for knowledge bases, information retrieval, text summary, decision support 
and advisory systems, expert systems and computer aided learning systems inter-
faces; in fact, any situation in which nontrivial reasoning needs to be communicated 
to a human user, or vice versa. 
Although the largest part of human linguistic exchanges occur as speech, the 
broad problem of spoken language processing can be tackled, initially, by limit-
ing the analysis to the simpler sub-problem of (unambiguous) written language 
processing. In particular, this work is concerned with the problem of automatic 
generation of the structure of a discourse. 
A discourse structure consists of an abstract 'skeleton' which captures the logical 
and intentional relations existing among the semantic units or concepts which will 
have to be conveyed in the message; the discourse structure does not necessarily 
contain any explicit NL expression. 
The importance of the construction of an underlying 'palimpsest' of the dis-
course to represent the logical and intentional structure of the message during the 
phase of generation (and understanding) has been recognized by several authors 
in the fields of linguistics and computational linguistics (e.g. [63], [98], [74], [153], 
[121], [99]). 
Although a more specific definition of discourse and discourse structure will 
be given later on in the thesis (Section 2.3), i t is useful to point out that one of 
the main hypotheses at the basis of this work consists of assuming discourse to 
be the result of a goal oriented process: people communicate for a specific reason. 
This initial reason normally leads the speaker to identify a set of communicative 
goals [98] (or intentions) which constitute the effects that (s)he intends to produce 
on the hearer's mind. 
More precisely, this thesis focuses on the class of discourse structures which are 
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generated by a specific type of communicative goal, namely, that of persuading the 
audience of the validity — or, alternatively, of the fallacy — of a certain proposi-
tion or fact. Hence, the class of discourses considered has been restricted to that 
of persuasive discourses. 
The decompositional nature of intentions and goals along with the tree-like 
structure of discourse have led to the adoption, in A I , of the planning technique 
as a widespread approach to the problem of automatic discourse generation and 
processing (e.g. [25], [5], [64], [100], [92], [74], [98], [153]). 
In this work, the same approach has been adopted: the problem of the discourse 
structure generation is treated as an application domain for the theory of planning, 
in which the objective consists of the development of systems for the automatic 
generation of plans for persuasive discourses. 
However, as mentioned before, the scope of this thesis has been restricted to 
the problems concerning the generation of the high-level structure of a discourse 
plan, excluding the issues related to the low-level refinement of the message to be 
communicated, such as the selection of the specific terms in NL, the attention shift 
or the choice of the linguistic register. Hence, the discourse plans which will be 
considered will only contain a non-refined representation of the message. 
The adoption of planning for the automatic generation of discourse structure 
also allows the representation, through the plan which is being constructed, of the 
entire intentional skeleton and logical relations which underly the selection of the 
discourse contents. Notice that the specific contents to be conveyed by the mes-
sage will be represented in terms of primitive semantic units (or events) inside the 
current planning 'state', which will contain the set of knowledge and beliefs of the 
system (that is, of the speaker). 
Planning a communication that achieves a specific change in the hearer's mental 
state and attitude towards certain propositions requires the speaker to hypothesize 
and maintain an adequate model of the hearer's beliefs, which must be updated 
according to the effects that the speaker's utterances (are expected to) have on 
such beliefs. 
As a matter of fact, a generic speaker must always assume a certain minimum 
level of knowledge and deduction abilities (rationality) in the audience: these as-
sumptions, taken together, constitute what has been defined as the speaker's model 
of the hearer. In the theories of discourse and communication, the need for the 
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speaker to maintain an internal representation of the hearer's knowledge and beliefs 
has been widely acknowledged (e.g. [25], [98], [145], [10], [11]). Quoting Grosz and 
Sidner: 
" [ . . . ] any model (or theory) of the communication situation must dis-
tinguish among beliefs and intentions of different agents". [64, p.425] 
In is important to notice that for a discourse processing system involved in an 
informational exchange, not only is modelling the beliefs and intentions of the 
other agent(s) needed during the generation phase, but, as Moore and Pollack 
have underlined in [99], it can be also frui t ful during the process of discourse 
interpretation and contents understanding. 
In the computational theories of discourse generation and understanding there 
exist various examples of formalized languages of beliefs and intentions which have 
been developed to describe the model of the hearer as a part of the speaker's 
cognitive state (cf., for example, [10], [12], [153], [92]). 
However, one of the characteristics of the languages of beliefs is that the more 
expressive they are, the more complex their use becomes. The growth of complex-
ity is due to the high number of redundant expressions and interactions between 
different propositions that an expressive language introduces by getting closer and 
closer to a real natural language. 
As a consequence, if these languages are adopted to represent mental states of 
the speaker during the process of discourse planning, their use must be regulated 
by specific rules and axioms deduced from the meaning of the expressions, in order 
to avoid the generation of incorrect belief states representations. 
In other words, planning in the domain of 'belief worlds' can involve the defini-
tion of extremely complex operators, which should take into account the meaning 
and consequent effects of propagation of every belief change of the state, in accor-
dance with the semantics of the specific language defined. In order to avoid this 
situation, the approach suggested in this work consists of dividing the problem into 
two distinct parts: first of all, it seems appropriate to identify clearly the language 
of beliefs, the meaning of the various expressions and the interactions present be-
tween them, as well as the restrictions to which a 'correct' belief model must be 
subject. In brief, this corresponds to giving a complete formal specification of a 
belief system. 
Secondly, it will be necessary to effect the integration of the belief system pre-
viously defined into a planning system, in order to allow the use the of language of 
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beliefs for the specification of the speaker (and hearer) mental states and planning 
operators, which wil l be employed to produce the desired discourse plans. 
As it will be shown, this approach presents several advantages, from the point 
of views of the complexity of the development, generality of the solution and main-
tenance of the final product. 
1.3 Statement of the problem 
Having traced the broad outline of the contents of the thesis, i t is now appropriate 
to give a clear definition of the problem, in order to delimit the scope of the work, 
identify the main objectives and introduce the methods for the evaluation of the 
results. 
The central problem tackled in this thesis consists of analysing, formalising and 
implementing a belief system which is intended to be used — in conjunction with 
a planning system — for the automatic generation of persuasive discourse plans. 
The requirements that the belief system which will be integrated in the planning 
system has to satisfy are summarised by the following points: 
• the ability to adopt rules of inference in order to deduce new beliefs from 
existent ones, and, at the same time, to limit such process of deduction to 
the minimum amount necessary, in order to allow the realisation of systems 
with limited resources; 
• the ability to deal with uncertainty and with inconsistent information; 
• the ability to represent a structure of belief justification and grounding based 
on the formalization of inferential and non-inferential — i.e., experience-based 
— beliefs. 
The model of beliefs developed will allow the representation of the beliefs of the 
system from the point of view of the speaker, and will also have to be able to 
contain a representation of the (hypothetical) model of the hearer. 
Notice that the audience will always be considered as a single hearer, even when 
actually consisting of many. In such cases, the model of the hearer should be re-
garded as composed by the set of beliefs resulting from the intersection of the belief 
sets of all the members of the audience. 
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The evaluation of the model of beliefs developed will be based on two parameters 
which result to be critical for most of the formal logics and reasoning systems, 
and which are, in general, antagonist: expressiveness and efficiency. Moreover, 
the formal correctness of the solution proposed will also constitute a necessary 
requirement. 
Being the belief system designed to be used by a planning system to produce 
plans for persuasive discourses, these aspects will also be evaluated with respect to 
the problem of persuasive discourse planning itself. This means that, in order to be 
expressive, the language of beliefs will have to be sophisticated enough to capture 
the relevant information and concepts which will be needed during the process of 
construction of the logical structure of a discourse. 
Similarly, the efficiency will be evaluated as the workload necessary to integrate 
the belief system into a planning system, plus the impact which the result of the 
process of integration itself has on the efficiency of the planner. In addition, two 
other aspects of the integration will also be considered as parameters of efficiency 
of the solution proposed: the first one consists of the range of different planning 
systems into which the belief model developed will be able to be integrated; the 
second one corresponds to the complexity of the possible procedure of maintenance 
of the final product. 
Finally, the requirement of correctness of the solution will be considered satis-
fied only i f the formal specifications of the belief system developed are fully met 
by the model actually implemented, and after a formal proof of the validity of the 
process of integration has been given. A more specific description of these criteria 
of evaluation will be given in Chapter 2, Section 2.5. 
In order to complete the definition of the characteristics and scope of the prob-
lem, it is necessary to introduce one of the main hypotheses which will be as-
sumed throughout the thesis, concerning the expected 'attitudes' of the hearer 
(and speaker) towards communication in general. 
With regard to the general principles which regulate conversational exchanges, 
Grice (in [61]) introduced the maxim quoted below, defined as 'the supermaxim of 
Quality', which constitutes part of the general principle of cooperative conversation: 
"Try to make your contribution one that is true." [61, p.46] 
In what follows, persuasive discourse, even though aimed at affecting the hearer's 
beliefs concerning certain propositions, will be assumed to be totally sincere. More 
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specifically, Grice adds the two following principles: 
1. Do not say what you believe to be false; 
2. Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence. 
In the model developed in this thesis, these two maxims are assumed to hold during 
the complete process of discourse planning. This implies that the speaker's strategy 
of persuasion cannot make use of deceptive techniques, rhetorical tricks or fallacies. 
What is more, the hearer will be expected to be aware of this 'sincere approach'. 
In other words, the two basic assumptions upon which the discourse construction 
will rely are as follows: 
Axiom I) The speaker is sincere; 
Axiom I I ) The hearer believes the speaker to be sincere. 
From now on, these two principles will be referred to as sincerity axioms. I t should 
be noticed that these assumptions are not enough to guarantee that the hearer will 
believe (or be persuaded of) anything the speaker says. Sincerity, by itself, is not 
sufficient to convince: after the discourse, the hearer could still maintain that the 
speaker's opinions are completely mistaken, even though totally honest. 
1.4 Main contributions of the thesis 
The main contributions of this work lie in the field of discourse planning and consist 
of: 
1. the formal specification of a 'speaker-hearer' belief system for discourse plan-
ning (Chapter 4); 
2. a sound linear algorithm for the integration of the speaker-hearer belief system 
into a planning system (Chapter 5). 
The innovative aspects of the belief system developed are essentially its ability 
to offer all the basic features required to an expressive resource-bounded speaker-
hearer belief system (as stated in the previous section) and its suitability for the 
automatic integration into an entire class of planners. 
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The main advantages of the integration algorithm adopted, consisting of the 
pre-processing of the rules which govern the belief system into the planning prob-
lem itself, lie in its formal correctness and linear complexity. Moreover, as it will be 
shown in Chapter 5, the algorithm produces planning problems which are formally 
correct and can be solved more efficiently than those produced by other methods 
of pre-processing. 
In conclusion, not only will the results presented in this work satisfy the declared 
goals of the thesis, but constitute also a useful contribution to the current research 
in this field, which will be surveyed in the next chapter. 
1.5 The structure of the thesis 
The content of this thesis has been divided into seven chapters. Following this 
introductory chapter, Chapter 2 contains the review of the current research related 
to the problem considered, and a more precise definition of the evaluation criteria. 
Chapter 3 introduces the formalization of a paradigm for the specification of 
belief systems, not necessarily tailored to the problem of discourse generation. This 
chapter defines the high-level structure, functioning and characteristics of a general 
model, according to which the system actually implemented has been designed. 
Chapter 4 contains the detailed, low-level description of the belief system for 
persuasive discourse planning actually implemented, built according to the theoret-
ical paradigm described in the preceding chapter. The chapter includes the formal 
specification of the system and a brief description of its realisation. 
The main task of Chapter 5 consists of presenting a method for the automatic 
integration of a belief system into a generic planning system, and of demonstrating 
its correctness. The set of models of beliefs considered for integration contains 
all the systems which can be built according to the formal paradigm described in 
Chapter 3. On the basis of a theoretical analysis, these systems are shown to be 
generally integrable into a wide range of planning systems through a procedure 
which presents linear computational complexity. This result is formally proved for 
part of the set of belief systems considered, the proof of the correctness of the 
integration algorithm relying on a specific set of assumptions. Nevertheless, the 
belief system presented in Chapter 4 does satisfy such assumptions. 
Chapter 6 contains the description of the realisation of a discourse planning 
system, obtained as the result of the integration between a specific belief system 
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(consisting of a simplified version of the system of Chapter 4 still satisfying the 
necessary requirements for the integration) and a specific planning system. In the 
final part of this last chapter, some examples of belief situations and resulting plans 
generated for the achievement of persuasive communicative goals are illustrated. 
Finally, Chapter 7 evaluates the results of the work, according to the criteria 
of evaluation which will be established at the end of Chapter 2. 
Chapter 2 
Related Work 
2.1 Introduction 
The subject of this thesis overlaps mainly with three different trends of research. 
These three main areas are: 
1. belief systems; 
2. planning; 
3. theories of discourse and argument structure. 
This chapter dedicates one section to each of the mentioned areas, in which the 
relevant works are reviewed. The subject of belief system is presented first and is 
treated in more details than the others because of its pre-eminent position with 
regard to the declared aim of the thesis. The section on planning is the last 
presented, and represents, to some extent, a 'trait d'uniorH between the previous 
two. 
Finally, the fourth section restates more accurately the criteria of evaluation 
which this work will adopt, taking into account the literature surveyed. 
2.2 Belief systems 
The history of the evolution of the human thought is driven, at least, by two 
fundamental 'urges', which are often in competition. 
The first of these forces consists of the need of the human beings to develop, in 
the course of their lives, a set of basic truths, principles, or 'datum points', upon 
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which to rely for undertaking action. 
The second one consists of the natural inclination of the human thought to the 
process of rational enquiry. 
Since ancient times, innumerable systems of truths have been developed in phi-
losophy, theology and science. However, the application of rational questioning has 
revealed their points of weakness, their inconsistency and incompleteness, produc-
ing a continuous, historical process of construction of new ''frameworks' of beliefs, 
each built in order to replace the previous, obsolete model (see [86]). 
Historically, the use of rationality has not been shown to be incompatible with 
the development of 'religious' systems of beliefs. One of the most important exam-
ples, in the western civilization, is represented by the work of St Thomas Aquinas 
(1225-1274), who, in his Summa Theologica, tried to give a ".. .complete descrip-
tion of the relation between man and God, relying only on philosophical reasoning, 
and without recourse to mystical assertion or unsupported faith. [... ] [T]he sub-
sequent synthesis of Christian doctrine and Aristotelian metaphysics [... ] has 
remained to this day the most persuasive of the foundations offered for Christian 
theology" [129, p.17]. 
Another interesting example can be found in the 'ontological proof for the 
existence of God. This 'proof, normally credited to St Anselm, Archibishop of 
Canterbury (1033-1109), represents one of the arguments at the basis of the me-
dieval theology, and makes use of one of the main strategies adopted in formal logic 
for the proof of theorems, viz., reductio ad absurdum (see [129, p.21]). 
The rise of the modern philosophical thought and scientific investigation is 
marked by the publication of the work of Rene Descartes (1596-1650). In his writ-
ings, Descartes openly declares that all previous results of philosophy and specula-
tion were without foundation and had to be set aside or suspended until clear and 
indisputable premisses could be established, together with a method and principles 
whereby to advance from them. 
In his search for the truth, Descartes was guided by his famous 'method of 
doubt', which consisted of disregarding any assertion or belief which could be con-
sidered dubitable. In Descartes' view, everything could, in principle, be doubted: 
not only the evidence of the senses and the evidence of memory, but even the most 
basic presuppositions of scientific thought. 
Hence, as indubitable basis for his system of beliefs, Descartes put a proposition 
which he considered as 'self-verifying': " I think". According to Descartes, this 
proposition is peculiar in that i t cannot be entertained without at the same time 
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and for that very reason being true. This truth is known, as Descartes puts i t , by 
the 'natural light' of reason, that is, by a process which can be perceived to be 
valid by anyone who reasons at all. 
An interesting point about Descartes's premiss consists of the fact that its va-
lidity is contingent: the accent is put on the process of the subject perceiving the 
truth of the proposition, and not on its immutable necessity. In other words, the 
proposition should be regarded more as a belief, rather than as an objective truth. 
During the first half of this century, the scientific world has undergone another 
major crisis, brought about by the discovery of the existence of paradoxes in the 
set theory, of non-Euclidean geometries and of the Trans-finite set theory. This 
crisis culminated with the publication of Godel's theorem of incompleteness, which 
put an upper limit to the power of general validity of any consistent formal system 
complex enough to contain the basic principles of the arithmetic (for a discussion 
on the relation between Godel's theorem and A I , see [58, pp.113-156]). 
One of the consequences of this revolution consisted of the rise of a current of 
thought known as falsificationism, mainly represented by the work of Karl Popper 
(see [115]). 
According to Popper, any theory of knowledge is destined to be proved, sooner 
or later, incomplete. That is, for any given theory, there are always 'exceptional' 
cases in which the expected results will not coincide with the results of the real 
experience. Therefore, in order to include these 'anomalies' in the model, a new, 
more complete theory will have to be constructed. But such theory, in turn, will 
be shown wrong in some cases, and so on, ad infinitum. 
As a result, the idea that the human mind is able to acquire objective knowledge 
is undermined at its very foundations, and is replaced by the 'weaker' concept of 
temporary — and, thus, subjective — systems of beliefs. 
The development of theories of beliefs and knowledge during the last decades 
can be divided, roughly, into two currents: the first one, mainly deriving from the 
field of philosophy, has produced rather informal works. The second one, emerging 
from a branch of classical logic, has been marked by the construction of numerous 
formal theories. The next section will examine some interesting examples of the 
former kind of approach, while the more formal theories will be considered in 
Section 2.2.2. 
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2.2.1 Informal approaches 
This section analyses three informal works on belief systems, namely, those of Ack-
ermann [1], Armstrong [8] and Harmann [66]. These examples have been chosen 
because, taken together, they tackle most of the important issues related to the 
subject; moreover, their point of views are, to some extent, complementary. Fur-
thermore, although the first two examples were published early in the '70s, their 
ideas can still be found in much later works on belief systems, including formal 
theories — which will be discussed in Section 2.2.2 — and more recent informal 
approaches, as the analysis of Harman's work will show. 
The work of Ackermann 
A representative example of informal analysis of belief systems can be found in the 
work of Robert Ackermann, 1 Belief and Knowledge' [1]. 
Ackermann begins by dividing the actual beliefs of a human mind into three 
categories: behavioural beliefs, unconscious beliefs and conscious beliefs. Into the 
first category fall those 'assumptions' which rational agents adopt — without ex-
plicitly formulating them at a conscious level — when undertaking actions in daily 
life. For example: Mary, intending to have Cheerios for breakfast, goes to the 
cupboard and opens i t . When performing such an act, she relies on the (unstated) 
belief that the Cheerios are in the cupboard. 
To the second category belong "long-standing beliefs that can influence behavior 
over a long period of time, but which resist recognition by the agent." ([1, p.6]). The 
main example of this group consists of the set of prejudices which can be deeply 
and unconsciously act in somebody's mind. 
Finally, any belief that a person has explicitly formulated and which is aware 
of falls into the class of conscious beliefs. 
Besides these three categories of beliefs, Ackermann also introduces a fourth 
type of beliefs, which he calls rational, representing "a philosophical idealisation 
of actual belief structures as they are found in human beings" ([ibid., p.8]). Ack-
ermann then imposes that a particular set of rational beliefs be consistent (i.e. 
do not contain contradictions) and complete, "in the sense that all of the logical 
consequences of a given consistent set of beliefs should be regarded as belonging 
to a rational set of beliefs."([ibid., p.9]). However, he points out immediately af-
terwards that the "completeness condition is strong since it plainly requires that a 
man having any belief also have as beliefs the infinite number of consequent beliefs 
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that can be drawn from that belief by valid inference. The completeness condition 
reveals the essentially ideal nature of rational belief." 
This problem, well known in formal logic, is commonly referred to as the prob-
lem of logical omniscience of a rational agent (a term introduced by Hintikka in 
[69]). With regard to this issue, the view which Ackermann puts forward is con-
tained in the following quotation: 
"We will take a person's actual beliefs to be rational if they could be 
taken as a proper subset of the set of beliefs of some ideally rational agent 
whose rational belief structure satisfied the conditions of consistency 
and completeness [ . . . ] . An even weaker sense of rationality is provided 
if we say a man is rational should he always be willing to revise his 
beliefs when it is demonstrated that they are not incorporable in the 
belief structure of an ideally rational agent." [ibid., pp.9-10] (The italic 
is mine). 
The interesting point to notice is that, according to Ackermann, although a real 
agent has to be ready to accept — once put in front of the rational evidence — any 
of the logical consequences of his beliefs (and, consequently, be ready to revise the 
set of beliefs to eliminate possible contradictions), (s)he does not necessarily have 
to be aware of all of them. 
The same idea of 'awareness' is expressed in formal terms by Fagin and Halpern 
in [37], where the authors extend Levesque's logic ([89]) of implicit and explicit 
belief to allow multiple agents and higher-level belief (i.e., beliefs about beliefs). 
Such logic will be reconsidered in more details in the Section 2.2.2. 
Ackermann also introduces a syntax for the 'well formed formulae' ( w f f ) of the 
language of beliefs; some of the expressions he uses are listed below: 
• Ba (a believes that). 
o ~ Ba (a doesn't believe that). 
• BaBa (a believes that a believes that). 
• Ba ~ Ba (a believes that a doesn't believe that). 
Notice that in Ackermann's formalism, a's belief is not iterated more than twice. To 
justify this restriction, he points out that i t is "difficult to imagine circumstances in 
which ' I believe that I believe that I believe that p' can vary in truth or significance 
from ' I believe that I believe that p.' " With regard to this issue, Ackermann seem 
to have adopted, for the notion of belief, the same position that many others hold 
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with respect to the problem of the distinction between the concept of 'knowing' 
and 'knowing to know'. For example, Schopenhauer writes: 
"I f your knowing and your knowing that you know are two different 
things, just try to separate them, and first to know without knowing 
that you know, then to know that you know, without this knowledge 
being at the same time knowing." [68, p.166] 
Nevertheless, the validity of this concept is limited to situations which do not 
involve the nesting of attitudes of different agents. 
After the definition of the syntax of the sentential formulae of belief, Ackermann 
introduces a simple algorithm to check for the consistency of any given set of beliefs. 
I t is interesting to notice that his system allows the possibility for an agent to be 
'agnostic', that is, to have an attitude of uncertainty towards a specific proposition. 
In fact, the set of beliefs 
B — { ~ Bap, ~ Ba ~ p } 
is shown to be perfectly consistent by his checking algorithm ([1, p.27]). In other 
words, the analogue of the logical law of the excluded middle (p V ~ p) in the model 
of beliefs of the agent 'a' is not valid. 
With regard to the adoption of probabilities values to determine more precisely 
the boundaries between the three qualitative attitudes 'belief, 'disbelief or 'ag-
nosticism', Ackermann uses the famous example of the 'lottery paradox' ([87]) to 
show why this strategy does not always produce good results. 
Finally, another important aspect concerning Ackermann's view of a rational 
belief system lies in the need of a structure of belief justification, or, as he puts i t , 
of supporting 'evidence': 
"If my beliefs are to be regarded as rational, not only must they be 
logically consistent, they must also be related to the evidence I have at 
my command in such a fashion that beliefs which are rendered highly 
unlikely on that evidence are not believed by me." [1, p.33] 
Although Ackermann does not present a specific syntax to express this evidence, 
such an idea constitutes an important part of his model, especially in relation to 
the analysis of the concept of knowledge. In fact, he (among many others) considers 
the assertion "knowing that p" as a special case of "believing that p", in which the 
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proposition asserted must be supported by evidence so strong that it rules out all 
relevant objections to p: 
" . . . : a person knows p because he has sufficient evidence to rule out 
all possible relevant non-metaphysical objections [ . . . ] " [ibid., p.75] 
However, the notion of 'sufficient evidence' (or 'complete justification', introduced 
later on) is not clearly defined. As Ackermann points out, this concept is highly 
dependent on the context: for any particular knowledge claim, one must examine 
the circumstances to determine whether there are objections and whether they can 
be met in order to determine whether the knowledge claim is true. 
In conclusion, Ackermann's analysis seems to suggest that the approach to the 
representation of human knowledge should be based on a system of beliefs, and 
should allow the adoption of a structure to represent the evidence supporting any 
specific claim. Moreover, being such evidence not clearly definable in objective and 
generally applicable terms, it seems that the justification structure will be doomed 
to be identified on the basis of subjective and context-dependent criteria. 
The work of Armstrong 
A second interesting informal account on belief systems and knowledge is given 
by Armstrong in [8]. This work, although contemporary with Ackermann's, is 
presented with a less 'rational' slant, and seems to be more concerned with the 
philosophical issues related to the matter. 
To begin with, Armstrong sees beliefs as 'maps' by which we 'steer', that is, 
entities upon which we rely when undertaking action: "beliefs are, mere thoughts 
are not, premisses in our practical reasoning."[Op.cit.,p.74]. The analogy with 
maps is also used to describe the idea of introspection: using Armstrong's words, 
the "belief-map will include a map of the believer's own mind, and even, as sub-
part of this sub-part, a map of the believer's belief-map (that is, his beliefs that 
he holds certain beliefs)." However, according to his view, this entails no vicious 
infinite regress, because the "belief-map is not a complete map of the world, and 
[... ] the map of itself that it contains is even more incomplete [... ] . " ([ibid., p.4]). 
In order to give a more precise definition of what a belief is, Armstrong describes 
beliefs as 'states': according to his view, an agent's belief in p is a matter of the 
agent's being in a certain 'continuing state', a state which endures for the whole 
time that (s)he holds the belief. Interesting enough, this interpretation of beliefs 
as states leads him to allow for the existence of 'irrational' belief systems: 
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" [ . . . ] [A] man who recognizes the simultaneous existence of logically 
incompatible beliefs in his own mind must also recognize that his cog-
nitive state is irrational. But recognition of one's own irrationality does 
not necessarily abolish it . And if beliefs are distinct structured states, 
then it is easy to see how the belief that p, the belief that ~ p, and 
the knowledge both that the two beliefs are held and that they are 
incompatible, could co-exist in the one mind." [ibid., pp. 105-106] 
According to Armstrong, this view is supported by the psychological hypothesis of 
the presence, in the human mind, of multiple belief systems which exist in relative 
isolation from each other. This idea has been also advocated by other philosophers; 
for example, Robert Stalnaker writes: 
"A person may be disposed, in one kind of context [... ] to behave in 
ways that are correctly explained by one belief state, and at the same 
time be disposed in another kind of context [... ] to behave in ways 
that would be explained by a different belief state." ([139, p.83]) 
In order to sustain the possibility of the co-existence of contradictory beliefs, Arm-
strong proposes also a more 'pragmatic' point of view: 
" [ . . . ] [T]he human mind is a large place and untidy place, and we 
may believe 'p' and '~p ' simultaneously but fail to bring the two beliefs 
together, perhaps for emotional reasons. [... ] In the above sorts of 
case, the believer has two beliefs which are very obviously logically 
incompatible, but, because he does not bring them together, is not 
aware of holding incompatible beliefs." [ibid., pp. 104-105] (The italic 
is mine). 
Thus, as in Ackermann before, there is the idea that a — resource limited — ratio-
nal agent could be not fully 'aware' of all of the consequences of the beliefs (s)he 
holds, including, in this case, possible inconsistencies. In order to solve such situ-
ations, i t would seem necessary to draw the agent's 'attention' simultaneously on 
the two contradictory beliefs. 
I t is appropriate, at this point, to make a brief digression. With regard to the 
existence of contradictory beliefs, it should be noticed that, amongst the theories 
of beliefs based on a formal approach, there is a family of non-Cartesian1 logics — 
1The non-Cartesian logics are those in which there are no theorems of the form 'BelievesaP', 
implying, in some sense, the existence of propositions which must be believed by everyone. 
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namely, paraconsistent modal logics — which are inconsistency-tolerant. 
These logics are characterized by the absence of the logic theorem 
( P A ->P) —» Q 
known as ex falso quodlibet (anything can follow from contradiction). The problem 
with this theorem lies in the fact that, when a contradiction is deduced from a set 
of beliefs, i t also follows by ex /also that any proposition, including every possible 
contradiction, follows validly from that set of beliefs. Therefore, if we apply a 
classical inference engine to drawing conclusions from an inconsistent set of beliefs, 
the inconsistency spreads across every part of the system. 
However, this does not seem to be what happens in real-life belief systems: rea-
sonable people normally isolate inconsistency, or temporary suspend judgement, 
but certainly do not exploit contradiction to deduce the validity of any belief they 
happen to need to prove. As a consequence of the fact that also artificial agents 
have, after all, limited resources, there has been a recent resurgence of interest in 
these logics, which seem to be able to deal with contradiction in a more rational 
fashion than that indicated by classical ones (see, for example, [59]). 
I t is interesting to examine briefly Armstrong's categorization of the rules of 
inference adopted by an agent to deduce new beliefs from the existent ones. Such 
rules are classified as 'general beliefs', by which Armstrong means 'dispositions' 
that the believer has to extend the set of beliefs. There are two interesting aspects 
related to his definition of such beliefs: first of all, they are not considered 'part of 
the map', i.e., they are not actually regarded as 'beliefs'; secondly, their validity is 
totally subjective: 
"So, I suggest, if 'q' is to be (one of) A's reason(s) for believing that 'p', 
there must be some general principle operating in A's mind according 
to which it is possible for A to move from the first proposition to the 
second. The general principle need not be true, nor have any plausibility 
to anybody but A. Nor need A be aware that the principle operates in 
his mind." [ibid., p.85] (The italic is mine). 
Armstrong seems to consider the process of inferring new beliefs as one of belief 
grounding: according to his view, "a proposition 'q1 is a sufficient ground for 'p' if, 
and only if, the belief states Baq and Bap are causally connected"2 [Op.cit.,p.93], 
2 l Bap' should be read as "Agent 'a' believes p". 
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that is, i f the first belief-state brings the second belief-state into existence and acts 
as sustaining evidence for it . Later on, Armstrong also discusses the concept of 
'reason' for justifying a belief: 
" [ . . . ] [T]he goodness or badness of a reason has nothing essential to 
do with its actually operating for somebody as a reason. [ . . . ] 'q' is 
a conclusive reason for believing that 'p' if, and only if, i t is the case 
that ' i f q, then p'. [ . . . ] The proposition ' i f q, then p' need not be 
true of logical necessity. [ . . . ] . A l l that cannot be allowed is reading 
' i f q, then p' simply as the logician's 'q D p'. And a logical link does 
not make 'q' a more conclusive reason that in the case of a non-logical 
link." [ibid., pp.96-97] 
The only theme which all these considerations seem to have in common is that 
of the subjectivity of the mechanisms of inferencing and belief justification. This 
finds further support in the fact that, although rejecting the (Cartesian) notion 
of existence of beliefs which are self-evident, indubitable or incorrigible ( " I think 
the logical possibility of error is always present in any belief about any subject 
matter whatsoever" [Op.cit., p.156]), Armstrong clearly accepts the existence of 
non-inferential beliefs, which can be held without any need for a specific justifica-
tion: 
"It is perfectly possible to hold a belief without the holder having any 
reason for i t . Such a belief will be called a 'non-inferential' belief. 
(That a belief is non-inferential does not entail that it is unreasonable 
or irrational. [•••])" ([ibid., p.77]) 
The issue of non-inferential beliefs is raised again subsequently, when the rela-
tion between knowledge and belief is examined. With regards to this problem, 
Armstrong adopts the 'classical' view, shared by Ackermann, according to which 
" . . . knowledge is a true belief for which the believer has sufficient evidence [... ] . " 
[Op.cit., p.152]. However, unlike Ackermann, Armstrong believes that the evidence 
for knowledge will have to be "...some proposition, 'q,', which is known to [the 
agent] [ . . . ] . " Hence, knowledge that 'p' will be analysed in terms of knowledge 
that 'q', knowledge that 'q' in terms of knowledge that V , and so on, it would 
seem, ad infinitum. 
In order to solve the problem of 'infinite regress' — already known at the times 
of Plato — Armstrong appeals to non-inferential beliefs, which, according to his 
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view, consist of "empirically reliable belief[s]" [Op.cit., p.159]. More precisely, he 
writes: 
" I suggest that at least one place where non-inferential knowledge is 
to be found is in the simpler judgements of perception. [... ] I have 
in mind such judgements as 'There is a noise within earshot', ' I t is 
getting hotter','There is something red and round over there', 'There is 
something pressing on my body' and so on." [ibid., p. 163] 
Armstrong describes also what he calls the 'pessimistic' view of non-inferential 
knowledge. In this view, the actual sensory beliefs should be restated as ' I t sounds 
to me as i f there is a noise within earshot', ' I t feels to me as i f i t is getting hotter', 
and so on; in other words, the accent is put on the subjectivity of the physical 
perceptions. 
Summarizing, the analysis of Armstrong draws the attention upon various as-
pects related to the issue of belief systems, such as the co-existence of contradictory 
beliefs, the nature of inference rules and the problem of the infinite regress of belief 
(or knowledge) justification; the main 'ingredients' of the solutions which he pro-
poses for these questions can be condensed in the three following ideas: subjectivity 
of the point of view of the believer, limited resources of the rational agent and 
importance of the sensorial experience as a way of belief grounding. 
The work of Harman 
Several elements present in the works of Ackermann and Armstrong can be found 
in many other informal approaches which have been developed subsequently. An 
interesting example is represented by the work of Gilbert Harman ([66]), who, 
although mainly concerned with the principles of reasoning, proposes an interesting 
analysis of the problem of belief systems and related issues. 
One of the ideas introduced by Harman as a consequence of the consideration of 
the limited 'storage capability' for beliefs of an agent consists of the assumption that 
beliefs can be divided into two classes, namely, explicit and implicit beliefs. Harman 
defines as 'explicit' any belief which involves an explicit mental representation; on 
the other hand, "something is believed only implicitly if i t is not explicitly believed 
but, for example, is easily inferable from one's explicit beliefs." ([66, p.13]). 
To quote the example that Harman gives, if one explicitly believes the earth 
has exactly one sun, one can easily infer that the earth does not have two suns, 
that the earth does not have three suns, and so on. Hence, although one can have 
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only a finite number of explicit beliefs, one can implicitly believe infinitely many 
things — most of which one is not aware of. 
By adopting this view, Harman claims that what he calls the 'Logical Clo-
sure Principle' — stating that one agent's beliefs should be closed under logical 
implication — should be abandoned: 
"Clearly this principle does not apply to explicit beliefs, since one has 
only a finite number of explicit beliefs, and they [would] have infinitely 
many logical consequences. Nor can the Logical Closure Principle be 
satisfied even by one's implicit beliefs. One cannot be expected even 
implicitly to believe a logical consequence of one's beliefs if a complex 
proof would be needed to see the implication." ([ibid., p.14]). 
This point of view clearly reflects that of Ackermann, who, in relation to the 
problem of logical omniscience, considered the actual beliefs of a person to be 
rational i f they could be taken as a proper subset of the set of beliefs of some 
ideally rational agent (see page 14). 
Similar considerations to those presented by Armstrong on the existence of 
contradictory beliefs in a rational agent can also be found in Harman's work: 
" [ . . . ] [S]ometimes one discovers one's views are inconsistent and does 
not know how to revise them in order to avoid inconsistency without 
great cost. In this case the best response may be to keep the incon-
sistency and try to avoid inferences that exploit i t . This happens in 
everyday life whenever one simply does not have time to figure out 
what to do about a discovered inconsistency." [ibid., p. 15] 
The analogous of Ackermann's definition of 'knowledge' as true belief supported by 
evidence which meets any possible objection is given by Harman in more pragmatic 
terms: 
"In fully accepting P, one takes oneself to know that P is true. [... ] 
[0]ne is justified in fully accepting P only if one is justified in ending 
one's investigation into whether P is true. This means one has to be 
justified in implicitly supposing that further investigation would not be 
sufficiently worthwhile, for example, by uncovering relevant evidence of 
a sort not yet considered. [... ] A hypothesis is 'corroborated' only to 
the extent that it survives one's best attempts to refute i t ." [ibid., pp.47-
48] 
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It is interesting to notice that Harman solves Ackermann's problem of defining 
precisely the meaning of 'any possible objection' by taking — as anticipated — a 
subjective position. 
In relation to the problem of the regress of belief justification, Harman presents 
two theories, the foundations theory and the coherence theory. The former theory 
holds that "some of one's beliefs 'depend on' others for their current justification; 
these other beliefs may depend on still others, until one gets to foundational beliefs 
that do not depend on any further beliefs for their justification." [ibid., p.29]. 
On the other hand, according to his definition of coherence, one's ongoing beliefs 
ought not to have the justificational structure required by the foundations theory: 
"Justification is taken to be required only if one has a special reason to doubt a 
particular belief." [Op.cit., p.29]. 
Although Harman clearly supports the view that people do not keep track of 
the justification relations among their beliefs because, for a resource limited agent, 
this "would involve too much record keeping" (p. 115), he still suggests that, under 
the coherence theory, the following basic principle should be adopted for belief 
revision: 
"Principle of Positive Undermining One should stop believing P when-
ever one positively believes one's reasons for believing P are no good." [ibid., p.39] 
Clearly, the idea of keeping track of the 'reasons' for believing a specific belief is 
still present. 
Finally, it should be pointed out that, along the lines of a more 'resource sparing' 
theory, Harman introduces also the idea that belief revision should involve minimal 
changes in one's beliefs, and should be adopted exclusively when it increases the 
overall coherence of the belief system: 
"The coherence theory supposes one's present beliefs are justified just 
as they are in the absence of special reasons to change them, where 
changes are allowed only to the extent that they yield sufficient increases 
in coherence." [Op.cit., p.32] 
These concepts have been subsequently adopted for the development of formal 
models of belief system revision (e.g. [54], [3]). Such models will be examined, to 
some extent, in the following section. 
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2.2.2 Formal approaches 
The various formal approaches to the problem of belief systems can be classified 
in terms of two parameters: the model of belief adopted, which determines the 
semantic characteristics of the system, and the language used to formalise the 
model, which specifies the syntax of the expressions which the system will be able 
to deal with (cf. also [151]). 
With regards to the model adopted, there are two basic approaches: the first, 
best-known, and probably most widely used solution consists of adopting a possible 
worlds semantics, where an agent's beliefs are characterized as a set of so-called 
'possible worlds'. In such semantics, belief is taken to be a relation between the 
agent and abstract propositions about the world: the model attributes specific 
propositional attitudes (knowledge or belief) to an agent, but does not impose any 
cognitive structure. 
The most common alternative to the possible worlds approach consists of adopt-
ing a sentential, or interpreted symbolic structures model. In this kind of models, 
an agent's beliefs are characterized by the computations an agent performs on syn-
tactic objects (symbols or sentences) explicitly represented in the data base of the 
agent; an epistemic state is normally represented as a set of propositions, and an 
agent believes a proposition 0 iff 0 is present in the belief set. 
With respect to the language of beliefs, there are, traditionally, two fundamental 
approaches. The first consists of using a modal language, which contains non-truth-
functional modal operators applied to formulae. The second, so called syntactic 
approach, involves the use of first-order (truth-functional) 'metalanguages', and is 
normally adopted for sentential models. The differences between these languages 
can be found both on a syntactic and semantic level. 
From a semantic point of view, in classical (propositional or first-order) logic, 
the truth value of an expression is dependent solely on the truth values (deno-
tations) of its sub-expressions. For example, the denotation of the propositional 
logic formula (p A q) is a function of the truth-values of 'p' and lq\ However, the 
notion of belief does not seem to be truth functional: as noticed by Wooldridge and 
Jennings in [151], "It is surely not the case that the truth value of the sentence 
'Janine believes that p' is dependent solely on the truth-value of p [... ]." 
From a syntactic point of view, the argument 'p' of a modal expression Bap is 
normally considered as a proposition of the language of beliefs itself. In contrast, 
the argument 'e' of a predicative formula Bel(a, e) is taken to refer to an expression 
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in some 'object' language, whereas the language of Bel constitutes a metalanguage. 
Quoting Konolige: 
"In the so-called syntactic approach, the language is a first-order met-
alanguage that contains terms whose denotations are expressions in an 
object language. The object language serves as the internal language 
of the belief system, and predicates in the metalanguage express facts 
about these sentences, such as their inclusion in the base set of sen-
tences." [82, p.6] 
Notice that i f the metalanguage and its object language coincide (i.e. 'e' can refer to 
expressions in the language of Bel) the metalanguage is said to be self-referential; 
otherwise, i t is hierarchical. 
Although various examples of first-order metalanguages have been developed 
(e.g. by Konolige [81], Haas [65], Morgenstern [101] and Perlis [109] [110]), the 
main weak points of these formalisms seem to be their predisposition to fa l l prey 
to inconsistency (cf. [141]) and their notational complexity, which "makes them 
very hard to work wi th . " [82, p.84] (cf. also [150, pp.28-32]). 
The basic possible worlds model and the other alternative models of beliefs 
which w i l l be analysed in the subsections that follow adopt, to specify the syntax 
of the language of beliefs, the 'modal ' approach. 
T h e possible worlds model 
The possible worlds model for logics of knowledge and belief was originally proposed 
by Hint ikka [69], and is now most commonly formulated in a normal modal logic 
using the techniques developed by Kripke [85]. 
A normal modal logic is essentially a classical propositional logic, extended by 
the addit ion of two operators: ' • ' (necessarily) and 'o ' (possibly). Let Prop = 
{p, q,... } be a countable set of atomic propositions. Then, the syntax of the logic 
is defined by the following rules: (i) i f p e Prop then p is a formula; ( i i) i f <f>, tp are 
formulae, then so are - i < f > and (<j>\/ip); and ( i i i ) i f <f> is a formula, then so are and 
<xj). The operators '->' (not) and 'V ' (or) have their standard meanings. The re-
maining connectives of classical propositional logic con be defined as abbreviations 
in the usual way. 
The formula n<j> is read "necessarily <f>"; analogously, <xj) is read "possibly <f>". 
The semantics of the modal operators are given by introducing 1) an accessibility 
relation R, which defines what worlds are considered accessible f r o m the current 
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world, and 2) a valuation function, which says, for each world w, which atomic 
propositions are true in w. The formula Oip is then true i f is true in every world 
accessible f r o m the current world; otp is true i f ip is true in at least one accessible 
world. 
The two modal operators are duals of each other, i.e., each can be defined in 
terms of the other: 
Dtp 
A formula ip is said to be valid i f i t is true in all the possible models, where a 
'model ' simply consists of a specific collection of possible worlds, of an associated 
accessibility relation and a valuation function. To express that ip is valid, the 
standard notation '(= ip' is normally adopted. 
The two basic properties of this logic are the following: 
K ) (= u{<f> ( n ^ = » ••*/>); 
N) I f \= (f> then f= 
The first axiom is called K , in honour of Kripke; since i t is a valid formula, i t w i l l 
be contained in any normal modal logic. Similarly, the second property, gener-
ally called the necessitation rule, w i l l appear as an inference rule of any complete 
axiomatisation of normal modal logic. 
The most interesting properties of normal modal logics derive f rom the char-
acteristics of the accessibility relation R, defined for each model. For example, 
consider the following axiom schema: •</> =>- 4>. I t turns out that this axiom is true 
in all and only the models which have a reflexive accessibility relation. 
The study of the way that properties of R correspond to axioms is called corre-
spondence theory. The four main axioms which are associated to important prop-
erties of R and which are the basic 'building blocks' of any normal modal logic are 
reported below: 
T •</> 4> D •</>=><>(/> 
4 ••</> 5 o<£ 
Through the correspondence theory, i t is possible to derive completeness results 
for a range of simple normal modal logics. These results provide a useful point 
of comparison for normal modal logics, and make the possible worlds approach an 
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attractive mathematical tool to work w i t h [21]. 
The logics of knowledge (epistemic logics) and the logics of belief (doxastic 
logics) are tradit ionally derived f r o m modal logics by interpreting the formula DT/J, 
respectively, as "Agent knows that ip" and "Agent believes that ip", Let us consider 
the meanings of the basic axioms T , D, 4 and 5 under the doxastic interpretation. 
A x i o m D says that an agent's beliefs are non contradictory. I n fact, using the 
dual definit ion of the modal operators, i t can be rewrit ten as: Batp ->Ba-iip. 
A x i o m T says that what the agent believes is true. This axiom is only acceptable 
adopting a subjective interpretation of the notion of belief system: i f one believes 
a proposition, one considers that proposition to be true, regardless of whether i t is 
actually true in the real world. 
A x i o m 4 is called the positive introspection axiom, and implies that an agent 
believes to believe a believed proposition, recursively. A x i o m 5, similarly, is called 
the negative introspection axiom, and says that an agent is aware of what (s)he 
does not believe. 
I t should be pointed out that, given the respective epistemic and doxastic in-
terpretations of the modal operators, the axioms KD45 ( identifying the so called 
'weak-S5' system) are often chosen as logic of (idealised) belief, whereas K T D 4 5 as 
a logic of (idealised) knowledge (cf. [151]). 
Nevertheless, under this interpretation, the two fundamental properties K and 
N of the normal modal logics tu rn out to be rather problematic. 
In fact, according to the axiom K , the knowledge (or beliefs) of an agent is 
closed under implication. Together w i t h the necessitation rule, this axiom implies 
that an agent's beliefs are closed under logical consequence: an agent must believe 
all the logical consequences of the beliefs (s)he is currently holding. 
This property, already mentioned in the Section 2.2.1 as the logical omniscience 
problem, together w i th the problem of the widespreading of inconsistency (an agent 
containing one pair of contradictory beliefs is allowed to believe everything), seem 
to make the possible world approach unsuitable for representing resource bounded 
believers. As Levesque points out: 
"Any one of these [problems] might cause one to reject a possible-
world formalization as unintuit ive at best and completely unrealistic 
at worst." [89] 
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As a result, many researchers have attempted to develop alternative formalisms 
for representing belief. In the subsections that follow, some of these attempts are 
examined. 
Impl i c i t and explicit belief 
The concept of differentiating between impl ic i t and explicit beliefs, already found 
in the work of Harman (see Section 2.2.1), is also at the basis of the formal work 
developed in [89] by Levesque. 
As in Harman, the intuit ive idea is that a resource bounded rational agent has 
a relatively small set of explicit beliefs, and a very much larger (in fact, infinite) 
set of impl ic i t beliefs, which includes all the logical consequences of the explicit 
beliefs. 
To define the semantics of impl ic i t and explicit beliefs, Levesque proposes the 
use of situations, a notion borrowed f rom situation semantics (cf. [27]). A situation 
is best thought of as a fragment of a world, or a part ial description of a world. 
Situations are similar to possible worlds, but differ in that whereas a world assigns 
to every primit ive proposition either True or False, a situation may assign i t True, 
False, Neither or Both (in which case, a situation is said to be incoherent). 
Levesque proceeds by assigning an agent a set of situations, which, somehow, 
the agent considers possible. Intuit ively, an agent could be said to explicit ly believe 
ip i f ip were assigned the value True in each situation of the considered set. 
More formally, a model of Levesque's logic is determined by three elements: a 
set B of situations (wi th B C S, the set of all situations), which turns out to identify 
the agent's explicit beliefs, and two valuation functions, T and T, which take a 
primit ive proposition 'p' and return the sets of situations T ( p ) , Tip) (subsets of 
S) in which 'p' is, respectively, assigned a True and False value. 
Given a model and a specific situation V , the t r u t h of a proposition 'p' is said to 
be 'supported?, in that situation, i f f s G Tip). Similarly, its falsehood is supported 
i f f s G Tip). Finally, a formula ip (built , as usual, w i t h propositions and standard 
connectives '->' and 'V') is (explicitly) believed by the agent (formally, Bip) i f f i t is 
supported in every situation present in the set B of the model. 
Now, consider the following aspect of the problem of logical omniscience: be-
cause of the necessitation rule, in possible worlds semantics, an agent is supposed 
to believe all the tautologies of propositional logic, as they are valid formulae. 
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Unfortunately, the set of the logical tautologies is infini te. How does Levesque's 
formalism overcome such problem? 
The answer lies in the fact that, in possible world semantics, every world acts 
as a 'prepositional valuation', that is, assigns the t r u t h value True to al l the tau-
tologies, whereas a tautology is not necessarily assigned True in every situation in 
B. In short, situations do not act as propositional valuations, so the problem of 
infini te (explicit) beliefs is avoided. 
Finally, in order to complete his logic, Levesque introduces the impl ic i t belief 
operator (L), such that a proposition ip is impl ic i t ly believed (Lip) by the agent 
in a situation s i f f its t r u th is supported in all the situations of S which 1) 'agree' 
w i t h V on the t r u th or falsity of propositions, and 2) act as classical propositional 
valuations. W i t h this definition, L has the properties of a normal modal logic 
necessity operator • w i t h axioms K T 5 . 
A number of objections have been raised to Levesque's model (cf. [124, p. 135]): 
first , i t does not allow nested beliefs; second, his notion of a situation might be 
considered even more obscure than the notion of a world in possible worlds; th i rd , 
Fagin and Halpern [37] have shown that under certain circumstances, an agent 
modelled by Levesque's scheme must s t i l l be aware of propositional tautologies. 
To overcome this negative result, Fagin and Halpern have themselves developed 
a logic of 'general awareness' ([37]) based on a similar idea to Levesque's but w i t h 
a simpler semantics; however, this proposal has been criticised by Konolige in [83], 
where he concludes: 
" I t does not seem that there is much to be gained by considering a 
logic of general awareness, at least as far as modelling resource l imited 
reasoning f rom beliefs is concerned. I t is no more powerful than [the 
deduction model], and can be re-expressed in those terms." [83, p.248] 
Hence, i t seems appropriate to examine Konolige's alternative, which falls in the 
category of sentential models of beliefs which use a modal language. 
T h e Deduct ion M o d e l of belief 
The starting point of Konolige's analysis lies in the fol lowing observation: "The 
deduction model was developed in an effort to define accurate models of the beliefs 
of A I robot planning systems." [82, p.3]. Thus, the aim of his work was to develop 
a model of beliefs of art if icial , computational agents, and not a model of human 
believers. 
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Figure 2.1: Konolige's schematisation of a typical A I belief system. 
He argues that the two most important properties of such a model are: 
• agents can draw conclusions f rom an in i t i a l set of beliefs, but 
• they do not necessarily derive all the logically possible ones. 
Possible worlds logics of belief capture the first property; they do not capture the 
second. Konolige proceeds by noticing that a typical belief system has three key 
components: a database of symbolically represented beliefs, a group of inference 
rules (deduction rules) and a control strategy (see Figure 2.1, taken f rom [82, p.19]). 
"When presented w i t h a query, the belief system has a fixed, short 
amount of t ime wi th in which i t tries to answer the query, either by 
matching i t directly to some fact in the base set, or by applying inference 
rules to derive i t indirectly. The belief set ' be l (M) ' is the set of sentences 
for which the belief system M answers 'yes'." [ibid., p.19] 
W i t h respect to the problem of contradictory beliefs, Konolige describes two 
possible types of inconsistency: when both the formulae <p and -><p are in the belief 
set ' be l (M) ' , a belief system is simply said to be contradictory. However, when the 
base set is logically inconsistent, but the inference rules are not strong enough to 
derive a simple contradiction, the system w i l l evaluate true both of the mutually 
inconsistent sentences <p and ip, but w i l l evaluate false both -xp and ->ip. Hence, 
the belief system is logically inconsistent, but not contradictory. 
A n important feature of Konolige's formalization is that i t distinguishes between 
internal and external language of beliefs: while the 'base beliefs' contains a set of 
statements expressed in the internal language (generally a logical one), the external 
language is used by the 'observer' to describe the beliefs of the agent or to query 
the system. 
I t is important to notice that this distinction is only intui t ively analogous to 
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that of 'object' language and 'metalanguage'; as Konolige points out, 
" . . . we could use a metalanguage/object language structure to express 
this distinction. The external language would have terms that refer to 
sentences of the object language, and a predicate Bel(...) [ . . . ] . How-
ever, [ . . . ] the metalanguage is notationally complex. For example, 
there must be metalanguage functions that construct all of the differ-
ent boolean and quantificational expressions allowed by the internal 
language. 
Instead, we follow the simpler course of defining a belief operator whose 
argument is a sentence or sentence schema of the internal language." 
[ibid., p.28] 
Moreover, Konolige also argues that an agent uses sentences of his internal language 
to refer to the beliefs of other agents: he introduces the idea of a (modal) belief 
operator in the internal language, "an operator whose arguments are an agent S 
and a sentence (f>, and whose intended meaning is that S believes 0" [Op.cit., p.27]. 
W i t h respect to the application of inference rules, Konolige proposes to s implify 
the modelling process of the control strategies by assuming that an agent possesses 
a finite set of rules, which are applied exhaustively to the agent's base beliefs. A n 
agent then believes 4> i f f i t is possible to derive <j> f r o m the agent's base beliefs 
using the deduction rules, that is, i f <j> belongs to the deductive closure of the set 
of beliefs. 
Formally, the deductive closure can be defined as a funct ion 'close': 
close((A,p)) = d e f {(f) | A h p (f)} 
where ( A , p) constitute a deductive structure, composed of a set A of internal 
language formulae of belief and of a set p of deduction rules. The notation A h ^ 
means that (j> can be proved f rom A using only rules in p. 
Konolige defines two modal languages for describing beliefs: LB, which does not 
allow quantifying a variable which appears inside a modal context f rom outside that 
context, and LBq, which does. The language LB is in i t i a l ly defined as external, and 
is based on an internal language L0, which is a first-order language. However, as 
Konolige points out, i f the internal language needs to allow the representation of 
other agents' beliefs, "[t]he natural candidate for the internal language L is then 
LB itself." [ibid., p.32]. 
I t should be noticed that the model defined includes the possibility for an agent 
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to be undecided about a specific formula <f>; such case occurs when neither <j> nor 
->(j) belongs to the current deductive closure. 
Finally, Konolige also shows that the deduction model can be treated as a gen-
eralization of possible worlds semantics, and that any of the 'standard' possible 
worlds systems can be modelled using the deduction model (cf. [ibid., Chapter 6]). 
Furthermore, he develops a variety of proof methods for his logics, including reso-
lut ion and tableau systems [57]. 
To conclude, while Konolige's model is arguably too simplistic to capture the 
intricacies of human belief, i t represents a very interesting model of the beliefs of 
A I systems, and is therefore relevant for the purposes of this thesis. 
Bel ie f revision: R M S and A G M 
A n important aspect of the theories and implementation of belief systems consists 
of the problem of belief revision and t ru th maintenance. 
A system of beliefs is not normally seen as a 'static' set of beliefs, but rather as 
a dynamic system which must be ready to accept new informat ion in input. The 
addition of a new belief to the system might cause the rise of a contradiction, or 
the change of att i tude towards other beliefs which are supported (or challenged) 
by the new information. On the other hand, the removal of an old belief which 
has become obsolete can generate the consequent lack of support for other beliefs, 
which, in tu rn , might become uncertain, leading to a 'chain' propagation of the 
process of revision. 
Researchers in this field seem to have reached a consensus on the fact that, 
after a change has been effected on the beliefs set, the revision process should be 
aimed at restructuring i t in order to maintain intact certain required properties of 
the system. The two main properties w i t h which they have been concerned are 
consistency (or coherence) and groundedness. 
The notion of 'consistency', in its stronger connotation, requires that a system 
contains no logically contradictory beliefs. However, as already seen in Konolige, 
there are also weaker notions of consistency, which require only no 'obvious' con-
tradiction, but admit possible 'derivable' inconsistencies which are not discovered 
by the agent because of the l imi ted resources. 
The concept of 'groundedness' is normally intended to refer to the structure 
of justifications, or reasons, which constitute the basis of the beliefs: again, in 
its stronger form, this means that every belief present in the system should be 
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supported by appropriate evidence. 
The work of Harman [66], discussed in Section 2.2.1, presents two extreme 
possible approaches to belief modelling and revision, each of which puts more i m -
portance on one of the two above properties; they have been identified, respectively, 
as the foundations approach and the coherence approach (see pag. 22). 
The notion of Truth Maintenance System (TMS) or, as subsequently amended, 
Reason Maintenance System (RMS), introduced by Doyle in [28], has been viewed 
by many (e.g. [66], [55]) as a classical example of foundations approach. According 
to Doyle ([29]), 
" . . . the foundations approach divides beliefs into two classes: those 
just if ied by other beliefs, and those not just if ied by other beliefs. The 
former constitute derived beliefs, while one may view the latter as "self-
jus t i fy ing" (or non-inferential) beliefs. The model provides 'explana-
tions' of beliefs by requiring that each derived belief be supportable by 
means of some non-circular arguments f rom basic beliefs. This non-
circularity also allows one to use arguments to determine changes to 
the overall set of beliefs; one should retain a belief, even after removing 
one of its justifications, as long as independent justifications remain 
[...}."[ibid., p.34] 
On the other hand, the coherence approach to belief revision maintains that an 
agent holds some belief just as long as i t agrees w i t h the agent's other beliefs, 
independent of how they may have been inferred or adopted. Whi le one belief 
may be related to more beliefs than another, no belief is more fundamental than 
another. The so-called A G M theory of Alchourron, Gardenfors and Makinson [3] 
endorses the coherence approach, and is based on a 'conservative' approach to belief 
revision. 
Let us analyse briefly these two different models just introduced. 
Doyle's RMS can be said to be a semantic-network-based model of epistemic 
states. A semantic network typically consists of a set of nodes representing concepts 
(i.e. propositions, object of belief) and of a set of links between the nodes which 
represent 'relations' between concepts (cf. [134], [88]). 
In RMS, there are two basic types of entities: nodes, representing propositional 
beliefs, and justifications, representing reasons for beliefs. Justifications may be 
other beliefs f rom which the current belief is derived. Since each specific node can 
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have associated various justifications, these can be thought of as (labelled) links to 
(or f rom) other nodes. 
A node may be in or out, which correspond to accepting as True or False the 
belief i t represents. I f a certain belief is 'out ' in the system, the corresponding 
negation does not necessarily have to be ' i n ' . On the other hand, i f both a belief 
and its contrary are ' i n ' , then the system w i l l start a revision of the set of nodes 
and their justifications in order to re-establish consistency. 
The justifications of a node are represented as a pair of lists: an ' inl is t ' and an 
'outl ist ' . A node is in i f and only i f i t has some just i f icat ion, the inlist of which 
contains only nodes that are in and the outlist of which contains only nodes that 
are out. I n other words, the inlist contains reasons supporting the belief, whereas 
the outlist contains the possible 'objections' which have been 'ruled out ' (cf. the 
concept of knowledge in Ackermann, Section 2.2.1). 
A particular kind of just if ication, called "nonmonotonic" just if icat ion, is intro-
duced when the system does not have enough positive evidence to support a node, 
but has sufficient evidence to 'attack' its negation. For example, a belief in 'p' 
can be justif ied simply by the fact that the belief in ->p is out. This technique 
represents a way of modelling commonsense 1 default' expectations. I t uses non-
monotonic reasoning in the sense that, given the previous example, a later addition 
of a (positive) reason for ->p w i l l lead to a 'retraction' of the belief in i p \ 
Finally, a state (N, R) is a legal state of RMS i f f N consists exactly of the 
grounded consequences of the reasons (justifications) R. 
In contrast to RMS, the A G M approach models states of belief by sets of propo-
sitions. I n some treatments (e.g. that of Gardenfors [54]) states of beliefs are mod-
eled by deductively closed but not necessarily consistent sets of propositions. In 
other treatments, however, states of belief are modelled by sets of propositions that 
need not be deductively closed; these sets are normally called belief bases. Many 
of the theoretical results about belief revision concern the former type of models. 
The A G M theory considers three types of operations on belief states. For each 
belief state K and proposition l p \ we have: 
E x p a n s i o n : Expanding K w i th p, wr i t ten K+p, means adding p to K 
and requiring that the result be a (possibly inconsistent) 
belief state; 
Contract ion: Contracting K w i t h respect to p, wr i t t en K — p, means 
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removing p f rom K in such a way to result in a belief 
state; 
Revi s ion: Revising K w i th p, wr i t ten K + p, means adding p to K 
in such a way that the result is a consistent belief state. 
Expansion is naturally defined in terms of the union of the set of beliefs and the new 
proposition. Contraction and revision, on the other hand, have no natural defini-
tions, only the standard requirement that the change made be as small as possible 
so as to minimize unnecessary loss of knowledge and resources. This requirement 
does not define these operations since there are usually several ways to get r id of 
some belief. Nevertheless, Alchourron, Gardenfors and Makinson formulate and 
motivate sets of rationali ty postulates that these operations should satisfy [3]. 
Al though Harman and Gardenfors regard these two approaches to belief mod-
elling and revision as antithetical, Doyle argues in [29, p.30] that they differ " . . . less 
than has been supposed, in that the fundamental concerns of the coherence ap-
proach for conservativism in belief revision apply in exaclty the same way in the 
foundations approach." In fact, as he clarifies later on, "the RMS update algorithm 
was designed to attempt to update states conservatively. That is, i f one takes the 
current state (N, R) and modifies R to obtain R', RMS should choose a new legal 
state (N1, R') w i t h a set of nodes N' as close as possible to the current set N" 
[ibid., p.35]. 
Moreover, because of the main objection raised to the foundations approach, 
namely, that i t involves excessive computational expense for bounded resource 
agents, Doyle has more recently introduced the idea of local coherence and ground-
edness (cf. [30], [31]). 
Al though retaining the idea that a reason maintenance system keeps track of 
what information has been computed f rom what, he takes the purpose of the RMS 
to be "to maintain a description of the overall system's state of belief that is as 
good as possible given the reasoner's purposes and resources" [31]. 
To make the RMS adaptable to rational control of the effort expended on re-
visions, Doyle divides the belief system into parts, called locales, each of which 
may be revised or preserved separately. Each locale contains its own set of beliefs, 
and maintenance/revision instructions are defined in relation to the locales of the 
system. These instructions may indicate that changes should propagate wi th in the 
locale containing the belief, or to its neighbours, or globally; or that all beliefs 
in the locale should be grounded w i t h respect to the locale, w i t h respect to its 
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neighbours, or globally. 
Because of this partiali ty, the overall set of beliefs may exhibit inconsistencies 
by including conflicting beliefs f r o m different locales; moreover, the RMS w i l l be 
sometimes unable to track all the consequences of all beliefs, which w i l l result 
to be not fu l ly grounded. However, specialized locales corresponding to specific 
problems w i l l be kept grounded in the axioms formulat ing these problems: "[t]he 
system of beliefs can thus be thought of as 'islands' of groundedness floating in a 
sea of ungrounded beliefs." [31]. 
This concept clearly fits into the idea of a cognitive state in which mult iple belief 
systems exist in relative isolation f rom each other, present in Armstrong's (and 
Stalnaker's) work (see p. 17). Moreover, as in the views of Ackermann, Armstrong 
and Harman, at the basis of Doyle's work lies the idea that the amount of sufficient 
evidence which should be kept as a support for the beliefs of a bounded resource 
rational agent is highly context-dependent and essentially subjective. 
2.3 Discourses and arguments 
The definition of a theory of discourse is one of the main problems of the field of 
linguistics. The two main facets of this problem, discourse analysis and discourse 
generation, are str ict ly related to each other. 
I t would seem quite straightforward that different models of discourse genera-
t ion lead to different approaches to the problem of discourse analysis and under-
standing, and, thus, one could argue, the problem consists simply of deciding which 
is the most appropriate model for discourse generation, and the understanding bi t 
w i l l follow as a 'corollary'. 
Unfortunately, since we do not have, in general, direct access to the mental pro-
cesses which govern the construction of a discourse, one of the approaches adopted 
consists exactly of starting f rom the results — that is, f rom the available exam-
ples of actual discourses — in order to identify some 'clues' on the mechanisms 
underlying their generation. 
Therefore, i t is possible to identify two different approaches for the development 
of theories of discourse: in a "top-down" approach, a certain model of discourse 
generation is assumed, according to which specific discourses can be produced. The 
validity of the theory can then be tested by comparing the discourses which i t can 
generate w i t h the examples found in the real world, and, also, by testing the results 
of the application of such theory to the problem of (real world) discourse analysis 
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and understanding. 
On the other hand, the "bottom-up" approach utilizes the material available 
to 'induce' a general theory of discourse analysis and evaluation. This approach 
represents also a fundamental source of ' inspiration' for devising models of dis-
course generation and, therefore, constitutes a useful 'feed-back' for the top-down 
approach. 
Intuit ively, a discourse can be defined as a linearised structure of semantically 
related statements generated by a single source in order to achieve a specific com-
municative goal3. 
As specified in Section 1.2, the scope of this thesis has been restricted in two 
ways: first of all , i t has been l imited to the 'high-level' aspects of the problem of 
automatic discourse generation, concerned w i t h the format ion of the basic structure 
of the message; the lower-level issues related to the actual 'surface-features' of the 
discourse and its realisation in N L w i l l not be treated here. Secondly, the class of 
discourses considered has been restricted to that of persuasive discourses, that is, 
discourses which are generated w i t h the goal of convincing the hearer about the 
validity or the fallacy of a specific proposition. 
As a matter of facts, a consequence of the latter assumption is that other classes 
of linguistic structures can be included under the broad category of persuasive 
discourses. For example, w i t h respect to the definit ion of argument, O'Keefe [104] 
distinguishes two meanings of this term: one refers to the structure created to 
support a case, whereas the other one to the activity of disputation. The former 
meaning can be considered intuit ively equivalent to that of persuasive discourse, 
as defined above. 
Moreover, consider the following quotation, taken f rom Reed and Long [120]: 
"One of the most prolific forms of persuasive argumentation, however, 
is the monologue [ . . . ] . Monologue [ . . . ] is a 'speaker-oriented' activity, 
relying solely on the speaker's knowledge, both of the domain of the 
argument, and also of the (presumed) hearer knowledge (of both the 
domain of the argument and the speaker, etc.). [ . . . ] [A] persuasive 
monologue has an aim — to alter the beliefs of an audience (most 
usually to convince [ . . . ]) ."[Op.cit .] 
I n this context, the form of persuasive argumentation considered — monologue — 
3 This definition is based on works which will be surveyed in this section. 
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seems to be analogous to the concept of persuasive discourse. Finally, according to 
Freeman [47, p.5], "Arguments are discourses in which certain statements are put 
forward to support others." 
Thus, taking into account the above mentioned restrictions which apply to the 
scope of this thesis, i t seems appropriate to include in this survey the description 
of some of the most representative theories concerning the structure of discourses 
and arguments which are relevant to the area of automated persuasive discourse 
generation; when recognizable, such models w i l l be classified under the two broad 
categories of top-down and bottom-up approaches. 
2.3.1 Discourse structure 
According to Grosz et al., the analysis of a variety of types of discourse (including 
arguments and explanations) has established that discourses divide into discourse 
segments, and that these segments may bear different kinds of relations to one 
another [62, p.439]. 
The question of how these segments can be identified is s t i l l the object of contro-
versy in the field of computational linguistics; however, two major t radi t ional ap-
proaches can be identified: the formalist and the functionalist perspectives (cf. [74]). 
According to typical formalist analysis, discourse exhibits internal structure, 
where structural segments encapsulates semantic units that are closely related. 
Typically, the theories are used to explain pronominalisation and quantifier scoping 
effects. The theories tend to concentrate on the development of formalisms for 
discourse segments and the discourse structure itself, which usually is a tree wi th 
clause-level utterances or groups of them as the nodes. The theories tend to be 
weak on the actual contents of the structure, such as the precise interrelationships 
between segments and the communicative purposes of the discourse. 
From the functionalist point of view, discourse exhibits internal structure, where 
the segments are defined by the communicative goals. The theories tend to con-
centrate on the intentions of the speaker and on the ways these goals are reflected 
in the discourse structure, often as interrelationships between segments (cf. [90]). 
The theories are strong on the particular intersegment relations, but tend to be 
weak on the global f o rm of the discourse structure. 
Some of the more influential formalist works are represented by Kamp's Dis-
course Representation Theory (DRT) [79], and by the works of Polanyi [111] and 
Cohen [23]. On the other hand, two representative examples of fuctionalist ap-
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proaches can be found in the works of Hobbs [70] and Mann and Thompson [91], 
the latter being by far the most relevant in this context for its use in the field 
of discourse planning. Finally, a combination of the formalist and functionalist 
ideas is embodied in the theory of discourse developed by Grosz and Sidner [63], 
who describe an analysis of discourse based on three separate structures: the for-
malist segmentation of the utterances, the functionalist structure of the speaker's 
intentions, and the attentional state. Let us examine briefly the three most inf lu-
ential works, namely, those of Kamp [79], Mann and Thompson [91] and Grosz and 
Sidner [63]. 
Discourse Representat ion T h e o r y ( D R T ) 
Kamp's D R T [79] consists of a (bottom-up) two-step approach to a semantics for 
natural language. I t provides an algorithm for mapping a fragment of English onto 
a system of representations and then defines a mapping f r o m these representations 
into a first order model to determine t ru th conditions [9]. 
Central to D R T is the notion of Discourse Representations (DR) , which are 
described by Kamp as mental representations which a person forms as a response to 
the input (s)he receives. Sometimes a representation w i l l involve structured families 
of DRs (often representations of conditional sentences), and then this structured 
grouping w i l l be called a Discourse Representation Structure (DRS). 
Kamp claims that each sentence or discourse induces the construction of such 
a DRS, and only i f the sentence or discourse is fa i r ly simple w i l l the DRS consist 
of only one DR. He adds that among the DRs w i t h i n a DRS there is always one 
which represents the discourse as a whole. 
A n example of construction of D R is illustrated by the two sentences "Pedro 
owns Chiquita. He beats her." [79, p.284]. Symbols are assigned to the two elements 
contained in the first sentence, hence Pedro and Chiqui ta become ' u ' and V , 
respectively. The D R produced is "it owns v". As a consequence of the second 
sentence, the D R produced is uu beats v". 
The mapping f rom sentences — or rather, f r o m their syntactic parses — into 
DRSs is performed following a DRS construction algorithm, which operates on the 
parse tree of a sentence in roughly a top-down manner, and is typically applied to 
such a parse tree wi th in the content of an already established DRS representing the 
information provided by antecedent discourse, or, more generally, by the context 
of use. DRSs thus determine the t ru th conditions of a sentence 'S" when i t is 
interpreted in isolation f r o m its surrounding context, but they also reveal how the 
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context of S"s use combines wi th the information contained in S (cf. [67]). 
The DRS construction algori thm is intended to represent in a highly idealized 
way the processing of a verbal input by a recipient; the outputs of the DRS algo-
r i t hm, the DRSs, are intended to represent the information that a hearer recovers 
f rom a verbal input . 
Kamp's theory yields a treatment of indefinite and definite noun phrases that 
has made an important contribution to understand the anaphoric and "pseudo 
referential" behaviour of indefinites (cf. [9]). Even though this work has been 
considered relevant as representing one of the first attempts to take the discourse 
structure into account, the theory is extremely l imi ted, as i t does not examine 
motivations, communicative intentions and goals, which are considered to be at 
the basis of the production of the rich complexities of discourse phenomena. 
R h e t o r i c a l S truc ture T h e o r y ( R S T ) 
Mann and Thompson's RST [91] constitutes an analytical too l for describing the 
structure of text. I t is based on a study involving some hundreds of paragraphs 
(ranging over advertisements, scientific articles, letters, newspapers texts, and oth-
ers) and proposes a set of approximately 25 relations to represent the relations that 
hold w i th in normal English texts. 
The theory holds that the relations are used recursively, relating ever smaller 
segments of adjacent text, down to the single clause level; i t assumes that a para-
graph is coherent only i f all of its parts can be included under one overarching 
relation. Most relations have a characteristic English cue word or phrase which 
informs the hearer how to relate the adjacent clauses; larger blocks of clauses are 
then related similarly, so that, eventually, the role played by each clause can be 
determined w i t h respect to the whole. 
Most relations contain two parts, a Nucleus, which identifies the major, central 
contents of the segment, and a Satellite, specifying more subordinate, qualifying 
material. Moreover, each relation has an intended effect, or funct ion, which de-
scribes the expected consequences of that span of text on the hearer's attitudes 
and beliefs. 
By way of example, the relation 'Evidence' (taken f rom [ibid., p.251]) 4 is re-
ported below: 
4 I n the relation, 'N' and 'S' stand for Nucleus and Satellite, whereas 'R' and ' W are the 
equivalent of hearer and speaker (respectively, Reader and Writer). 
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Relation Name: EVIDENCE 
Constraints on N: R might not believe N to a degree satisfactory to W [... ] 
Constraints on S: R believes S or will find i t credible 
Constraints on the 
N+S combination: R's comprehending S increases R's belief of N 
The effect: R's belief of N is increased 
Locus of the effect: N 
Although the interpretation of RST relations as operators for discourse planning 
(cf. [71], [74]) has produced results of significant popularity (work in this context 
will be described in more details in Section 2.4), one of the principal criticisms of 
this theory lies, once again, in the lack of specification of the intentional structure 
of the discourse (cf. [99]). 
This problem can be seen as a consequence of the fact that RST was developed 
as a bottom-up approach to the study of the structure of the discourse, whereas 
the decomposition of communicative goals and intentions seems to be more a top-
down concept of discourse structure generation for theories which assume discourse 
construction to be a goal-driven process. An important example of such approach 
is given by the work of Grosz and Sidner, which we now move on to consider. 
The work of Grosz and Sidner 
In the theory presented by Grosz and Sidner in [63], discourse structure is composed 
of three separate but interrelated components: the structure of the sequence of 
utterances (called the linguistic structure), a structure of communicative purposes 
(called the intentional structure), and the state of focus of attention (called the 
attentional state). 
The linguistic structure consists of "segments of the discourse into which the 
utterances naturally aggregate." The intentional structure captures the purposes 
which lie behind the segments as well as the relationships among them. The at-
tentional state is an abstraction of the focus of attention of the speaker and of the 
audience as the discourse unfolds. It is realized through a dynamic stack — derived 
from the linguistic structure — which records, for each segment, a list of objects, 
properties and relations that are salient at that point of the discourse. 
The linguistic structure consists of the discourse segments and an embedding 
relationship that can hold between them, and which reflects the relationship among 
elements of the intentional structure. When a segment boundary is crossed and a 
speaker moves from one segment to another, cue phrases (such as "On the other 
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hand", "In contrast", etc.) can be argued as indicating a switch in the speaker 
attention or intention. 
According to the theory, the discourse has an overall purpose (the Discourse 
Purpose, or DP), constituting the specific intention that underlies engaging in the 
particular discourse. Moreover, each segment is associated with a specific Discourse 
Segment Purpose (DSP), which specifies how this segment contributes to achieving 
the overall DP. 
Three examples of possible intentions which could serve as DP or DSPs are 
quoted below (taken from [ibid., p.179]): 
1. "Intend that some agent intend to perform some physical task. Example: 
Intend that Ruth intend to fix the flat tire. 
2. Intend that some agent believe some fact. Example: Intend that Ruth believe 
the campfire has started. 
3. Intend that some agent believe that one fact supports another. Example: 
Intend that Ruth believe the smell of smoke provides evidence that the campfire 
is started." 
Notice that while the first two intentions concern an agent's (supposedly, the 
hearer's) belief towards a specific fact (case 2) and towards an agent's own at-
titude about performing an action (case 1), the last intention concerns the agent's 
belief in a relation of support between different beliefs. 
Although the theory presented by Grosz and Sidner can be seen as a milestone 
in the study of the discourse structure, it is often argued that the main thrust of 
their ideas on focus and topic rely too heavily upon the syntactic features, and 
that their interest in the linguistic structure overshadows concern with intention 
(cf. [77, p.43]). 
More recently, work has started on a principled unification of the tripartite 
distinction proposed by Grosz and Sidner and the Rhetorical Structure Theory 
(cf. [102]), whereby the notion of 'dominance' introduced in [63] is equated with 
that of nuclearity of the RST. Along this line is also the account given by Hovy, 
which is discussed below. 
Hovy's computational definition 
Surveying the text planning systems of several researchers for a variety of domains 
and taking into account various theoretical works, including that of Grosz and 
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Sidner [63], Mann and Thompson [91], Polanyi [111], and the work on intention 
recognition of Allen and Perrault [5] and others, Hovy presented in [74] a general 
formulation of plan-based English discourse; such formulation is summarized below, 
and concludes this survey on the works concerning the theory of discourse structure. 
1. Discourse. A discourse is a structured collection of clauses. By their semantic 
relatedness, clauses are grouped into segments; the discourse structure is 
expressed by the nesting of segments within each other according to specific 
relationships. A discourse can thus be represented as a tree structure: at the 
top, the discourse is governed by a single root node; at the leaves, the basic 
segments are single grammatical clauses. 
2. Purpose. Each discourse segment has an associated Discourse Segment Pur-
pose, which is represented at each node of the tree (including the root). Each 
DSP consists of one or more communicative goals the speaker has with re-
spect to the hearer's mental state. In a successful discourse, the contents of 
each segment achieve its DSP. 
3. Segment. The content of a discourse segment is either: 
• an ordered list of discourse segments, together with one or more inter-
segment discourse relations that hold between them; or 
© a single discourse segment; or 
• the semantic material to be communicated, usually expressible as a sin-
gle clause in English. This material often takes the form of a set of 
knowledge base assertions. 
It should be noticed that this definition integrates the notions of intentional and 
linguistic structure introduced by Grosz and Sidner, and accounts for the represen-
tation of the RST intersegment relations proposed by Mann and Thompson. 
2.3.2 Argument structure 
As for discourse before, works on argument structure can be roughly divided into 
two main approaches, namely, bottom-up and top-down. In this context, the two 
approaches have led to the generation of informal structural models and analysis 
techniques (in the former case), and to the production of various formal models (in 
the latter case) aimed at extending standard logic representations to deal with the 
characteristics of naturally occurring arguments. 
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Both classes' most relevant and representative examples are surveyed in the two 
following subsections. 
Informal approaches 
The most common form into which arguments are analysed is an intuitive frame-
work which shares the main principles with those contained in the foundations 
of the rhetorical analysis, which, ever since Aristotle, has considered arguments 
to consist of three basic elements: minor premiss; major premiss; so conclusion, 
(cf. [48]). 
This standard treatment is well summarized by Freeman [47], who describes the 
four basic structures to be found in arguments as divergent (where one premiss 
con support several conclusions), serial (where a single premiss leads to a single 
conclusion, which may in turn constitute the single premiss to another conclusion, 
etc.), convergent (where two or more premisses contribute independently to a single 
conclusion) and linked (where two or more premisses together contribute to a single 
conclusion). These structures are graphically represented in Figure 2.2, as from [47, 
p.2]. 
0 
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Figure 2.2: The four basic standard argument structures. 
Complete arguments are composed of various combinations of these forms, 
where premisses to a super-argument can be the conclusion of a subargument. 
The alternative representation of argument structure traditionally rival to the 
standard treatment consists of the theory proposed by Toulmin in The Uses of 
Argument [142]. Under Toulmin schema (see Figure 2.3) a claim, C, is supported by 
a datum D, qualified to a degree Q. The support relationship is, in turn, supported 
by a warrant, W, which is founded upon a backing B. Finally, an argument can 
include a caveat anticipating a rebuttal, R. 
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D So, Q, C 
Harry was 
bora in 
So, presumably Harry is a 
British subject 
Bermuda 
Since W Unless 
R 
Since Unless 
Bermuda will 
A man born in Both his parents were 
aliens / he has become 
generally be a 
British subject 
a naturalised American /.. . 
On account of 
B 
On the account of 
The following statutes and 
other legal provisions... 
Figure 2.3: Toulmin schema (from 'The Uses of Argument', p.104) 
Toulmin introduces the notion of warrant by imagining our being challenged 
with the so-called 'question of relevance', i.e. "Why is that reason relevant to the 
claim?", or "How did you get there?", posed after the assertion of the datum D 
and claim C [142, p.98] [47, p.38]. 
I t should be noticed that the notion of 'warrant' represents, in an argument 
structure, the equivalent of a 'general belief in the work of Armstrong (see Sec-
tion 2.2.1). This concept is also mentioned by Grosz and Sidner in the example on 
possible Discourse Segment Purposes (see page 41), and by Ryle in [125]. As Free-
man himself points out in [47, p.62], "Given an argument 'p, so q' we may form its 
associated hypothetical, Hf p, then q\ For the argument to be valid, the associated 
hypothetical must be true. [... ] [W]e must admit in a candid formulation of the 
argument, the premise is lp and (if p, then q)\ not just lp', as might be supposed." 
At this point, Freeman claims that the validity of the argument 
Arg p and (if p, then q), so q 
would require a further associated hypothetical, therefore producing a vicious infi-
nite regress. However, he seems not to realize that the form of 'Arg' reflects that of 
the classical Modus Ponens rule, which is universally accepted without any further 
need for justification. 
With respect to the concept of warrant, Freeman declares: "We should em-
phasize that for us, linked structure is exclusively connected with the question 
of relevance." [ibid., p.94]. In other words, according to Freeman, the relevance 
question — at the origins of the presence of the warrant — gives rise simply to 
additional premisses in a linked structure. Hence, since no structural differentiation 
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exists between the elements linked, Toulmin's warrant and datum (and backing) 
are simply seen as different premisses of the same conclusion [ibid., p.88]. 
In the standard representation, a convergent argument is one in which a con-
clusion is supported by disjunctive subarguments. However, according to Freeman, 
distinguishing between arguments which have a linked structure from those which 
have a convergent structure is particularly difficult a task. He considers, among 
others, the following example of real argument: 
La Petite Coloumb has the best chef in town. The live entertainment 
there is outstanding. The menu is also quite varied. Thus, we should 
go there for dinner, (from [ibid., p.11]) 
He comments: "Each premise [... ] gives us some reason for the conclusion, leading 
us to think the structure is convergent. But does any of the three, by itself, 
properly support, give us a good argument for, the conclusion? Would basing 
our decision to go to La Petite Coloumb for dinner on just one of these factors be 
hasty?" [ibid., p. 11]. 
In order to supply a representation for this type of arguments, Freeman intro-
duces a further structure, derived from the convergent one by interconnecting the 
independent premisses with a horizontal line: "We might think of our separate, 
independent premises as weights which we place on one pan of a balance scale to 
support some conclusion." [ibid., p.96]. 
Freeman is then led to believe that, since the premisses of a linked structure 
must be generated by a relevance question, and the two premisses A and B of the 
argument "Since A and since B, then (A A B)" do not 'answer' that question, the 
new 'pan-convergence' structure should be used instead to represent conjunctive 
arguments as such. 
Most of the research in argumentation theory is not, however, aimed at simply 
diagramming the structure of arguments, but, rather, at evaluating their validity. 
Adopting a taxonomy proposed by Blair [14], there are five basic approaches to 
argument evaluation. 
Firstly, an argument is good if it is logically good, i.e. i f its premisses are true 
and the inferences are deductively valid. This constitutes the original aim of logic 
as construed by Aristotle — logic having been developed to determine whether 
or not an argument is valid. However, this condition is generally too strong for 
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real arguments which often make use of non-deductive inference and of premisses 
which are plausible — or acceptable to all parties — rather than true. Secondly, 
an argument can be evaluated through the use of schemes, specific argument forms 
to which empirical data can be compared: each scheme is associated with a set of 
critical questions, by which validity can be determined. Thirdly, arguments might 
be assessed by reference to criteria of relevance, sufficiency and acceptability: pre-
misses must be relevant to conclusion, must represent sufficient support, and must 
be acceptable to arguer and audience. Fourthly, argument validity can be equated 
with absence of fallacy. A list of the most common fallacies which, though illogical, 
are very common in natural language and are used (sometimes inadvertently) to 
strengthen an argument without actually supplying factual support, can be found 
in [118, p.159]. 
Finally, in a subjective and context-dependent view of argument evaluation, an 
argument can be defined valid if it is persuasive to a specific audience or hearer 
(cf. [108]). This evaluation technique must take into account issues of effective 
communication in real situations, and consider the various socio-psychological fac-
tors which affect natural argumentation (cf. [118, p.31] for a discussion on these 
aspects). 
Wilson's 'The anatomy of Argument1 [147] represents a typical example of texts 
on argument evaluation. I t contains most of the elements listed in Blair's taxon-
omy. For example, Wilson considers both the validity of deductive and the strength 
of inductive arguments, and the relevance, support and acceptability of the pre-
misses. He develops a schema consisting of nine separate steps which should be 
followed to fully evaluate an argument. Finally, he also considers the conditions 
for the successful communication of an argument in terms of hearer's and speaker's 
obligations with respect to issues such as the attention, the communication of the 
structure and the problem of recall [147, p.347]. 
Other similar accounts on the representation of the structure of arguments and 
their assessment can be found, for example, in Fisher [40] and Fogelin [41]. 
Formal approaches 
There is an increasing interest in using argumentation for systems based upon 
formal logic which need to reason about the real world and, in particular, which 
must be able to cope with uncertain and incomplete information. Reasoning about 
such domains can seldom employ strict deductive inference; rather, it becomes 
necessary to use some weaker notion of lsupporf which, often, is associated to the 
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idea of defeasibility or non-monotonicity. 
An interesting example is represented by the 'Logic of Argumentation' (LA) 
theory, proposed by Krause et al. [84], which uses a labelled deductive system [49] to 
record sets of supports and determine acceptability. In LA, propositions are labelled 
with a representation of the arguments which support their validity. Arguments 
may then be aggregated to collect more information about the potential validity of 
the propositions of interest. 
I t is interesting to note that, as Krause et al. point out, in LA the "property of 
classical logic and intuitionistic in which support for the contradiction is propagated 
to all propositions is rejected. This was for several reasons. Primarily we wish to be 
free to choose how, or whether, contradiction should be resolved; the significance 
of a level of contradiction may differ in different problem solving contexts." [84, 
p.130]. 
Finally, the authors claim that the theory "provides a uniform framework 
which incorporates a number of numerical and symbolic techniques for assign-
ing subjective confidences to propositions on the basis of their supporting argu-
ments" [ibid., p. 113]. This approach, motivated by the need to reason under uncer-
tainty (cf. [34]), has successfully been applied in a number of medical domains [43]. 
Another successful formal approach to dealing with uncertain and incomplete 
information is argument-based defeasible reasoning (see, for example, [113]). An 
interesting example of this approach is represented by the work of Dung [32], who 
presents a formalization of the idea of 'acceptability' of an argument. 
The main component of Dung's formal theory is represented by an argumenta-
tion framework, consisting of a pair (AR,attacks), where AR is a set of arguments, 
and attacks is a binary relation on AR. Intuitively, an argument A attacks another 
argument B i f f it supports the negation of B. Given a specific argumentation 
framework, an argument A e AR is acceptable with respect to a set S of argu-
ments iff for each argument B e AR which attacks A, B is attacked by S. In 
other words, an argument is acceptable iff all the possible objection are ruled out 
by other arguments. I t is interesting to notice that this notion clearly corresponds 
to the concept of knowledge as proposed by Ackermann in [1], which was discussed 
in Section 2.2.1. 
Dung claims that the theory he develops demonstrates that many of the major 
approaches to non-monotonic reasoning and logic programming are different forms 
of argumentation. In his view, " . . . a defeasible statement can be believed only in 
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the absence of any evidence to the contrary, which is very much like the principle 
of argumentation." [ibid., p.324]. 
In [114], Pollock agrees with Dung on the notion that an argument R is a 'de-
feated for Q iff R is a reason for denying Q. However, he also points out that 
defeaters can be divided into rebutting and undercutting: whilst the former kind 
supports the negation of the claim, the latter kind attacks the connection between 
'supporter' and 'supportee' (cf. [114] [pp.379-380]). This is equivalent to attacking 
the 'associated hypothetical' of an argument, according to the description of Free-
man [47] discussed above, or, in Toulmin's terms, i t corresponds to attacking the 
thesis that the warrant supports. 
Other representative examples of formal approaches to argumentation can be 
found in [144] and [116], the latter work being specifically oriented to the problem 
of reasoning in a 'legal' domain. 
Recently, argumentation has been seen as a direct means of negotiation and 
persuasion between agents (e.g. [123]). Parsons and Jennings [105] extended the 
defeasible argumentation system of Krause et al. [84] such that one agent could 
propose an argument (for a specific course of action) to another, and the recipient 
would then evaluate the argument subjectively, that is, on the basis of its own 
beliefs, intentions and plans. The evaluation is performed by searching for rebutting 
and undercutting counter-arguments. 
Nevertheless, as Reed and Long point out in [119], defeasible reasoning across 
rational, autonomous agents seems to miss the intuitions of how agents are func-
tioning in reality. Following an account such as that of Dung [32] or Vreeswijk [144], 
a speaker agent S trying to convince a hearer agent H would communicate exactly 
those supporting arguments which together either defeat, or are undefeated by, all 
the rebutting and undercutting arguments that S presumes H to believe. However, 
" . . . in the real world, S may or may not know (or even be aware of 
the existence of) the [H's counterarguments] [ . . . ] . I t is not the case, 
therefore, that S constructs her argument through anticipating H's pos-
sible counterarguments — rather, she is simply 'building a case' for her 
conclusion. Clearly, this process is going to involve consideration of 
what she thinks her hearer believes ( [ . . . ] ) . But it does not require S to 
perform 'H-reasoning' to produce the arguments which she must ensure 
are defeated by her own." [119] 
In conclusion, although the process of argument generation can be seen primarily 
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as showing evidence to support a claim, the possibility of including rebutting and 
undercutting defeaters in the model seems to be still necessary, as the presence of 
such arguments in the hearer's belief structure could have been actually detected 
by the speaker. In this situation, these beliefs would form a useful basis for the 
development of an alternative plan of persuasion in case of failure of the main one. 
This is the point of view adopted by Garagnani et al. in [51]. 
2.4 Planning 
Planning constitutes one of the basic techniques adopted in the area of general 
problem solving. In a planning paradigm, states of the world are modelled as 
sets of propositions, and actions are modelled with operator schemes, representing 
general actions that can be performed under certain conditions and which lead to 
specific changes in the current world. Given a specific initial state of the world and 
a set of propositions representing the goals which have to be achieved, a correct 
plan solution consists of a sequence of actions (steps) which transform the initial 
state into one in which all the goals hold. Each action consists of applying an 
operator to a certain situation in which the specified conditions of that operator 
(also called preconditions) are verified; the changes produced by the action (i.e. its 
effects) lead to a new state of the world, in which another operator can be applied, 
and so forth. 
According to the chronological analysis of the history of planning presented 
by Chapman in [20], at the basis of the development of this field lies the General 
Problem Solver (GPS) [103], which introduced the idea of means-ends analysis. 
The basic techniques that GPS adopted consists of adding an operator to a plan 
to achieve some of the current goals of the problem ('step addition') and taking 
the preconditions of the operator as new goals ('subgoaling') to be added to the 
remaining ones. 
In 1971, through the implementation of STRIPS [38], Fikes and Nilsson intro-
duced a general model of operator scheme in which the effects are specified by two 
lists of propositions (add and delete lists) representing the only changes that that 
operator will produce on the state to which it is applied. 
Still according to Chapman, domain-independent conjunctive planning began 
in 1973 with Sussman's HACKER [137], which contained many of the ideas which 
would have been adopted by later 'nonlinear' planners. For example, the concept 
of 'promotion', which consists of constraining one operator to follow another in a 
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plan in order to avoid conflict ('clobbering') between the effects of the former and 
the preconditions of the latter. 
The first truly nonlinear planner was Sacerdoti's NOAH [127]. The important 
idea which NOAH introduces is that a plan (at least while i t is being constructed) 
does not have to specify fully the order of execution of its steps. In other words, 
a plan becomes only a partial order on steps. NONLIN [140] extends NOAH by 
adding backtracking to enable a better search for a correct plan solution. In MOL-
GEN [135], Stefik formalised the concept of 'constraints' (order and codesignation) 
imposed on a partial order plan; Wilkins' SIPE [146] was based on the same idea, 
but incorporated various new techniques. 
This group of planning systems is followed by Chapman's TWEAK [20]. Chap-
man bases his work on the formulation of a criterion (the so-called Modal Truth 
Criterion) which establishes the conditions that guarantee a proposition to hold 
(necessarily or possibly) at a specific point of a partial plan. The algorithm which 
TWEAK implements consists of imposing the conditions specified by the criterion 
through a non-deterministic procedure. 
Through this formalisation, Chapman succeeds in proving the completeness and 
correctness of his system. Nevertheless, as he points out in [20], this theoretical 
result is of little use in practice, as the "restrictions on action representation make 
TWEAK almost useless as a real world planner." [ibid., p.350]. The restrictions 
Chapman is mentioning are essentially the following two: 1) the action representa-
tion does not allow the effects of operators to depend on the situation in which they 
are applied; and 2) all changes made by an action must be explicitly represented 
as effects of the operator. 
The essential difficulty with extended action representation, as Chapman puts 
i t , lies in the frame problem [76] [95]. The frame problem is traditionally stated as 
that of discovering what propositions are left unchanged by an action; thus, i t can 
be viewed as corresponding to the problem of finding an efficiently implementable 
'Modal Truth Criterion'. Unfortunately, in this respect, Chapman demonstrates 
the validity of the following negative result: 
"Intractability Theorem The problem of determining whether a propo-
sition is necessarily true in a nonlinear plan whose action representation 
is sufficiently strong to represent conditional actions, dependency of ef-
fects on input situations or derived side-effects is NP-hard." [ibid., p.352] 
Although this and other negative theoretical results "have caused some researchers 
to question the whole symbolic A l paradigm" [151, p. 140], various attempts have 
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been subsequently made in order to improve the efficiency of planning systems, 
and, at the same time, to extend the expressiveness of the limited STRIPS repre-
sentation. 
For example, in the former category of attempts falls the idea of distinguishing, 
in the effects of an operator, between primary and side effects. As Fink and Yang 
point out in [39], the distinction can lead to significant computational savings by 
pruning the search space without compromising either soundness or completeness 
of the resulting planning algorithm. This idea has led, for example, to the develop-
ment of systems which explicitly handle the links between one operator's postcon-
ditions and another's preconditions — 'causal' links — which could be threatened 
by the introduction of other operators in the partial plan. Partial order causal link 
(POCL) planners such as UCPOP [107] and SNLP [94], representing two examples 
of such approach, have been demonstrated to be sound and complete. UCPOP also 
addresses the restrictions on the expressiveness of the STRIPS language, adopting 
Pednault's ADL language [106] which permits the representation of conditional 
effects and universal quantification. 
In order to cope with the complexity of real world domains, the proposal of 
using abstraction as a technique for improving the efficiency of planning (originally 
introduced by Sacerdoti in ABSTRIPS [126]) has also been reconsidered. At the 
basis of the notion of abstraction lies the idea of initially tackling the problem in 
a simplified representation of the world; once a solution has been found in such 
abstract level, the system can 'refine' i t by moving to a more detailed level of 
domain description (cf. [44] for an account on hierarchical planning approaches). 
An example of planning system which adopts a hierarchical approach and also 
exploits the advantages of a causal-link paradigm is represented by the AbNLP 
planner of Fox and Long [45] [46], in which operators are divided into 'abstract' 
and 'primitive'. An abstract operator consists of an external shell and of a body. 
The shell specifies the preconditions (filters5) and the effects (add and delete list) of 
the operator, whereas the body contains the list of goals which need to be achieved 
to realize the abstract action represented by the operator. In other words, the 
body specifies the goals which will have to be considered in the next level of plan-
refinement. A primitive operator differs from an abstract one in that its body is 
empty. 
Another approach to the improvement of planning performance is represented 
5Notice that in contrast to the STRIPS operators preconditions, the mechanism of subgoaling 
is not allowed to be applied on filters. 
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by Prodigy [143], an architecture based on the idea of incorporating machine learn-
ing in planning and problem solving. Prodigy consists of a core general-purpose 
hierarchical planner and several learning modules that refine both the planning do-
main knowledge and the control knowledge to guide the search process effectively. 
A different perspective on solving planning problems has been proposed more 
recently by Blum and Furst with 'Graphplan' [15]. In their system, rather than 
immediately embarking upon a search as in standard planning methods, the algo-
rithm begins by explicitly constructing a structure called a 'Planning Graph' which 
encodes the planning problem in such a way that many useful constraints inherent 
in the problem become explicitly available to reduce the amount of search needed. 
A Planning Graph is a directed, leveled graph with two kinds of nodes (propo-
sitions and actions nodes) and three kinds of edges (preconditions, add and delete 
edges). The first level of a Planning Graph is a proposition level and consists of 
one node for each proposition in the initial state. The next level consists of all 
the possible actions (ground operators) that can be applied to the initial level; a 
further level of propositions follows — obtained as a result of the applications of 
the actions — which will contain all the propositions possibly true after one step 
(consisting of one or many parallel actions) has been executed. The procedure is 
then repeated on the newly created level of propositions, until either a level con-
taining all the goals is reached and a plan can be found through a backward search 
through the graph, or a specific condition of termination is detected, indicating 
that the problem is unsolvable. 
The Graphplan algorithm has been shown to be sound and complete, and to 
return always the shortest parallel-step plan solution, i f a solution exists; the sys-
tem's performance has been compared with that of different planners (including 
SNLP [94] and Prodigy [143]) and has produced competitive results in various do-
mains (cf. [15]). However, one of the limits of Graphplan consists of the fact that it 
adopts an impoverished representation (namely, STRIPS formalism) for the oper-
ators description. To overcome this limitation, Koehler et al. [80] have produced a 
system (IPP) which extends the language of Graphplan to a subset of ADL [106], 
allowing conditional and universally quantified effects in operators and preserving 
soundness, completeness and the ability to terminate when the problem is unsolv-
able. IPP has been compared with Graphlan and other planners that support 
ADL; the results suggest that the system usually outperforms the others, and that 
the effected extension of the language does not lead to a computational overhead 
(cf. [80]). 
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Finally, an alternative approach to the problem of expressiveness versus man-
ageability of a domain definition language has been presented by Gazen and Knoblock 
in [56], who describe a system to convert a UCPOP domain representation into a 
Graphplan representation. As the authors point out, a 'preprocessor' that trans-
lates domains from an expressive representation language into a simpler one for 
which more efficient planning algorithms exist is conceptually simple and not nec-
essarily specific to one planner. As a matter of fact, this constitutes the approach 
which has been adopted in this thesis, although the solution proposed is partially 
different. The relevant similarities and diversities between this work and that of 
Gazen and Knoblock will be examined subsequently (Section 5.1.3), once the fea-
tures of the system implemented will have been clearly explained and understood. 
Having surveyed the work on planning from a general point of view, it is now 
appropriate to consider more specifically the intersections of this field with the 
other two previously examined, namely, that of belief systems and of persuasive 
discourses. Let us begin by considering the former subset. 
2.4.1 Planning with beliefs: agents 
One of the main areas where one would expect to find examples of integration 
between a belief system and a planner (apart from that of discourse and argumen-
tation planning, which will be surveyed in the following subsection) consists of the 
field of research in agents. In fact, i t seems natural to assume that some form 
of planning system will be a central component of any artificial agent. Moreover, 
i t seems also natural to assume that agents will incorporate some form of belief 
system to keep a representation of the world in which they act. 
However, in literature, many of the agent architectures whose main component 
is actually a planner are tailored for tasks which do not require the use of an 
actual language of beliefs, and such that the representation of the world consists 
essentially of their direct sensorial 'perceptions' (see [151] for a useful account on 
agent theories and architectures). 
To this category of architectures belong, for example, Cohen's PHOENIX sys-
tem [26] (which includes planner-based agents operating in the domain of simu-
lated forest fire management), Wood's AUTODRIVE system [148] (where planning 
agents operate in a traffic simulation environment) and Etzioni's Softbots, that can 
plan and act in a UNIX environment [36]. 
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Another class of agent architectures, adopting more sophisticated languages for 
the description of the internal cognitive state, is based on the work of Bratman et 
al. [17]. Their resource-bounded agent model relies upon the theoretical formaliza-
tion of Rao and Georgeff [117], and exhibits four main symbolic structures: a 'plan 
library', actually containing the set of operator schemes, and explicit representa-
tions of Beliefs, Desires and Intentions (BDI architecture). In order to determine 
the plans to which the agent might decide to commit to achieve the current inten-
tions, the architecture makes use of a specific means-ends analyser (planner) which 
is invoked to produce (structurally and temporally) partial plans and to further 
refine plans which had been left incomplete. The means-ends analyser bases the 
plan construction on the current set of beliefs, which is continuously affected by the 
perception of the external world and by the internal reasoning. This architecture 
has been evaluated in an experimental scenario known as the Tileworld [112]. 
A recent example of BDI agent architecture describing more explicitly the lan-
guage for desires, goals, intentions, commitments and plans, can be found in the 
work of Brazier et al. [19], specified within a modelling framework for multi-agent 
systems (cf. [18]). In this model, the main emphasis is on static and dynamic rela-
tions between mental attitudes, considered at the basis of inter-agent cooperation. 
Beliefs, desires and intentions of an agent are modelled using a meta-language. 
Beliefs are divided into five different categories: internal beliefs, which an agent 
inherently has, with no further indication of their source; beliefs based on observa-
tions of the external world; beliefs based on communication with other agents (e.g. 
" i f communicated-fact-by(X,A) and trustworthy(A) then belief(X)" [ifod.]); beliefs 
deduced from other beliefs; and beliefs based on default assumptions. 
Although BDI architectures are interesting as they propose a possible model 
of integration between planning and belief modelling, they do not seem to take 
into consideration the cognitive state other agents, which, in the domain of dis-
course planning, plays a fundamental role. This is probably due to the fact that, 
in such architectures, the planning system is seen as a tool for generating plans 
for practical action, rather then plans aimed at producing specific changes in other 
agents' mental attitudes. Consequently, their belief languages do not normally in-
volve nested or mutual belief expressions, nor allow the explicit representation of 
an hypothetical (hearer) agent model of beliefs. 
Finally, somewhere in between the areas of planning agents adopting belief 
modelling and discourse planning lies the system developed for the 'TRAINS' 
project [6]. The project was aimed at building a plan reasoning system that 
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could communicate in natural language with humans in order to cooperatively 
solve generic tasks, and has been applied for the specific domain problem of train 
scheduling. 
The functioning of the system is based on a dialogue exchange with a human 
agent (the 'manager'), on the basis of which the system tries to reach a definition 
of the problem. Once the problem has been identified, the system develops its 
own plan using a specific internal planner. Then, the information supplied by the 
manager are analysed and, through them, the system tries to recognize the plan 
which the manager is considering. Finally, the manager's plan is compared with the 
system's own plan and, in case of conflicts, the system tries to agree on a common 
plan during the dialogue. 
The dialogue manager maintains a mental state in which i t records the context of 
the conversation, the set of shared beliefs concerning the domain and the problem, 
and the plans considered so far, including the manager's ones. On the basis of the 
current mental state, communicative goals are generated, which will lead to state 
the endorsement or rejection of plans, or the proposal of new possibilities to the 
manager. 
Although the system — through the recognition of the manager's plan — builds, 
to a certain extent, a 'manager model', there is no explicit representation of the 
hearer's beliefs, nor any adoption of a language of beliefs. Moreover, the pro-
cess of discourse generation is simply reduced to transforming each communicative 
goal into a specific conversational act (such as request or assert) without actually 
involving any goal decomposition or discourse structure formation. 
2.4.2 Discourse planning 
Most of the past and current work on discourse and argumentation planning is con-
ceptually based on the linguistic theories of Speech Acts, developed by Austin [13] 
and Searle [128]. 
Austin claimed that sentences in natural language are not simply propositions 
which can be evaluated true or false, but are in themselves 'acts'. More precisely, 
Austin distinguishes between locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary acts, all 
of which are present in any utterance. The locutionary act consists simply of utter-
ing the words of the sentence; the illocutionary act can be seen as the act that the 
speaker performs (or, better, that (s)he intends to perform) in uttering the sentence 
(e.g. to inform, to ask, to apologize, etc.). The perlocutionary act consists of the 
effects that uttering the sentence has on the hearer's mental state. Quoting the 
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example given by Aust in (d.[ibid., p.102]), a locutionary act is performed in saying 
"Shoot her!"; the il locutionary act (intended to be) performed by the utterance 
consists of 1 Urging somebody to shoot her\ whereas the perlocutionary act would 
be 1 Persuading somebody to shoot her\ 
Searle focuses upon the structure of i l locutionary acts, and sets out precise 
conditions for their successful execution (cf. [128, pp.66-7]). These prerequisites 
make use of two types of constraint, concerning the beliefs and the intentions of 
the speaker. Searle also distinguishes between the hearer understanding a locution, 
and being persuaded about its validity, the latter being the perlocutionary effect 
described in Grice's analysis [60] and the former Searle's definit ion of illocutionary 
effect. 
I n order to clarify the distinction between the concepts of perlocutionary and 
illocutionary, effects and acts, communicating and understanding, i t is appropri-
ate to sketch briefly the process which occurs when a speaker tries to convey a 
structured message in N L to an hypothetical hearer. 
The process can be intui t ively divided into the following steps (cf. [131]): 
(for the Speaker): 
a) identify the internal concepts and the relations among them which w i l l have 
to be communicated; 
b) translate them into the 'equivalent' N L expressions, ut ter ing them; 
(for the Hearer): 
c) understand the N L expressions (i.e. translate them back into an internal 
representation). 
The completion of the communication process normally marks the beginning of a 
fur ther phase of activity in the destination, representable as a step consisting of 
d) inference 
in which the hearer 'reacts' to the concepts communicated, reasoning on them, 
evaluating their validi ty and, possibly, creating new internal representations. Step 
b) corresponds to the locutionary act] step c) corresponds to the il locutionary effect 
(according to Searle), and step d) to the perlocutionary effect. The illocutionary 
act as defined by Aust in seems rather to represent the speaker's intended function 
of the message, which could be seen as the speaker's perlocutionary intention, not 
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necessarily coinciding wi th the perlocutionary effect. Also, in Austin's view, step 
c) — understanding — was st i l l part of the perlocutionary act. 
The general consensus that linguists have reached on the importance of the 
role of perlocutionary intentions in the process of discourse construction has led 
recent work to concentrate more on the modelling of the cognitive state of the 
hearer. For example, in their analysis, Asher and Lascarides [10] " . . . assume Fs 
cognitive state has embedded in i t a model of ,4's cognitive state, which in tu rn 
has a representation of Ps cognitive state", where A is the 'Author ' , and / the 
'Interpreter'. 
The point of conjunction between computational linguistic theories of discourse 
and planning can be taken to be the seminal paper of Cohen and Perrault [25]. 
Starting f rom the assumption that discourse generation is a goal-driven process, 
they developed a plan-based approach in which i l locutionary and perlocutionary 
acts are represented as planning operators w i t h specific preconditions (derived f rom 
Searle's theorisation) and specific effects, which included the expected changes of 
beliefs produced by the specific operator on the hearer. I n order to specify such 
operators, Cohen and Perrault adopted a modal language of beliefs which allowed 
three levels of nested speaker-hearer attitudes (e.g. "Hearer believe Speaker Believe 
Speaker Want A C T " , f rom [ibid., p.190]). The plans produced contained direct 
requests, informs and questions; nevertheless, as pointed out at p. 179 of [ibid.], 
they " . . . do not, however, discuss how those speech acts can be realized in words." 
Cohen and Perrault also present a 'rudimentary' Convince operator, which relies 
on the idea that for an agent A G T 1 to convince another agent A G T of the t r u th 
of a proposition p i t is sufficient that A G T believes that p is believed by A G T 1 . 
Nevertheless, they immediately point out themselves the over-simplicity of this 
operator, commenting: 
"Though this might be a necessary prerequisite to getting someone to 
believe something, i t is clearly not sufficient. [ . . . ] [B]efore A G T w i l l be 
convinced, she needs to know the justifications for A G T l ' s belief, which 
may require that A G T believe (or be C O N V I N C E of) the justifications 
for believing those justifications, etc. Such a chain of reasons for be-
lieving might be terminated by mutual beliefs that people are expected 
to have, or by a belief A G T believes A G T 1 already has. Ideally, a good 
model of C O N V I N C E would allow one to plan persuasive arguments." 
[ibid., p.193] 
Following the publication of this work, a number of systems adopted the planning 
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paradigm for discourse structure generation. A significant example is represented 
by Hovy's P A U L I N E , a discourse planning system which also integrates stylis-
tic concerns [72]. Following Mann and Thompson's publication of the Rhetorical 
Structure Theory (see Section 2.3.1), Hovy adopted their RST relations for his 
paradigm, transforming them into planning operators [73] [74]. Hovy's planning 
algori thm makes use of 'growth points' for generating two spans of the discourse, 
based on the RST division between 'satellite' and 'nucleus' material. His formula-
t ion of the perlocutionary effects of the operators is expressed in terms of Cohen 
and Levesque [24] B E L and B M B (mutual belief) modal logic. 
Another example of plan-based discourse and argument generation can be found 
in the work of Maybury [93], who proposes abstract plan operators which encode ar-
gument strategies such as ' convince-by-cause-and-evidence'. The system developed 
by Maybury represents an agent's beliefs about their own knowledge and beliefs 
about other agent's knowledge at one level of recursion. However, the system does 
not infer the logical consequences of the current beliefs; as the author points out 
in [92], " . . . belief representation and modification was not a principal focus of this 
work". 
A l l of the above models have been criticized (e.g. [99]) for their inabil i ty to 
record the intentional structure of the discourse which is being planned. To 
overcome this problem, Moore et al. [97] [100] [98] propose an alternative RST-
based planning mechanism which distinguishes intentional f rom rhetorical struc-
ture. More precisely, their planner employs two kinds of goals: communicative 
goals, which aim to "affect the beliefs or goals of the hearer" [98, p.668], and lin-
guistic goals, which characterise rhetorical relations. Fulfi l lment of communicative 
goals leads to the posting of linguistic goals, so the intentional and linguistic struc-
tures of discourse are bui l t in tandem. 
Al though Moore et al. do recognize the importance of modelling the hearer's 
reactions to the speaker's utterances in the process of discourse planning ( " . . . a 
generation system must represent and reason about the intended effect of individ-
ual parts of the text on the hearer [ . . . ] " [98]), the language adopted to express such 
effects is s t i l l based on single modalities such as B E L and K N O W - A B O U T , and 
does not address issues such as belief support or belief grounding (cf.[ibid., p.671]). 
A further step forward in the research on discourse planning is represented 
by the adoption of part ial order causal links (POOL) planners instead of N O A H -
based [127] architectures. This idea is implemented in L O N G B O W [152], a dis-
course planning system based on the D P O C L (Decompositional POCL) planner, 
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developed by Young et al. [153] [154]. In this architecture, both causal links — 
between postconditions and preconditions — and decomposition (i.e. hierarchical) 
links are maintained. I n a discourse context, such links are used to record the 
intentional structure of the discourse; they allow to distinguish between 'primary' 
and 'side' effects of an operator (i.e. of a 'discourse action'), and constitute funda-
mental information for the correct response of the system in case of plan failures 
(cf. [154]). 
I t is interesting to analyse briefly the 'Support actf operator, reported below, 
which " . . . has the effect of increasing the belief in proposition ?prop for the hearer" 
( f rom [153]): 
Action 
Header: 
Precondit ions: 
Effects : 
Bindings: 
Support (?prop) 
not(Believe(?prop)) 
Bel(?prop) 
none 
Decomposition 
Header: 
Constra ints : 
Steps: 
L i n k s : 
Bindings: 
Orderings: 
Support(?propl) 
causes(?prop2,?propl) 
Start, Cause-to-believe-l(?prop2) 
Cause-to-believe-2 (causes (?prop2, ?prop 1)) 
Combine-belief, Final 
(Combine-Belief, ?prop, ?prop, Final) 
none shown 
none shown 
Notice the adoption of the relation 'causes( ) ' , part of the informational struc-
ture, which expresses the fact that a proposition constitutes "a plausible cause of" 
another proposition. According to Young and Moore, " . . . one way to increase a 
hearer's belief in a proposition (i.e. to support a proposition) [ . . . ] ?propl is to 
find another proposition, prop2, such that causes( ?prop2, fpropl) [...]" [153]. The 
subplan contained in the decomposition is therefore a formalization of a strategy 
of 'persuasion' essentially based on a 'causal-support' version of the Modus Po-
nens rule, a concept already encountered in the informal work of Armstrong (see 
Section 2.2.1). 
Al though D P O C L is both sound and, for certain classes of plans, complete 
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(cf. [155]), its language for operator description seems to lack a clear separation 
between the model of the speaker and that of the hearer. Moreover, Fox [44] points 
out other shortcomings, which, according to Reed [118, p.27], are addressed in Fox 
and Long's A b N L P hierarchical planner. A b N L P has been adopted by Reed as 
the fundamental component of his 'Rhetorica' system for the automatic generation 
of arguments [121] [118]. In his system, Reed adopts a set of discourse planning 
operators, divided into a hierarchy of categories at the top of which lies the 'Argu-
ment Structure' level. In this class, Reed includes logical (Modus Ponens, Modus 
Tollens, Disjunctive Syllogism, etc.) and inductive operators, and, in addition, a 
group of fallacy-based operators. Rhetorica also allows the body of the operators to 
contain ' attentional' subgoals, which deal w i th issues such as focus and the ordering 
of subarguments for persuasive effects. 
Nevertheless, even in this architecture, the language of belief developed to spec-
i fy the changes produced by the discourse operators on the hearer's mental state 
and beliefs is l imited to very basic modal formulae, such as B E L ( A g , ~ P ) or the 
corresponding negation. Moreover, although Reed does presuppose in his architec-
ture the presence of a model of beliefs containing a representation of the hearer's 
beliefs, the characteristics of such a system are not discussed. 
I n conclusion, all of the discourse planning systems considered lack a precise 
formalization of a language of beliefs and of its semantics; moreover, although gen-
erally endowing relations of support and belief just i f icat ion, the models developed 
seem to neglect the issues of consistency, belief grounding and logical omniscience, 
normally associated w i t h the introduction of a system of beliefs. Finally, the rep-
resentation of the hearer model of beliefs is often not clearly distinguished f rom 
that of the speaker, and suffers f rom the same representational shortcomings. As 
Walker and Rambow point out in [145], 
" . . . effective text planners must explicit ly model aspects of the Hearer's 
cognitive state, such as what the hearer is attending to and what infer-
ences the hearer can draw [. . . ] . " 
Thus, the definit ion of a formal paradigm for the specification of a speaker-hearer 
belief system and its use in the discourse plan construction is needed for the real-
ization of complex, real-world persuasive discourse structures. 
C h a p t e r 2: R e l a t e d W o r k 61 
2.5 Criteria of evaluation 
As mentioned in Section 1.3, the evaluation of the system presented here w i l l be 
based on three fundamental parameters, namely, expressiveness, efficiency and 
correctness. Each of these parameters w i l l be evaluated in two contexts: first of al l , 
regarding the belief system as a tool designed for planning persuasive discourses; 
secondly, considering the belief system as a stand-alone piece of work. 
By taking into account the various works surveyed in the previous sections of 
this chapter, i t is possible to define more precisely how this evaluation can be 
performed in each of the two different contexts, which w i l l be identified, in what 
follows, respectively as PD (Planning Discourse) and BS (Belief System): 
Express iveness: 
PD: The model developed w i l l have to be expressive enough to capture the rele-
vant information needed during the process of construction of the discourse 
structure. These include: 
1. the intentional structure of the discourse, i.e., the communicative goals 
which underly the generation of each discourse segment (Section 2.3.1); 
2. the functional relations between different parts of a persuasive discourse 
described by the standard analysis of the argument structure (see Fig-
ure 2.2) and by the rival analysis of Toulmin (see Figure 2.3); 
3. the subjective, that is, defeasible, or non-strictly logical, relations of 
support and attack between different sub-parts of an argument, the latter 
including rebutting and undercutting defeaters (see Section 2.3.2, Formal 
approaches); 
4. the (hypothetical) point of view of the hearer on the relations men-
tioned in the previous point and on the objects of such relations (see 
Section 2.4.2). 
BS: The expressiveness of the belief system should be evaluated by considering 
its abi l i ty to capture the fundamental elements found in formal and informal 
systems (see Sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2). These include: 
1. the abili ty to deduce new beliefs f rom existent ones according to assigned 
rules of inference and, yet, to avoid the problem of logical omniscience; 
2. the abil i ty to formalise and tolerate situations containing contradictory 
and uncertain information; 
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3. the abili ty to allow a subjective and context-dependent representation of 
a structure of belief justification and of grounding (coherence vs. foun-
dations approaches). 
Eff ic iency: 
PD: The belief system developed w i l l have to be used by a planner to produce 
discourse plans. The efficiency of this use w i l l be evaluated in terms of: 
1. integrability of the belief system, consisting of i) the complexity of the 
process of integration between the belief system and the planning system 
and ii) the range of planning systems into which the belief system w i l l 
be able to be integrated; 
2. efficiency of the final product, consisting of i) the impact that the process 
of integration has on the original efficiency of the planner and ii) the 
complexity of the maintenance of the integrated system; 
BS: The efficiency of the belief system in itself can be estimated by the two 
following parameters: 
1. run-time efficiency, calculated as the computational load required by the 
system to answer a query (i.e., to evaluate the doxastic at t i tude towards 
a specific proposition); 
2. maintenance efficiency, i.e. complexity of the procedure of belief revision 
and reason maintenance. 
Correctness: 
PD: The correctness of the discourse planning system should be based on the 
formal proof of the correctness of the process of integration between the belief 
system and the planning system; 
BS: the correctness of the belief system wi th respect to the given formal specifi-
cations w i l l be based on the analysis of its actual implementation and on the 
results of a set of critical tests. 
I t should be noticed that the correctness of the discourse planning system as a 
whole follows directly f rom the last two conditions specified. I n fact, assuming the 
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planning system adopted for the integration to be correct, i f the belief system is in 
itself correct (as required by the second condition) and the process of integration 
is also correct, then the resulting final system must also conform the requirement 
of correctness. 
Chapter 3 
The Belief System Paradigm 
This chapter introduces the theoretical paradigm according to which the belief sys-
tem has been developed. The first section describes intui t ively the model and its 
relationship w i t h existing work. The second one formal ly defines the paradigm for 
belief systems, and presents some examples which show its sui tabi l i ty to deal w i t h 
modal (doxastic) logic formulae. Finally, the last section contains some considera-
tions on the complexity of the system. 
3.1 Introduction 
The paradigm for belief systems developed here belongs to the class of sentential, 
or interpreted symbolic structures models (see Section 2.2.2). I n particular, i t is 
based on the definition given by Ellis [33], according to whom a belief system is, 
in its simplest form, a set of assignments of the values True, False and X to the 
sentences of a language. Similarly, in this work a belief system is computationally 
defined as a calculable function (called 'Belief Prover', or BP function) which, 
given the current state — i.e. the set of beliefs currently held — assigns either the 
value True or False to each sentence of a language Lo (see Fig. 3.1). Notice that the 
use of the th i rd value X in Ell is ' model indicates the absence of any clear att i tude 
concerning a sentence s; in this paradigm, the equivalent at t i tude of uncertainty 
towards s w i l l be represented by imposing a situation in which neither s nor ->s 
is evaluated True by the BP function. This approach has also been adopted by 
Konolige i n his 'deduction' model of belief (cf. [82]). 
According to the previous definition, a belief system can be also seen as a 'black-
box' whose behaviour is unequivocally described by a corresponding formal theory. 
I n fact, given the set Lo of w f f s , constituting the 'query' language of the system, 
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expr Belief 
Prover 
State 
Figure 3.1: A belief system. 
the current state of the belief system can be thought of as set of axioms of the 
theory. A certain query s G Lo w i l l be evaluated True by the BP funct ion if and 
only if s is a theorem of the theory, where the theorems of a formal theory consist 
of all the axioms plus all the w f f s which can be derived f r om the axioms through 
the use of a set of inference rules. 
More formally, consider a finite set Rt, R2,..., Rn of relations (inference rules) 
between w f f s such that for each relation Ri, there exists an integer j > 0 such 
that for any set P containing j w f f s and for any single wff ' C i t is possible to 
decide whether P is in the relation Ri w i th C. I f this is the case, then C is a 
direct consequence of the set P of premisses through R4. A proof is a sequence 
A\,..., An of w f f s such that, for each i, A{ is either an axiom (i.e. Ai £ X) or 
a direct consequence obtained f rom the previous expressions {A\,..., Ai-\) using 
one of the inference rules. A theorem of the theory is a wff A such that there exists 
a proof which contains A as last element of the sequence (i.e., A can be derived 
f rom the axioms). 
This interpretation of belief system is also in accordance w i t h the schematisa-
t ion given by Konolige (see Figure 2.1), except for the fact that the 'Base Bel ief 
(the state) is considered here as a parameter given in input to the system rather 
than as an integrating part of i t . 
Even though the behaviour of a belief system can be defined clearly through a 
formal theory, the actual algorithm for the theorem (or belief) proving, calculating 
the BP funct ion of Figure 3.1, has not been identified yet. The definition of 
such an algorithm is clearly going to have an impact on the performances of the 
belief system. For example, suppose the algorithm consists simply of applying 
exhaustively the inference rules to the current state, as in Konolige's deduction 
model, and then checking whether the given query belongs to the resulting set of 
theorems: in this case, the inference rules cannot be strong enough to allow the 
generation of an infinite set of theorems. 
I n order to facilitate the definition of an efficient belief proving algorithm (or 
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BP algorithm, f r o m now on) i t is useful to investigate the nature and the origins 
of the inference rules, which characterise unequivocally the behaviour of a belief 
system. 
Consider the set Lo of w f f s representing the 'query' language of a belief sys-
tem. I f Lo is expressive enough to allow an accurate and natural description of 
the doxastic attitudes, i t is likely to be redundant, that is, to contain expressions 
which are syntactically different but semantically equivalent. More in general, a 
sophisticated language normally contains expressions which are related by logical 
formulae, determined by the semantics of the language. Such relations can be put 
in the fo rm of 'inference rules' and used to deduce the t r u t h value of expressions 
directly f rom the t r u th of other expressions of Lo. Therefore, by examining the 
logical relations 'characteristics' of a language Lo, i t is possible to identify an ' i n -
ner' language Li C Lo such that Li contains all and only the expressions of Lo 
which are semantically unrelated. 
The inner language Li is sufficient to describe unequivocally any possible state 
of the system: in fact, for any Lo, there is a (minimal) set of inference rules relating 
its w f f s such that any 'outer' state — defined in Lo — can be obtained f rom an 
equivalent 'inner' state (subset of Li) through the application of the rules. 
Notice that the distinction between query language Lo and state-definition 
language Li is analogous to Konolige's distinction between internal and external 
language of beliefs, and is closely related to the concepts of explicit and implicit 
belief described by Harman and, more formally, by Levesque (see Sections 2.2.1 
and 2.2.2). 
E x a m p l e 3.1 Consider the outer language 
where m ( ) and / ( ) mean, respectively, male and female, and x,y,w,z are meta-
variables which can be instantiated to names. By giving to the expressions of Lo 
the common natural language interpretation, i t is easy to identify the following 
semantic relations: 
Lo = {wife(s, t), husband(u, v),married(x, y), m(w), f ( z ) } 
r i ) married(x,y) 
r 2 ) married(x,y) A f ( x ) 
r3) married(x,y) A m(x) 
—>• married(y, x) 
-> wife{x,y) 
—> husband(x, y) 
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This set of logical rules is sufficient and necessary to deduce the t r u th of the 
expressions 'wife(f and lhusband()' f rom that of the remaining expressions of Lo. 
Thus, the 'inner' language 
Li = {married(x,y),m(w), f ( z ) } C Lo 
can be adopted as state-definition language, as any (correct) outer state So defined 
in Lo can be 're-constructed' f rom an equivalent inner state Si C Li through the 
applications of the inference rules. For example, the outer state 
So = {wife(Maria, Derek), husband(Derek, Maria), married(Derek, Maria), 
mar ried(M aria, Derek),m(Derek), f (Maria)} 
can be directly re-constructed f rom (one of ) its inner equivalent states 
Si = {married(Derek, Maria), m(Derek), f (Maria)} 
I t is interesting to notice that in the previous example the inference rules, all 
in the fo rm pi A pi A . . . A pn —> c, are such that Vz,pj G Li. Moreover, the rules 
could be divided into two groups having consequences 1) c G Li or 2) c G (Lo\Li). 
In other words, the inference rules could be splitted into 'inner' ones (ri), used 
only to 'complete' the state wi th more inner expressions, and 'outer' ones ( r 2 and 
r 3 ) , whose consequences 'extend' the state to the language Lo. Because of this 
characteristic, their application to any given state Si C Li to obtain the equivalent 
So C Lo could be divided into two separate phases, consisting of i) exhaustive 
application of r t and ii) exhaustive application of r 2 and r 3 to the state resulting 
f rom the previous phase. 
In summary, all of the previous considerations lead to the two following points: 
1. The language C0 adopted to query a (belief) system contains a simpler 'inner' 
language C{ C C0 which can be used to define the current state of the system. 
2. Given point 1, it follows that the definition of the BP function for the evalu-
ation of an input expression must be such that the truth of each 'outer' query 
w G £0 is calculated as a function of some expressions of C{. 
I t follows immediately that the set of expressions obtained as the union of all the 
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domains of the functions constitutes the language L%. In what follows, the query 
language £ 0 of a belief system w i l l also be indicated as ''outer' language of that 
system, whereas £ ; w i l l constitute the 'inner1 one. 
The concepts of 'query ' (or outer) language, inner language and t r u t h evaluation 
of each outer expression as a function of inner expressions are at the core of the 
formal definition of the belief system paradigm described in the following section, 
and w i l l facilitate the definition of a sound linear algori thm for the integration of 
such systems into discourse planning systems. 
3.2 The Belief System Paradigm 
Let us assume an alphabet to consist of a set of letters or symbols. 
Defini t ion 3.1 A Language is a set of expressions (well-formed formulae) which 
are bui l t — according to specific syntactical rules — using the symbols of a given 
alphabet. 
Defini t ion 3.2 Given a language L, a State is a set S C L. 
Defini t ion 3.3 Given a language L, a Boolean Evaluation of L is a decidable 
funct ion B : L —> {True, False}. 
A boolean evaluation simply maps every expression of a language into one of the 
two values True or False. The collection of expressions which are evaluated True 
by B() constitutes a state S representing the set of beliefs currently held by the 
system. 
Def in i t ion3 .4 Given a boolean evaluation B() of L, the state identified by B() 
is defined as 
SB = {w e L | B{w) = True} (3.1) 
In brief, the expression B(w) corresponds to the question "Does w belong to the 
state?". Moreover, assigning a boolean evaluation B() of L is equivalent to speci-
fy ing a state 5 B C i , Analogously, given a state S, there exists only one possible 
boolean evaluation B() identified by S such that SB = S. 
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The following definitions generalise and formalise the concept expressed in point 
2 of the conclusive considerations of the previous section. I n the formal model, 
the t r u t h of any query w i l l be evaluated as a 1 boolean function' of a finite set 
{ax, a 2 , . . . , an} of inner expressions: 
Def in i t ion 3.5 Given a domain set A = {ax, a 2 , . . . , an} C L and a boolean 
evaluation B() of L, a Boolean Function of L — defined on A — is a logical ex-
pression T(B(ai),..., B(an)) containing the operators ' - i ' (logical negation), 'V' 
and 'A', and the terms B(ax),..., B(an). 
For example, i f A = {Wx, W2} C L, the expression 
ri(B{Wx), B(W2)) = - (B(WX) V B(W2)) 
is a boolean funct ion (of L) defined on A. The logical value of T\ (either True 
or False) varies according to the boolean evaluation B() of L. In other words, 
when the current state contains W\ or W2, the expression T\ becomes False. For 
simplicity, a boolean function such as T\ w i l l also be wr i t t en as 
Fi{Wx,W2) = - . ( W i VW2) 
assuming impl ic i t ly that every expression w G L w i l l be substituted wi th True i f f 
w G SB (and, obviously, that w w i l l be substituted w i t h False i f f w $ SB), being SB 
the current state. This substitution w i l l be formally represented by the expression 
indicating that the value of T\ is calculated in the state S. For example, 
Ti(WuW2) | 0 = True 
TX{WUW2) \Sx = False 
Ti{WuW2) |s2 = False 
where Si = {Wx} and S2 = {W2, W z ) . 
Let Lo be the outer language of a belief prover, and Li C Lo be the inner lan-
guage, used by the system to define the state. The following definit ion formalises 
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the idea of evaluating the t r u t h of each query through the evaluation of the asso-
ciated boolean function of inner expressions: 
Defini t ion 3.6 A n Interpretation of Lo on Li is a funct ion X associating each 
w e (Lo \ Li) w i t h a boolean function T w of Li, and each w € Li w i t h the boolean 
function B(w). 
Notice that since the inner language Li is supposed to be used directly to specify 
the content of the state, the t r u t h (or falsehood) of any inner expression w i l l simply 
be determined by its presence in (or absence f rom) the current state. This is the 
reason why the interpretation function X() associates every element of Li to the 
boolean funct ion consisting of the element itself: 
where B() is the current boolean evaluation. 
When containing contradictory information, the contents of the state can origi-
nate contradictory answers. In order to avoid this, we need to be able to restrict the 
range of possible configurations which a state can assume. The concept of 'boolean 
funct ion ' can be used to specify a condition on a specific set of expressions of a 
language: 
Defini t ion 3.7 A Restriction on a language L is a boolean funct ion U defined 
on a finite subset ACL. 
Defini t ion 3.8 Given a restriction U on a language L, a state S C L is Co-
herent w i t h respect to U i f f U \$ = True. 
E x a m p l e 3.2 Consider the finite language L = {a, b, c, d}. The restriction U 
defined on the set A = { a, b, c } as 
requires the three expressions of A to be mutually exclusive. Any state S C L 
containing more than one expression of A w i l l 'violate' the restriction U. Hence, 
the only possible coherent states of L are 0, {a}, {b}, { c } , { d } , {a, d}, {b,d}, 
\/w(z Li, I(w) = B(w) (3.2) 
U(a, b, c :) = -, ( a A b) A -> (a A c) A - i (b A c) 
{c,d}. 
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The choice of the term 'interpretation' in the previous definit ion is due to the 
analogy which can be found between this abstract structure and the characteristics 
of a natural language. The identification of a simple and unequivocal inner language 
Li C Lo and the association of every element of Lo\Li w i t h a combination of inner 
expressions is, in fact, analogous to the process of describing the unique meaning 
of every statement of a language (Lo) using a set of unequivocal terms (Li), i.e. of 
assigning them a specific semantics. 
Definit ion 3.9 Given a language L, an Inference Rule r on L is an association 
between a boolean function V of L and an element c e L, wr i t t en as 
r) V\-c (3.3) 
Intuit ively, i f the left-hand side V (premiss) of the rule is evaluated True, then 
the right-hand side (consequence) of the rule should also be True, and therefore 
should be considered an element of the current set of beliefs. The inference rules 
are applied during the process of 'extension' of a state: 
Definit ion 3.10 Given a state S C L and a set of inference rules R = {ri, r2,...} 
on L, the Closure CR(S) of the state S using the set of rules R is defined as 
CR(S) = {ujeL\ShR u} 
where S hRuj means that u can be derived f rom S using only rules in R. 
This definition is equivalent to that of deductive closure given by Konolige in [82]. 
Notice that, f r o m the definition, i t follows that 
VSCL, SC CR(S) (3.4) 
I t should be pointed out that the adoption of a mechanism of deductive closure 
does not necessarily lead the model to fa l l prey to the problem of logical omni-
science; in fact, the set of inference rules adopted could contain only very l imited 
and logically 'incomplete' rules, whose application can be carried out as a finite 
process of practical completion (extension) of the state, rather than one of formal 
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deduction. As a matter of fact, this constitutes the main reason which motivated 
the introduction of the closure mechanism in the model, as the description of the 
actual belief system implemented in Chapter 4 will clarify. In such a system, in 
fact, the actual 'inferential engine' will be represented by the mechanism of inter-
pretation, defined previously, which allows the evaluation of the truth of any query 
without requiring explicit additions of beliefs to the state. 
Example3.3 Consider the language Lo <— <Wo>, defined as 
<Wo> ::= ABEL (<Ei>) | ABEL (NOT ( < £ i > ) ) 
A B E L ( < W o > ) | N O T ( < i y 0 > ) 
<Ei> ::= E i | E 2 | E 3 | . . . | E n 
Let the set R of inference rules contain the following rules on Lo: 
n ) ->£?(ABEL(Ei)) h NOT(ABEL(Ei)) 
r 2 ) - £ ( A B E L ( E 2 ) ) h NOT(ABEL(E 2 )) 
rn) - i S ( A B E L ( E n ) ) h NOT(ABEL(E„)) 
In fact, R could also be represented as a single inference rule schema 
r ) - i J B ( A B E L ( e ) ) h N O T ( A B E L ( e ) ) 
where the meta-variable 'e' can be substituted with any symbol generated by 
<Ei>. 
Then, the closure CR(S) of a state S will contain S itself plus all the "missing" 
propositions N O T ( A B E L ( E j ) ) . For example, 
C f l ( 0 ) = { N O T ( A B E L ( E ! ) ) , . . . , N O T ( A B E L ( E N ) ) } 
C R ( { A B E L ( E I ) } ) = {ABELCEO), N O T ( A B E L ( E 2 ) ) , N O T ( A B E L ( E N ) ) } 
Notice that the set R could even contain an (at most countable) infinity of rules. 
If these rules could be finitely represented, an algorithm which calculates CR(S) 
for a given S would terminate and generate a finite output, if CR(S) results to be 
a finite set. 
Chapter 3: The Belief System Paradigm 73 
The process of completion of the initial state through the application of a set of 
inference rules and the mechanism of interpretation constitute the two main com-
ponents of the functioning of a belief prover, as the following definition shows: 
Definition 3.11 Given a set R of inference rules on a language Li and an in-
terpretation function X() of Lo on Li, with Li C Lo, a Belief Prover (BP) for Lo 
on Li is an algorithm which calculates the function BP : Lo x 2Lt —v {True, False} 
defined as 
BP{u,S)=I(u) | s , 
where S' is the extended state S' = CR(S). 
Because of property 3.2, imposed by the definition of interpretation Z ( ) , the func-
tion BP() can be rewritten as 
\s> if w G (Lo \ Li) 
True if u e Li A co e S' (3.5) 
False otherwise 
with S' = CR(S). From the previous definition, i t is possible to show the validity 
of the following property, concerning the function BP : Lo x 2Ll —>• {True, False] 
calculated by a BP algorithm: 
VS C Li, € S, BP{u, S) = True (3.6) 
This follows directly from the definition of the BP() function: if to belongs to the 
state S, then certainly UJ is an inner expression; moreover, because of property 3.4, 
S C CR{S), and, therefore, u e CR{S). 
The outer language Lo, the inner language Li C Lo and the specific BP algo-
rithm adopted determine entirely the functioning of a Belief System: 
Definition3.12 A Belief System is a triple (Lo,Li,A), where Lo and Li are, 
respectively, the outer and the inner language, and A is a Belief-Prover (BP) al-
gorithm for Lo on Li which calculates, for any given expression ui € Lo and state 
S C Li, the boolean value BP(u>, S). 
Example 3.4 I t is interesting to show how the mechanism of outer language in-
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terpretation can easily deal with modal logics expressions. Consider, for example, 
the rule of necessitation in the normal systems in modal logic (see [138]): 
In other words, if ^ is a valid theorem of the theory, then so is (and, con-
sequently, so is ••</>, ad infinitum). In the belief system paradigm, the rule of 
necessitation can be realized simply by defining the outer language interpretation 
as follows: 
where £ j is the inner language, and B() is the boolean evaluation of £ j . In fact, 
this recursive definition constitutes the interpretation of an outer language Ca con-
taining queries in the form • • . . . Do;, with an arbitrarily-high number of modal 
predicates ' • ' in front of any inner expression u G L{. 
3.3 Complexity and integration 
In view of the process of integration between a belief system built according to 
this paradigm and a discourse planning system, it is appropriate to make some 
preliminary considerations regarding the computational complexity of the system. 
First of all, if repeated queries w',w",..., are given to the system while the 
state S is left unchanged, the calculation of the closure set S' does not need to be 
repeated, and the real computational load of the system will be represented by the 
evaluation of l(to). This situation occurs when the number of modifications of the 
state S is much lower than the number of queries which the system is presented 
with. This is, in fact, the assumption which has been made at the beginning by 
describing the state of the belief system as a 'parameter' rather than as an input 
value (see Figure 3.1). 
However, this assumption can be made only i f the belief system is regarded as 
an independent, 'stand-alone' module. In fact, if the belief system is considered 
as a part of a discourse planning system, the frequency of state updates could be 
much higher, because of the use of operators which add and delete propositions to 
and from the state. 
In order to reduce the work-load which repeated recalculations of the deductive 
N) if |= <f> then (= 0<f> (3.7) 
B(u) iiu€d 
1(DUJ) 
XUJJ) otherwise. 
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closure could involve, given a state S and its closure S' = CR(S), it should be pos-
sible to develop a mechanism for the updating of S' which allows the identification, 
for a specific modification of the state S, of the limited propagation of changes in 
5" deriving from the consequences of the specific addition and/or deletion, without 
the need to effect the entire recalculation of S' from the new state. 
In general, though, the realization of this mechanism would require a system 
to keep track of the relations of dependency between different propositions of the 
closure S', so that, for example, i f a belief A can be derived from B using the 
inference rules, a modification of the state S involving B will produce a propagated 
effect involving the belief A. 
Nevertheless, Chapter 5 will show that, under specific assumptions on the type 
of inference rules adopted, this 'localized' updating process can be realized without 
the use of explicit dependency links between the propositions of the completed state 
S", if the belief system is integrated within a planning system. This method has 
been actually adopted for the implementation of a discourse planning system which 
makes use of a belief system module built according to the theoretical paradigm 
defined in this chapter. 
Chapter 4 
A Speaker-Hearer Belief System 
This chapter contains the description of a belief system for persuasive discourse 
planning, built according to the theoretical paradigm specified in Chapter 3. The 
model is intended to constitute the basic component of a 'Speaker' system which 
generates discourse plans for a specific audience (the 'Hearer'). 
In the first section of the chapter, an overview is given of the framework into 
which the belief system developed is intended to fi t . The following sections are 
dedicated to the description and formalization of the belief system, whilst the final 
part contains a brief description of its implementation and illustrates some of the 
examples adopted for testing the system. 
4.1 Overview 
In this work, a discourse planning system has been considered to be a sub-part of a 
larger structure, namely, of an architecture which constitutes a speaker agent. The 
process of discourse structure construction has been assumed to make use of the 
knowledge base of the agent, as the contents of the discourse are not, in general, 
known a priori, and the system must be able to access any concept or information 
which might need to be included in the message. 
The complete knowledge base of the agent has been assumed to be expressed as 
a collection of events which evolves through time. Intuitively, an event represents 
a fact, or an abstract concept, that can be held in our mind, such as "The sky 
is blue" or "All men are mortals". This conceptual unit represents, in semantic 
networks, the equivalent of a proposition in predicate logic1. 
Semantic networks have been proven to be at least as expressive as First Order Logic (see 
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We can think of the actual process of discourse structure construction to oc-
cur, in one's mind, in an 'hypothetical' space, where only the relevant concepts 
are collected and organized, only the relevant relations between them (i.e. support, 
attack, etc.) are represented explicitly, and the (hypothetical) effects of the dis-
course on the hearer are planned. Since the process of discourse construction has 
been assumed to be goal driven, the speaker agent knows, from the beginning of 
the process, what communicative goals have to be achieved, and to which other 
concepts and beliefs such goals are related. Consequently, in the initial phase, the 
agent wil l 'scan' the entire knowledge base and extract the set of propositions and 
concepts which are relevant for the specific discourse communicative goals. This 
restricted and temporary version of the belief state will be used by the planner as 
planning state. 
The state wil l have to contain only the information necessary for the discourse 
structure construction; hence, it will not need to represent explicitly all of the 
natural language expressions corresponding to the events/propositions extracted 
from the belief base, although it should be able to 'refer' to them. Therefore, the 
discourse planning process will treat the events contained in the state mainly as 
'atomic' propositions (e.g. E 2 , E 3 , . . . ) whose semantic contents will not, in 
general, be accessible. This is because the declared aim of the system consists 
of producing discourse structures, without considering the issues related to the 
surface characteristics of the natural language realization. However, the features of 
the events and the relations between them which are useful for the representation of 
the structure of beliefs and for the construction of the discourse plan (e.g. support, 
grounding, rebuttal or attack) will be actually made explicit by the language of 
belief adopted, as will be shown in the subsection 'Features' of 4.2.1. 
Once the communication phase has been completed, if the planned effects of 
the discourse on the hearer's beliefs correspond to those which were expected, the 
final (hypothetical) state reached at the end of the plan can be used to update the 
larger, underlying belief base of the speaker agent. I f some parts of the plan did not 
achieve their intended aim, it will be necessary to identify the actual belief state 
of the hearer, update the larger belief base accordingly and start a new planning 
process, possibly re-using part of the previous plan. 
The model described above can be considered as an underlying framework into 
[134] and [130]). 
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which the system developed is expected to fi t . The belief system described in the 
following sections of this chapter has been defined by taking such considerations 
into account. 
4.2 Formalization 
According to the definition given in Chapter 3, a belief system consists of a triple 
(Lo, Li, A), where Lo is the outer (query) language, Li is the inner (state content) 
language and A is an algorithm which calculates the function BP : Lo x 2Ll —> 
{T, F} defined as 
BP(UJ,S)=X(U) \ S , 
where S' is the extended state S' — CR(S) and X() is an interpretation of Lo on 
Li. 
Let us begin by defining the first element of the triple (Lo, Li, A), i.e. the outer 
language Lo. 
4.2.1 The Outer language 
Specifying the outer language corresponds to deciding which queries the system 
will have to be able to evaluate True or False. However, part of the expressions of 
Lo will be used to specify the content of the belief system, as the inner language 
consists of a subset of the outer one. 
Moreover, it should be pointed out that this language has not been developed 
to fully represent the knowledge of an agent, but only to render explicit and make 
quickly available and updatable the relevant information required to construct a 
persuasive argument. As described in the previous section, the information con-
tained in the state should be 'extracted' from a larger, complete, knowledge base 
(e.g. a semantic network) according to the specific discourse intentions (or 'com-
municative goals'), and then used for the discourse planning process. 
Intuitively, the definition of the syntax for the outer language can be split into 
two separated parts: attitudes and features. Let us begin by considering the former 
type of expressions. 
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E 4 E , NOT(E 4 ) ( .) 
Hs 
H 
Figure 4.1: Graphical representation of speaker-hearer sets of beliefs. 
Attitudes 
The most obvious expression that any belief system should be able to deal with 
consists of the statement "the System BELieves proposition x", which, in our 
formalism, will be expressed as 
SBEL(:r) 
where 'S' stands for System, or, equivalently, for 'Speaker'. 
The belief model is intended to be used as a discourse planning tool by a system 
which generates discourse plans for an addressed 'Hearer', hence the necessity to 
represent not only the Speaker's beliefs, but also those events which are assumed 
to be believed by the Hearer. 
Intuitively, the belief system can be thought of as an evolving set S of events 
believed by the speaker, as shown in Figure 4.1. 
The set of events which the system assumes to be the audience's beliefs repre-
sents the model of the hearer, indicated by the set Hs-
For every event 'e' present in the set S of Figure 4.1, the expression SBEL(e) 
holds. For example, SBEL(E 3) and SBEL(E 4) are both True. The intersection 
between Hs and S contains the events which are (supposed to be) believed by 
both, whereas the set Hs \ S constitutes the conflictual set, containing events 
believed by the hearer but not by the speaker. 
In order to allow the language Lo to represent this situation, it is necessary to 
introduce a modal operator 
HBEL(z) 
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which represents the proposition "the Hearer BELieves x". Hence, Hs, in Fig. 
4.1, can be defined as the set containing all and only the events 'e' such that 
HBEL(e). 
The graphical representation of Figure 4.1 underlines that the real set of events 
believed by the audience, indicated by H, may differ from the one assumed by the 
system. In particular, there might be events, such as E l t which are not part of the 
hearer's beliefs, while the speaker supposes they are, or like E 2 , which the hearer 
believes despite the speaker's expectations. 
It should be noticed that the specific syntax for the set of expressions qualified as 
'events' has not been given yet; however, one of their main characteristics consists 
of the fact that that they can be negated. Let the expression 
NOT(e) 
indicate the negation of the event 'e': NOT(e) can be defined as the event which 
happens iff'e' does not happen. Obviously, two nested negations annul each other: 
NOT(NOT(e)) = e (4.1) 
The proposition corresponding to the event NOT(e) can be obtained simply by 
negating the action of e. For example, i f E i = "John likes Mary", then the negated 
event NOT(Ei) will be "John does not like Mary". 
Nevertheless, in many cases, the common meaning of 'negation' in natural lan-
guage does not correspond exactly to the definition given, because of the different 
relevance which humans normally assign to different components of an event. 
For example, let Ex be the event "Bill met his girlfriend for lunch, today". If 
the answer (of a human agent) to the question 
"Did Bill meet his girlfriend for lunch, today?" 
is "No, he did not", and if we represent this answer with NOT(Ei) , then there can 
be at least two different interpretations for the expression NOT(Ei): 1) Bil l did 
not meet his girlfriend today, at all; or 2) Bil l did not meet her for lunch, but he 
might have met her for another occasion, during the day. 
Although the definition of negation of an event given above should always be 
interpreted as in the latter case, the former possibility might be the most common 
one in natural language. This is because, in this specific example, the relevance of 
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the feature occasion (lunch) might be considered small if compared with the 'main' 
element of the event, namely, to meet a girlfriend. Thus, the simple assertion — 
in natural language — of NOT(Ei), deprived of any further detail (such as "No, 
he met her for dinner"), will probably be interpreted as negating the most relevant 
element of the event, i.e. the meeting itself. 
Nevertheless, in order for the system to be able to distinguish between these two 
cases, it would be necessary to effect a semantic analysis of the content of the events, 
taking into account the different relevance of the elements in connection with the 
current context of the discourse, a problem which goes beyond the declared scope 
of this work. 
In conclusion, the term 'event' should be hereafter interpreted as a semantic unit 
which could also represent the negation of another event. In fact, the set SuHs of 
Fig. 4.1, containing all the speaker (and hearer) beliefs, might as well contain neg-
ative events, producing beliefs such as SBEL(NOT(e)) or HBEL(NOT(e)). Indeed, 
since NOT(E 4 ) belongs to Hs, it results HBEL(NOT(E 4 )) , whereas SBEL(E 4). 
Another important requirement of the system consists of its ability to manage 
uncertain information. From a practical point of view, the presence of uncertainty 
is a fundamental aspect of the real world. To quote Clark: "Uncertainty is present 
in most tasks that require intelligent behaviour" ([22], p.109). The limited and 
subjectivity-prone resources of a human being require a system to be able to deal 
with uncertain information in most of the cases. 
The specific model developed adopts a qualitative 2 tripartite approach, also 
used, among the others, by Ellis [33] and Gardenfors [54]. In brief, the attitude 
of the system towards every event 'e' must be one (and one only) of the following 
three: 
a) Speaker believes e; 
b) Speaker is undecided about e; 
c) Speaker believes NOT(e). 
The attitude a) — SBEL(e) — is adopted by the system when the event 'e' is 
considered True, whereas case c) — SBEL(NOT(e)) — represents the opposite 
situation, in which the system believes 'e' to be False. The attitude b) of uncertainty 
2 See [22] for an interesting comparison between numerical (quantitative) and symbolic (qual-
itative) techniques for uncertainty management. 
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towards 'e' is held when there are not enough information for the system to decide 
whether 'e' should be evaluated True or False.3 Notice that requiring that one 
of these attitudes be held towards an event corresponds to imposing a specific set 
of restrictions on the language. The expression of uncertainty is allowed by the 
introduction of the following modal operator in the outer language Lo: 
SUND(e) 
The possibility of uncertain attitudes in the speaker's beliefs requires the introduc-
tion of a symmetrical modal expression 
HUND(e) 
for the hearer model representation. 
Although, at first glance, the three cases HBEL(e), HUND(e) and HBEL(NOT(e)) 
seem to be adequate to describe the hearer model, there is a category of events 
which would be difficult to classify under any of these attitudes. For example, 
suppose the speaker has a good knowledge of computer science, and believes in 
the event E x = "The computational complexity of any known algorithm which cal-
culates the permutations of a set of objects grows exponentially with the number 
of objects". If the hearer does not have the same scientific background, (s)he is not 
likely to have any knowledge of computational complexity whatsoever. In fact, i t 
may as well be that the hearer had never 'heard' this concept before, or not even 
'conceived' it as a thought. 
What attitude should a hearer be expected to have towards an event which (s)he 
has never considered before? The hearer could not possibly believe, disbelieve or 
even be uncertain towards something over which (s)he has never pondered. The 
last modal operator of Lo, introduced to represent this situation, is 
HUNK(x) 
which should be read as "the event x is UNKnown to the Hearer", meaning that 
the concept x has never been conceived as a thought in the hearer's mind. The 
reciprocal notion of this concept (namely, 'KNOW-ABOUT') has been adopted by 
Moore and Paris in [98, p.671]. 
The symmetrical form for the speaker, namely SUNK (a;), is also a correct ex-
pression of Lo, although it will never be possible for an event in the speaker's 
3 The simple tri-partition can be further refined into many degrees of belief, as shown, for 
example, in [42]. 
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knowledge to be unknown to the speaker. In fact, as soon as the speaker simply 
thinks about the concept SUNK(:c), this becomes immediately false by definition, 
as the event x is not anymore unknown. This situation presents an interesting 
parallelism with the Cartesian basic belief " I think", which, analogously, becomes 
immediately true as soon as the speaker conceives i t . 
Notice that this attitude should not be confused with a situation of incomplete 
knowledge: for example, the speaker might believe that (s)he does not know at 
what time the next train to London will leave, but the event "The next train to 
London will leave at a certain time" has been conceived as a thought, and, even 
though not complete in its details, is not an unknown event4. 
In fact, it would be possible to extend the representation by introducing a nota-
tion for events having components which are only partially known by the speaker, 
but believed to be known by the hearer. However, this kind of situations can also 
be captured by using the verb lto know' (or its negation) as the action of the events. 
In the previous example, we could have Ei="The hearer knows at what time the 
next train to London will leave", and SBEL(Ei). 
If we allow events as subject or objects of other events and consider all of the pre-
vious predicates as representing a specific kind of events, then the language becomes 
much more sophisticated, and permits the construction of mutual belief expressions 
(e.g. SBEL(HBEL(SBEL(a;))) ), nested beliefs, such as SBEL(SBEL(SBEL(z))), or 
more complex expressions, like SBEL(NOT(HBEL(x))) or NOT(HUND(SUND(x))). 
Moreover, this assumption allows the hypothetical model of the hearer to be 
simply considered as part of the speaker model: any expression, including those 
describing the hearer model (such as HBEL() or HUNK() ), will be an element of 
the set S of events believed by the speaker. 
Before defining precisely the final syntax of these expressions, it is necessary to 
decide how many levels of nested predicates the language Lo should allow. 
Since this language is intended to be used by the speaker to build a persuasive 
discourse, i t must be able to represent disagreement, i.e. situations in which the 
hearer's (expected) belief might be different from the speaker's one. For example, 
SBEL(Ei), but SBEL(HBEL(NOT(Ei))). 
4 The difference between these two meanings of the verb to know is similar to the distinction 
that, in German, is marked by the two verbs kennen and wissen, the first one being used mostly 
to express the idea of knowing a concept as being 'acquainted' to it (see also [1, p.61]). 
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Moreover, in many cases of arguments, the conflictual situation between the two 
(or more) agents is due to a basic 'misunderstanding' in which an agent believes 
the other(s) to have a certain belief, whereas this is not the case. For example, 
in the speaker model, we could have HBEL(SBEL(E 2 )) 5 , whilst it is true that 
SBEL(NOT(E 2)). 
In order for the speaker to be able to deal with and solve such a situation, 
i t seems appropriate to include this kind of expressions in the language Lo, and 
endow the system with a — hypothetical — model of the hearer's model of the 
speaker's beliefs. 
A further level of nesting in the expressions would lead to beliefs such as 
HBEL(SBEL(HBEL())), which represent (from the point of view of the system) 
the hearer's view of the of the speaker's model of the hearer's beliefs. This sort 
of hypothetical model, besides being rather complex and unusual in common sit-
uations, requires also a notable amount of knowledge and assumptions about the 
hearer's mental state, which are likely to be collected only in specific contexts, such 
as protracted dialogues or prolonged shared experiences. 
Furthermore, a three-level nested belief expression is often associated with an 
attempt to produce (or resist) deception: according to Cohen and Perrault, 
" . . . if AGT1 successfully lied to AGT2, he would have to be able to 
believe some proposition 'p', while believing that AGT2 believes that 
AGT1 believes p is false (i.e. AGT1 BELIEVE AGT2 BELIEVE AGT1 
BELIEVE ( ~ p ) )." [25, p.183] 
Since this model is meant to produce persuasive discourses without using deceptive 
techniques (as specified by the sincerity axioms), the syntax for the outer language 
Lo has been restricted to only two levels of adjacent modality nesting. 
The first half of the BNF formalization of the grammar < WFE > ('Well Formed 
Expressions') generating the set of correct query expressions contained in Lo is 
given below. 
<WFE> ::= <P1 > | <P2> \ <A> 
<P1> ::= <Pred>(<A>) | NOT(< Pred>(< A>)) 
<P2> ::= <Pred>(<Pl>) | N O T ( < P r e d > ( < P I >)) 
<Pred> ::= SBEL | SUND | SUNK | HBEL | HUND | HUNK 
5Notice that this expression should be thought of as having an ' S B E L ' predicate in front of it. 
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<A> ::= <E> | N O T ( < £ > ) 
This grammar contains all the expressions analysed before, and allows two levels of 
belief nesting (production rule <P2>). Each of the two levels can be negated, i.e. 
can have a 'NOT' in front of the predicate. Since every belief should be thought 
of as having the prefix 'SBEL' in front of i t , the number of levels of nesting can 
actually be considered equal to three. 
Since < WFE> generates exclusively expressions obtained from < P I >, <P2> 
and < A > , and each of these symbols can produce, in turn, a specific sub-expression 
or the negation of the same sub-expression, every event of Lo has its negation in 
Lo. For example, both of the expressions NOT(HBEL(SBEL(NOT(e)))) and cor-
responding negation HBEL(SBEL(NOT(e))) are generated by <WFE>. 
The inner content of a predicate is defined by the production for the symbol 
<A>, or 'atom', which can be either an 'event' <E> or its negation. The precise 
production rule for the symbol <E> will be described in the next section. 
The reader should bear in mind that the distinction made here between 'atoms', 
'events' and 'predicates' is purely syntactical: all of these expressions should be con-
sidered as different kinds of events, as mentioned earlier in the section. 
This first part of outer language allows to combine various predicates into the 
two levels of nesting of an expression. Even though the meaning of each predicate of 
< Pred > has been clarified, the interpretation of their combinations in a two-level 
expression is yet to be explained. 
In fact, for example, what is the meaning of the query SUND(NOT(HBEL(e)))? 
And, if this meaning may appear 'intuitive', what is the difference — if there is 
one — between the previous query and SUND(HBEL(NOT(e)))? In other words, 
on which basis can these more complex expressions be evaluated True or False? 
The 'algorithmic' meaning of all of the outer expressions wil l be defined, subse-
quently, by the function of interpretation J ( ) , which will identify the specific tests 
which will have to be carried out on the state in order to evaluate any possible 
query. However, the definition of X() will be based on the 'intuitive' meaning of 
the expressions of <WFE>. This meaning, specified in terms of the semantic 
relations which hold between different groups of expressions, is described below. 
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The Meaning of the Attitudes 
The outer language generated by <WFE> contains expressions which are se-
mantically equivalent. The elements of each pair of the following list have been 
considered as having the same meaning: 
1) SUND(NOT(x)) & SUND(a;) 
2) SUND(HBEL(x)) SUND(HUND(z)) 
3) HUND(NOT(x)) HUND(rr) 
4) HUND(SBEL(rc)) & HUND(SUND(x)) 
5) HBEL(HUND(x)) <^ HUND(x) 
6) HBEL(HBEL(a;)) <^ HBEL(a;) 
7) SBEL(SUND(a;)) SUND(x) 
8) SBEL(SBEL(a;)) SBEL(x) 
Equations 1) and 3) formalise the concept according to which if an agent is unde-
cided about the truth of an event, (s)he must also be undecided about its negation. 
Notice that while the first equivalence concerns the speaker model, the other one 
is defined for the expressions specifying the hearer model. 
Equivalence 2) associates SUND(HBEL(a)) with SUND(HUND(a)). The mean-
ing of the first form can be thought to be "The speaker is undecided about whether 
the hearer believes or not the event a". Generalizing, this can be seen as being 
undecided about the opinion of the hearer towards the event 'a', opinion which 
could be either of belief, disbelief or uncertainty. Therefore, the three expressions 
a. SUND(HBEL(a)) 
b. SUND(HBEL(NOT(a)) 
c. SUND(HUND(a)) 
can be considered semantically equivalent, and assumed to represent the same state 
of uncertainty of the speaker towards the hearer's opinion about 'a' 6 . 
6Notice that SUND(HBEL(NOT(a))) is equivalent to SUND(HUND(NOT(a))) because of 2); 
this expression, then, becomes SUND(HUND(a)) through 3). 
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Equivalence 4) is analogous to 2), if each 'S' is replaced with 'H ' and vice versa: 
the three expressions 
a'. HUND(SBEL(a)) 
b'. HUND(SBEL(NOT(a)) 
d. HUND(SUND(a)) 
have to be considered equivalent. 
Finally, equations 5)-6) and 7)-8) represent the implementation of the rules of 
positive and negative introspection (axioms 4 and 5 of modal logic) and 'subjective' 
knowledge (axiom T) for the speaker and hearer model, respectively (see page 25). 
They formalise the concept according to which, if an agent believes (or is undecided 
about) some event, then (s)he believes to be in that attitude, and vice versa. 
Besides the previous relations of equivalence between syntactically different 
queries, the expressions of the language < WFE > have been grouped into three 
semantic 'levels', and the expressions of each level have been required to satisfy a 
condition of mutual exclusivity and exhaustivity. 
The three sets of expressions subject to this restriction are reported below: 
5i(e) = { e, NOT(e), SUND(e) }; 
5 2(e) = { HBEL(e), HBEL(NOT(e)), HUND(e), HUNK(e), SUND(HUND(e)), 
SUND(HUNK(e)) }; 
5 3(e) = { HBEL(SBEL(NOT(e))), HBEL(SUND(e)), HBEL(SUNK(e)), 
HBEL(SBEL(e)), HUND(SUND(e)), HUNK(e), HUND(SUNK(e)) }. 
with e::<E>. 
In other words, for any given event e::<E>, the set S* of queries (formulae 
of Lo) evaluated True by the belief system must satisfy the property according to 
which one and only one expression of each of the sets <Si(e), S2 (e), 53(e) is evaluated 
True 7 . 
7 I n order to guarantee that this property is always respected, a set of restrictions will have to 
be imposed on the inner language of the belief system. 
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^HBEL(SBEUe))) (jHBEL(SUND(g))) (HBEL(SBEL(NOT(e))) (HBEL(SUNK(e)j) 
HUND(SUND(e)) 
HUND(SUNK( e))\ 
( HUNK( e) ^ 
Figure 4.2: Hierarchical representation of the set 53(e) of mutually exclusive and 
exhaustive beliefs. 
Notice that the expressions of Si represent the tri-partition of the speaker's 
attitudes already introduced at page 81; 52 contains the attitudes which define the 
model of the hearer, whereas the set S3 contains the expressions concerning the 
hearer's model of the speaker. 
In order to clarify the meaning of the expressions contained in S 1 - S 3 , consider 
the diagram of Figure 4.2. The tree organizes hierarchically the content of 63(e), 
so that the higher the level in the tree, the more specific the knowledge that the 
hearer has regarding the speaker's opinion, and the lower the level of uncertainty of 
the hearer model. The lowest node (root) HUNK(e) corresponds to no knowledge 
at all with respect to e, whereas the four leaves at the top specify clearly the hearer 
model of the speaker's opinion towards e. 
If an expression is placed at the intersection of branches, i t represents an un-
certain state, in which one of the opinions of the higher nodes connected directly 
to the intersection is supposed to hold, but i t is not clear which one it is. 
For example, the expression HUND(SUNK(e)) can be defined as representing 
the hearer's uncertainty between the two following cases: 1) HBEL(SUNK(e)) and 
2) HUND(SUND(e)). In case 1, the speaker (in the hearer's model) does not know 
the event e. In case 2, the hearer believes the speaker to know e, but is uncertain 
about the specific attitude — amongst the three possible SBEL(e), SBEL(NOT(e)) 
and SUND(e) — that the speaker holds towards the event. 
Swapping the prefixes 'S' with 'H ' for each predicate present in the tree will 
produce a new diagram containing the analogous hierarchical structure for the set 
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5 2(e) 8 . 
Consider now the expressions in the form HBEL(NOT(S.. . (a))): their inter-
pretation can be deduced directly from the diagram of Figure 4.2. 
For example, HBEL(NOT(SBEL(o))) means that the hearer believes that it is 
not the case that the speaker believes 'a'. Thus, the alternative opinions which are 
left are SBEL(NOT(a)), SUND(a) and SUNK(a) (as beliefs of the hearer's model), 
for if the hearer is sure that the speaker does not believe a, then i t is not possible 
for the hearer to be in the state of uncertainty HUND(SUND(e)) — which would 
admit the case HBEL(SBEL(a)) — nor to be in the even more uncertain state 
HUND(SUNK(e)). Hence: 
HBEL(NOT(SBEL(a))) HBEL(SBEL(NOT(a))) V HBEL(SUND(a)) V 
HBEL(SUNK(a)) 
Similarly, for the other two possibilities, we have: 
HBEL(NOT(SUND(a))) ^ HBEL(SBEL(NOT(a))) V HBEL(SBEL(a)) V 
HBEL(SUNK(a)) 
and 
HBEL(NOT(SUNK(a))) <=> HBEL(SBEL(NOT(a))) V HBEL(SBEL(a)) V 
HBEL(SUND(a)) V HUND(SUND(a)) 
Belief by Default 
The imposition of the restrictions on the sets S1-S3 can give rise to a problem of 
finiteness of the state representation. 
In fact, consider the set of possible events generated by <E>. I f the cardinality 
of this set is infinite 9, the number of attitudes to be represented is also infinite. This 
is due to the fact that, for every event e :: <E>, at least one of the three beliefs 
of the set 5i(e) = { e, NOT(e), SUND(e) } has been required to hold. 
If we simply included in the state of the system the specific event of S'i(e) 
8Notice that the new root, SUNK(e), should be dropped from the diagram, being one of the 
contradictory expressions. Moreover, in order to obtain the exact content of 52(e), any prefix 
'SBEL' should also be removed from the new nodes. 
9E.g., <E> could be allowed to generate an infinite list of primitive events E i , E2, 
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which is currently believed by the speaker, and repeated this operation for every 
possible e ::<E>, we would end up with a state containing an infinite number of 
propositions. 
However, the mechanism of interpretation, introduced in the paradigm of the 
belief system, allows this problem to be easily solved through the adoption of a 
'default' belief. The solution consists of assuming one of the possible attitudes to 
be the most common and considering it as the default attitude of the system. This 
attitude will be automatically assumed towards any event e :: <E> — without 
any need to mention the event e in the state — iff none of the others attitudes is 
explicitly stated. The three default expressions chosen for S1S3 are shown below: 
a) SUND(e), for 5i(e); 
b) SUND(HUNK(e)), for S2(e); 
c) HUND(SUNK(e)), for S3(e). 
For example, given e = Ei , the belief SUND(Ei) will be evaluated True by the 
system iff neither E i nor NOT(Ei) belongs to the current state. More formally, 
SUND(e)) -. ( B ( e ) V B(NOT(e))) 
The implementation of the three default mechanisms — and also of the expressions 
in the form HBEL(NOT(S.. . (a))) considered before — will be realized through the 
function of interpretation X{), which can define the truth of any outer query as a 
boolean function of (inner) terms. For example, for <Si(e), 
J(SUND(e)) = - (5(e) V J3(NOT(e))) 
The complete specification of the interpretation X() will be given in Section 4.2.2. 
Features 
Whilst the syntax for the predicates, described in the previous section, is intended 
to capture the different attitudes which speaker and hearer have towards a set of 
events, the second group of expressions concerns the representation of the features 
of an event and of the relations between different events. Such features have been 
introduced to render 'explicit' the relevant information encapsulated in the atomic 
units of 'events', and normally not accessible (see page 77); such information are 
useful for the construction of the discourse structure and for the representation of 
the structure of the belief system itself. 
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In logic, given a proposition p and a formal theory, if p is a theorem of that 
theory, then p must be either a consequence of inference rules and other theorems, 
or be one of the axioms of the theory. Similarly, in a rational system, the presence 
of a belief must be justified (see Sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2). According to the 'foun-
dations' approach, i f an agent believes an event 'e' to be True, then 'e' must either 
be a consequence of a process of reasoning based on other beliefs, or constitute 
a grounded belief, i.e. an event whose truth is, from the agent's point of view, 
unquestionable. 
From a 'cynical' point of view, shared by Armstrong [8], the only beliefs in our 
mind which we do not normally question are those deriving from our direct expe-
rience of the physical reality, that is from our sensorial perception of the external 
world. For example, if the agent A experiences the event E j = "Agent A sees a 
table", then A will strongly believe E i . 
However, considering that the belief system is designed to be used for discourse 
generation purposes, a speaker's belief will be allowed to be left 'unjustified' when 
it is already (supposed to be) believed by the audience. In other words, i f the 
event 'e' is (for the speaker) fully justified — through a reasoning process — and 
HBEL(e) holds, then there is no need to represent, in the knowledge of the belief 
system, the justification(s) for 'e', as this 'supporting evidence' will not have to 
be mentioned in the discourse10. This idea is in accordance with the 'coherence' 
approach, introduced in Sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2. 
If the event 'e' is not believed by the audience and the discourse aims require 
the hearer to believe i t , i t will be necessary, for the discourse to be effective, to use 
the persuasive action of the events which, in the speaker's view, justify the validity 
of the belief. As Cohen and Perrault pointed out, 
" . . . before AGT will be convinced, she needs to know the justifica-
tions for AGTl ' s belief, which may require that AGT believes (or be 
CONVINCED of) the justifications for believing those justifications, 
etc." [25, p.193] 1 1 
Notice that the grounding of events through information provided by other sources 
(i.e. directly by human agents, or through media, such as books, newspapers, etc.) 
is a special case of the grounding through sensory experience, although the credi-
1 0This consideration is based on the assumption that model does not use rhetorical forms. 
n I n this context, AGT and AGT1 represent, respectively, the hearer and the speaker. 
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bility of the information provided will have to be based also on the reliability of the 
source, which, in turn, might require further justification (see [123] for a similar 
discussion on belief grounding). 
In order to represent the mentioned aspects of belief justification — namely, 
reasoning and sensory input — and the relevant relations between events (e.g. 
support and attacks) which are useful for the discourse structure construction, the 
following expressions have been included in Lo: 
a) relation of support between events: SUP(e, e'); 
b) Speaker or Hearer Real events: SR(e), HR(e'); 
c) Speaker or Hearer Inductive EXPeriences: SIEXP(e), HIEXP(e); 
More precisely, these expressions constitute the different forms which an event 
generated by <E> can assume. Let us examine these new terms of the outer 
language Lo. 
a) I f the belief in e' is a consequence of reasoning, then there must be (at least) 
another event e such that the belief in e supports the belief in e'. The expression 
SUP(e,e') means that the belief in the event e is a sufficient reason to believe e', 
but i t does not imply that either e or e' have to be believed. 
Notice that SUP(e,e') constitutes an event itself, and, in order to be believed, 
it should be justified. Hence, we could have supporting evidence for a 'support' 
event, e.g. SUP(e,SUP(e', e")). Notice also that this event could be believed by 
the speaker, but not by the hearer, or vice versa. This underlines the fact that the 
model allows subjective interpretations of the world: different agents might have 
different perceptions of the idea of 'sufficient justification' for a specific event, and 
thus have different opinions towards a SUP() event. 
b) The expressions SR(e) and HR(e) indicate that the event e is a real experience 
for, respectively, the speaker and the hearer. In other words, the agent believes 
e because (s)he has perceived its happening through sensorial experience. This 
means that the agent was involved directly in the event as its object or subject, or 
simply was a 'spectator' of the event. 
Even in this case, the expression SR(e) constitutes an event itself, but its pres-
ence in the set of the speaker's beliefs does not require any further justification or 
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support, neither does the presence of the event 'e'. The same property applies to 
HR(e), in the (speaker's) model of the hearer. For example, i f HR(Es) is assumed 
to hold, then no further support is needed, in the hearer model, to justify the pres-
ence of the belief HBEL(E 3 ) 1 2 . 
Notice that if e=SUP(Ei,E 2), the expression SR(e) should not be considered 
correct. In fact, a support relation cannot be 'experienced' physically: what can be 
perceived is simply the happening of E x and the subsequent happening of E 2 . 
The only way in which a support relation between two events E i and E 2 can be 
learned through sensorial perception consists of a sequence of repeated experiences 
in which, every time, the happening of E i produces the happening of E 2 . In this 
case, the mechanism of induction wil l lead to a generalization, producing the ground 
to believe that a causal relation between the two events does exist. 
c) In order to distinguish a 'normal' real experience from an inductive one, the two 
following additional event-qualifiers have been included in the language Lo: 
SIEXP(s), HIEXP(s) 
indicating, for the speaker and hearer, that the support event s=SUP() is an 
Inductive EXPerience of the agent. The properties and characteristics of these 
expressions (e.g. no need for further justification) are the same as those of the 
corresponding forms SR() and HR() . 
As mentioned in the previous sub-section, for every event e generated by <E> 
there are three possible attitudes which the system-speaker can adopt: SBEL(e), 
SUND(e) and SBEL(NOT(e)). Since at least one of these attitudes must be chosen, 
the decision about which category an event e wil l belong to should be taken by 
assessing the various supports which hold in favour of e and in favour of NOT(e). 
For example, if neither e nor NOT(e) has any supporting argument — i.e. an-
other event e' such that SBEL(e') and SBEL(SUP(e', e)) or SBEL(SUP(e',NOT(e))) 
— then the belief SUND(e) should be adopted by the system. 
Another situation in which an uncertain attitude should be chosen is represented 
12Since HR(E 3 ) is one of the speaker's beliefs, it should be justified. However, this would not 
be necessary if, for each belief HR(e), the model also assumed HBEL(HR(e)): in fact, this would 
allow HR(e) to be left 'unjustified', as already believed by the audience. This assumption will 
actually be adopted by the model through one of its inference rules (Section 4.2.2). 
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Figure 4.3: Graphical representation of balanced supports for E and NOT(E). 
in Fig. 4.3, in which two contradictory events have, simultaneously, supporting 
arguments. 
The relation SUP(e, e') should not be treated simply as the logical implication, 
e —> e' (read "e implies e'"), but, rather, as a 'defeasible' form of implication. 
This peculiar interpretation given to the SUP relationship is originated by the 
presence of uncertainty in the model. In fact, it is possible to show that only if 
the possibility of an uncertain attitude is excluded, does believing SUP(t/,:r) entail 
believing SUP(NOT(a;)>NOT(y)). 
To see this, assume a generic agent A to believe the two following events: 
Let us first consider the case in which there can be no uncertainty in the model, 
which means that A must necessarily believe either y or NOT(y), that is yV NOT(y) 
must be always True. 
If ABEL(y) 1 3 , then there would be supporting evidence for A to believe x, which 
contradicts ABEL(NOT(x)). Hence, for the law of the excluded middle, i t must be 
ABEL(NOT(y)). In this case, believing SVP(y, x) and NOT(x) has led to NOT(j/), 
as if SUP(y,x) were equivalent to SUP(NOT(x),NOT(y)). 
Nevertheless, in a model which admits uncertainty, the fact that A believes 
NOT(s) A S\JP(y,x) leads only to the conclusion that A cannot — coherently — 
believe y, but leaves open two possible attitudes: ABEL(NOT(y)) and AUND(y) 1 4 . 
Hence, in this case, it is not possible to conclude ABEL(NOT(y)) by exclusion, and 
the SUP() relationship cannot be interpreted exactly as the logical implication. 
Summarizing, the second half of the BNF formalization of the grammar < WFE >, 
generating the outer language Lo, is given below: 
NOT(x), SUP(y,x) 
Read "agent A BELieves y". 
Read "A is UNDecided about y". 
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<Su> 
<Ei> 
<E> SR(<Ei>) | ER(<Ei>) | S U P ( < y l > , < . 4 > ) 
SIEXP(<Su>) | H I E X P ( < S u > ) | <Ei> 
S U P ( < A > , < A > ) | N 0 T ( S U P ( < J 4 > , < A > ) ) 
E 0 | E i | E 2 | E 3 | . . . | E „ . . . 
The symbol <A> corresponds to <E> | N O T < £ ' > , as already introduced in 
the first part of the BNF formalization, given in the previous section. 
I t should be noticed that the inner argument of the two 'real' expressions SR() 
and HR() cannot be a negative event. This is because i t is not possible to experi-
ence something which is not. Although in natural language there are expressions 
which could be interpreted as such, their implicit meaning, after a careful analysis, 
appears to 'summarize' a collection of positive facts. This view is also endorsed by 
Armstrong, who writes: 
"It seems reasonable to say instead that the nature of a thing is ex-
hausted by its positive properties. That is to say, positive properties 
are a thing's only properties. I t is they, in all their multitude and diver-
sity, which make negative predicates applicable to objects." [8, p.124] 
For example, consider the event "My watch does not work": although it would 
appear to be a real negative experience, it consists actually of the result of the 
repeated (positive) real experiences "Its hands are completely immobile" and "It is 
completely silent", collected continuously during the last minute or so. 
On the other hand, the argument of an inductive real experience can be a 
negated event. For example, the expression SIEXP(NOT(SUP(Ei ,E 2))) is perfectly 
acceptable. In fact, this event represents one or many counter-example experiences, 
in which the realization of the event E j did not lead to the happening of E 2-
Notice also that each of the two arguments of a SUP() event is allowed to be 
an 'atom' <A>, which might be replaced, in turn, by another SUP() event, and 
so forth, yielding to expressions with an arbitrarily-high level of nested supports. 
Finally, a belief event cannot be considered a real experience. If that were 
the case, then the belief would not need further support, whereas we expect the 
model to have a rational justification for each belief which is not grounded. In 
fact, a real experience event can only be an event involving the agent's sensorial 
perception, and the only expressions allowed to represent i t are the 'primitive' 
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events E 0 , E i , E 2 , •. • • 
Shown below are few examples of query expressions generated by <WFE>: 
NOT(HBEL(NOT(HBEL(E 
HUND(NOT(SR(E 3 4))) 
HBEL(NOT(SUNK(SUP(E 4 ,NOT(E 3))))) 
NOT(SUND(HUNK(SUP(HR(E 2),SUP(E 3,E 5))))) 
One of the possible derivations of the first query is reported below: 
<WFE> <P2> -)• N O T ( < P r e d > ( < p l > ) ) -> 
N O T ( H B E L ( < P l > ) ) -> 
-> NOT(HBEL(NOT(<Pre r f>(<A>) ) ) ) -> 
->• NOT(HBEL(NOT(HBEL(< A >)))) -> 
-> NOT(HBEL(NOT(HBEL(<£ '>) ) ) ) -)• 
-> NOT(HBEL(NOT(HBEL(<Ei>) ) ) ) ->• 
->• NOT(HBEL(NOT(HBEL(E!)))) 
The precise 'algorithmic' meaning of each outer expression generated by < WFE> 
is determined by the specific function of interpretation J ( ) , which is described in 
the following section. 
4.2.2 The BP Algorithm iA> 
This section describes the main component of the belief system {Lo, Li, A), namely, 
the BP algorithm lA\ 
As explained in Section 3.2 and 3.2, the BP algorithm calculates the truth of 
every expression w G Lo as the logical value assumed by the boolean function X(w) 
in the 'completed' state S' — CR(S), where S is the current state, and R the set 
of inference rules adopted. 
The BP algorithm A can be summarized by the following abstract steps: 
A 
- let w € Lo be the expression to be evaluated, S C Li the current state, R a 
set of inference rules on Li and J ( ) an interpretation of Lo on Li. 
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1 Calculate S' = CR{S); 
2 result:= T(w) \s>. 
There are two important points which should be made clear. 
First of all, there are expressions of Lo which should be always evaluated True. 
For example, as mentioned before, the event SUNK (a;) cannot be held as one of 
the speaker's beliefs, and therefore its negation NOT(SUNK(x)) will always be 
evaluated True. 
This can be realized by associating these expressions with the boolean function 
constantly true TT = True, and associating their negation with the boolean function 
constantly false Tp = False. 
The set of contradictory expressions, associated with TF, is reported below: 
I) SUND(SR(e)) 
II) SUND(SIEXP(e)) 
I I I ) SUNK(z) 
IV) SUND(SUNK(a)) 
V) SUND(SUND(a)) 
VI) SUND(SBEL(a)) 
I') HUND(HR(e)) 
I I ' ) HUND(HIEXP(e)) 
IIP) HBEL(HUNK(a;)) 
I V ) HUND(HUNK(o)) 
V ) HUND(HUND(a)) 
VP) HUND(HBEL(a)) 
The first two pairs exclude the possibility for an agent (speaker or hearer) to be 
undecided about its own real (or inductive) experiences: this means that, for any 
given event e::<E>, the agent knows exactly if 'e' does or does not constitute a 
real experience15. 
The two pairs III)—III ') , I V ) - I V ) concern the concept of 'unknown': as already 
discussed, in the speaker model, the belief SUNK(a:) is False for any expression 
x, and so is the symmetrical event for the hearer model HBEL(HUNK(a;)). Con-
sequently, i t is not possible for an agent to be undecided about the knowledge of 
1 5This excludes the possibility of uncertainty in the memories concerning the real experiences 
of an agent. 
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an event: as soon as the event 'a' is conceived, it becomes immediately known 
The last two pairs exclude states of uncertainty of an agent towards its own 
opinions concerning an event a::< A > : an agent knows whether or not (s)he believes 
(or is undecided about) a specific event. 
The set of tautologies is obtained simply by negating all the contradictory ex-
pressions, that is by adding the prefix NOT() to each term of the previous list of 
pairs. Moreover, using the pairs I ) -T) , II)—II'), other four tautologies can be iden-
tified, consisting of the same negated expressions to which the prefix HBEL() has 
been added: this is equivalent to 'transfer' these tautologies into the hearer model 1 6. 
The second important observation concerns the characteristics of the interpre-
tation function I(): if the expression w G Lo belongs also to the inner language 
Li C Lo, the function associated to w is simply B(w) (by definition of interpreta-
tion; see also Equation 3.2), where B() is the boolean evaluation of Li determined 
by the 'completed' state S'. This means that X() must be such that 
In order to define entirely the algorithm A, let us begin by specifying the interpre-
tation J ( ) . 
Interpretation 
The interpretation J ( ) associates every expression of Lo with a boolean function 
defined over a subset of Lo. The specific interpretation adopted by the BP algo-
rithm lA' is described below. 
Let w be an expression of Lo «— <WFE>; the boolean function X{w) associ-
ated to w is 
where w' and the function check() are defined as follows: 
1. w' is obtained from w by applying, whenever possible, the following syntac-
16Notice that the same operation could be done for the other tautologies, but the resulting 
expressions would not belong to the language <WFE>, as containing three levels of nested 
predicates. 
( I V - I V ) . 
True i f w G S' 
Vw G Li, l(w) 
False otherwise 
X(w) = check(w') (4.2) 
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tical transformations: 
0. NOT(NOT(a)) 
1. SUND(NOT(x)) 
2. SUND(HBEL(a)) 
SUND(ar) 
SUND(HUND(a)) 
3. HUND(NOT(:r)) 
4. HUND(SBEL(x)) 
HUND(a;) 
HUND(SUND(x)) 
5. H B E L ( H U N D ( a ; ) ) — • H U N D ( J ; ) 
6. H B E L ( H B E L ( x ) ) — • H B E L ( a ; ) 
7. 
8. 
SUNK(p(a)) 
HUNK(p(a)) 
SUNK(a) 
HUNK(a) 
for any string x and any one-argument expression p(a) such that the left hand 
sides of the reductions are expressions of Lo. For example, SUNK(NOT(a)) 
becomes SUNK(a) (using 7), but SUNK(SUP(e, e')) will be left unchanged, 
as p(a)=SUP(e, e') has two arguments. 
I t is important to notice that these simplifications should be applied to every 
part of w (i.e. even inside other predicates) and until there are no more trans-
formations applicable. For example, the expression HBEL(HUND(NOT(a))) 
could be firstly reduced to HBEL(HUND(a)) using reduction 3, and then to 
HUND(a) via reduction 5. 
2. The function check() is defined through the mechanism of 'pattern match-
ing'. The expression w' is matched against a sequence of expressions — in 
a specific order — which might contain variables. A match returns True iff, 
for each variable v{ of the expression, there exists a string Si such that, sub-
stituting every variable Vi with the associated string S j , the two expressions 
result to be identical. I t should be pointed out that the order in which w' 
is matched against the list of possible cases is important and needs to be re-
spected to guarantee correct results. This is due to the fact that many of the 
case definitions of the function check are based on the assumption that the 
expression w' has not matched any of the previous possibilities, and therefore 
must be of a certain type. 
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The ordered sequence of matches is given below. Notice that the symbol ' = ' 
is used as abbreviation for the word 'matches', the symbol '_' represents a 
variable whose value is not relevant, and the notation '::' indicates the type 
of a variable, i.e. the production rule of <WFE> which generates all the 
possible strings which can be used to instantiate the variable (e.g. if a :: 
<A>, then the variable 'a' can be instantiated to any string generated by 
<A>). 
check{w') — 
TT if w' matches one of the tautologies; 
J~p if w' matches one of the contradictions; 
check(x) i f w' ^ SBEL(x); 
-. J3(SR(eO) if w' ^ NOT(SR(ej)); 
- 5(SIEXP(s)) i f w' ~ NOT(SIEXP(s)); 
B(w') i f w' :: <A>; 
-. check(x) i f w' ^ NOT(x); 
- i ( B(HUND(e)) V S(HBEL(NOT(e))) V £(SUND(HBEL(e))) V 
B(HUND(e)) V c/iecA;(HUNK(e)) ) i f w' = SUND(HUNK(e)); 
B(w') if w' ^ SUND(HUNDQ); 
n ( 5 ( e ) V f l ( N O T ( e ) ) ) if w' ^ SUND(e); 
X(HUNK(a)) V X(HUNK(fc)) if w' ^ HUNK(SUP(o, &)); 
B{w') if w' = HUNK(ej); 
-. ( 5(HBEL(SBEL(NOT(e)))) V £?(HBEL(SBEL(e))) V £(HBEL(SUND(e))) V 
£(HUND(SUND(e))) V c/iecA;(HBEL(SUNK(e))) V c/iecfc (HUNK (e)) ) 
if w' = HUND(SUNK(e)); 
B(w') if w' ~ HUND(_); 
£(HBEL(SBEL(NOT(e)))) V B(HBEL(SBEL(e))) V c/iecA;(HBEL(SUNK(e))) 
if w' ^ HBEL(NOT(SUND(e))); 
X (HBEL(SBEL(NOT(a)))) V I (HBEL(SUND(a))) V X (HBEL(SUNK(a))) 
if w' £* HBEL(NOT(SBEL(a))); 
£(HBEL(SBEL(NOT(e)))) V £(HBEL(SBEL(e))) V JB(HBEL(SUND(e))) V 
£(HUND(SUND(e))) i f w' ^ HBEL(NOT(SUNK(e))); 
- check (HUNK (e)) i f w' ^ HBEL(NOT(HUNK(e))); 
X (HBEL(NOT(a))) V X (HUND(o)) i f w' ^ HBEL(NOT(HBEL(a))); 
£(HBEL(NOT(e))) V B(HBEL(e)) i f w' ^ HBEL(NOT(HUND(e))); 
X (HBEL(SUNK(a))) V X (HBEL(SUNK(6))) 
if w' S HBEL(SUNK(SUP(a,6))); 
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B(w') i f w' ^ HBEL(_); 
If the type of a variable is not indicated, the variable can be matched with any 
expression of <WFE>. 
Notice that the negation '->' indicates the unary logical operator, whilst the 
predicate 'NOT' is part of the syntax; for example, the expression B(NOT(e)) 
returns True iff the string "NOT(e)" is present in the current state, whereas 
l->check(xy returns the boolean negation of the truth value of check(x). 
Summarizing, the second step of the algorithm A has been refined into the two 
following sub-steps: 
Before analysing the reasons which motivated the previous definitions of the func-
tion check() and the simplifications 0-8, let us see, with an example, how they 
work. 
Example 4.1 Suppose the expression which has to be evaluated to be 
w = SBEL(NOT(SUND(NOT(E;)))) 
First of all, simplification 1 will transform w into 
w' = SBEL(NOT(SUND(E i))) 
Assuming that neither w' nor any of its sub-expressions — NOT(SUND(Ei)), 
SUND(Ei) and E i — match a tautology or a contradiction, the boolean func-
tion T{w) associated to w can be deduced from the definition of check() in the 
following way: 
I(w) = check(w') 
2 . 1 w' = simplify (w); 
2.2 result:= check(w') \s>. 
= check (SBEL(x)) 
= check(x) 
= check(NOT(x')) 
= - i check(x') 
- with x = NOT(SUND(E!)) 
- by def. of check ( ) 
- w i t h x' = SUND(Ei) 
-def. o f c h e c k { ) (x f.<A>) 
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=-ic/iecA;(SUND(Ei)) -substitution 
= - . - . ( £ ( E i ) v £ ( N O T ( E i ) ) ) -def . of check ( ) 
= B(Ex) V J B(NOT(E 1 )) - elimination 
In conclusion, X{w) — B(E{) V JB(NOT(E 1)). Hence, the expression w, which can 
be read as "the speaker believes not to be undecided about the event NOT(Ei)" , 
will be evaluated True if either E i or NOT(Ei) belongs to the (completed) state 
S'. In fact, i f one of these two beliefs holds, then the speaker cannot be undecided 
about NOT(Ei) , as (s)he either believes it , or believes its negation. 
Let us now examine the meaning of the nine simplifications applied to the 
expression w given in input to the BP. 
The first one eliminates any double negation present in the event, according to 
Equation 4.1. 
Simplifications 1-6 have been deduced from the relations of equivalence l ) -6) 
which hold between these expressions (see page 86). Their role consists simply 
of choosing one of the two forms as the 'standard' one. For example, because of 
equivalence 1), the two expressions 
SUND(a), SUND(NOT(a)) 
are considered semantically equivalent. Through simplification 1, the simpler non-
negative syntax of the former has been chosen as representative of both: every 
occurrence of the latter form will be automatically reduced to this one. 
It should be noticed that equivalences 7)-8) do not have a corresponding pair 
of simplifications: in fact, these relations, expressing the rule of reflection for the 
speaker, have been implemented directly through the definition of the function 
check(), as i t will be explained subsequently. 
The last two simplifications are concerned with the concept of 'unknown' event. 
The idea behind them is that an event is unknown if i t contains an unknown 
argument. For example, the event HUND(Ei) cannot have been conceived in the 
hearer's mind if (s)he has never conceived the argument 'E i ' ; neither could, for the 
same reason, the event HBEL(NOT(E!)), etc. 
Hence, any query in the form HUNK() or SUNK() wil l be reduced to HUNK(ej) 
and SUNK(ej), where e4 ::<Ei> is the innermost argument of the initial ex-
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pression. The only exception to this rule occurs when the expression contains 
a SUP() relation, and thus presents more than one innermost argument. In fact, 
the query HUNK(SUP(Ei,E 2)), for example, cannot be simplified, as the expres-
sion HUNK(E 1 ,E 2 ) would not be syntactically correct (as it cannot be generated 
by <WFE>). 
However, the event SUP(E!,E 2) should be considered unknown by an agent iff 
any of the events Eh E 2 is unknown. More formally: 
These rules of interpretation have been actually realized by the function check() 
through the use of boolean functions, as will be shown in the following paragraphs. 
I t should be noticed that the actual boolean function X{w) associated to an 
expression w is identified implicitly by the definition of the function check(w), 
which, in some cases, is recursive. 
The recursive 'call' to the function Z ( ) inside the definition of check() is neces-
sary when the innermost argument 'a' of the expression which is being considered 
can be a negative event. I f this is the case, the new terms which have to be 
evaluated might need the reapplication of some of the simplifications 0-8. 
The recursion on check() itself has been used when the truth value of the 
argument might be determined not simply by its presence in the current state (and 
thus calculated directly using the function B()) but, instead, by the value of an 
associated boolean function. 
For example, i f w' =SBEL(a;), the result of check(w') is defined as check(x) 
and not simply as B(x). In fact, if x =SUND(E]), for example, the truth of 
SUND(Ei) is determined as -. ( B { E i ) V fl(NOT(Ei)) ), and not simply by check-
ing if SUND(Ex) belongs to the current state. 
Let us now examine, one at a time, all the cases which constitute the definition 
of the function check(). 
The cases presented take into consideration every possible expression w' :: 
<WFE> which has been 'filtered' by the simplifications 0-8. The reader should 
bear in mind that the order in which the expression w' is matched against the 
possible cases does matter, and, indeed, should be the one given in the definition 
HUNK(a) V HUNK(fc) HUNK SUP a, b)) 
SUNK(SUP(a,ft)) SUNK a) V SUNK(fc) 
(4.3) 
(4.4) 
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of the function check(). 
The first case after the in i t i a l match of the expression w' against the tautologies 
and contradictions constitutes the equivalent of the rule of 'necessitation': the 
expression SBEL(:r) is evaluated True i f f the event x is True in the speaker model. 
The two following cases implement a sort of 'default mechanism' for the two 
beliefs NOT(SR(e)) and NOT(SIEXP(s ) ) , as explained below. 
The first case assumes NOT(SR(e)) to be True i f f the belief SR(e) is not present 
in the state. This definit ion reflects a commonly adopted behaviour, according to 
which i f we cannot recall in our memory an event, we w i l l assume (by default) that 
event not to be part of our past (real) experience. I n other words, i n case of real 
experiences (only), the system adopts the Closed Wor ld Assumption, in which i f 
something is not explicit ly stated, i t is considered False. 
The second one is exactly the same, only that i t deals w i t h inductive real expe-
riences containing support events s :: <Su>. 
I t is interesting to notice that the definition of the two previous boolean func-
tions forces any query in the fo rm SUND(SR(e)) or SUND(SIEXP(s) ) to be eval-
uated False. This means that the presence of these two expressions in the list of 
contradictions (respectively, I and I I ) is actually unnecessary. 
The case dealing w i t h any expression w' :: < A > is reached only i f the previous 
cases have not produced a successful match. According to this definition, all the 
possible expressions generated by <A > (apart f rom the previous two) are evaluated 
simply by checking for their presence in the current state. I n other words, these 
expressions are treated as elements of the inner language Li, and associated to the 
boolean function B(w'). 
The following case, w' = N O T (a;), deals w i th any negated expression generated 
by < P 1 > or <P2>. Notice that whilst for the expressions e :: <E> i t is not 
always true that e V N O T ( e ) (for i t could as well be SUND(e)) , for all the other 
queries x of type < P 1 > or <P2> the meaning of N O T ( x ) includes the case of 
uncertainty, and thus i t is possible to impose that x V NOT(:r ) always hold. Hence, 
in such cases, the t r u t h of N O T ( x ) has been defined simply as the logical negation 
of the t r u t h value of x, that is check (x). 
More formally, 
VS C Li, Vx :: <WFF>, x/.<E>, X{x) V J ( N O T ( x ) ) | s = True 
The next case implements the default mechanism for u / = S U N D ( H U N K ( e ) ) , the 
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default belief of the set 5 2(e), which w i l l be evaluated True i f f none of the terms 
present in the set S2{e) \ {w1} is evaluated True. 
The following case evaluates any expression w' = SUND(HUND(_)) by checking 
for its presence in the state (i.e. w' G Li). 
Case SUND(e) realizes the default mechanism for the set Si(e). Notice that 
because of simplification 1, the event e cannot be a negated event. 
The next match, w' = HUNK(SUP(a , b)), realizes the interpretation explained 
before (Equation 4.3). 
Because of simplifications 7-8, the case w' = H U N K ( e j ) is reached only by 
expressions w i t h ej :: <Ei>. Hence, w' is simply searched for in the current state 
(w' e Li). 
The next case implements the default rule for the set 53(e), whilst the subse-
quent match w' = HUND(_) — which can be reached successfully only by queries in 
the fo rm HUND(e) w i th e :: <E> — w i l l be treated as inner language expressions 
(i.e. associated to B(w')). 
The three following cases corresponds to the relations formalized at page 89, 
deduced f rom the diagram of Figure 4.2. 
Query w' = H B E L ( N O T ( H U N K ( e ) ) ) can be thought as asking whether the 
hearer believes to have conceived the event 'e' in his (her) mind. The answer is 
'yes' i f f the event is not unknown by the hearer, i.e. -> check(HUNK(e)). 
The next three cases are self explanatory; al l the remaining expressions in the 
form HBEL(_) which did not match any of the previous cases are treated as ele-
ments of the inner language Li by the last case of the definit ion. 
Through the given definition of interpretation X ( ) , i t is possible to identify the 
inner language Li C Lo. I n fact, the inner language Li can be defined as the union 
of all the domains of the boolean functions adopted by the interpretation I ( ) . 
These domains can be identified by isolating all the expressions w' of Lo which the 
funct ion check() associates directly to the boolean funct ion B(w'). 
However, the formal definition of the inner language is the object of Sec-
t ion 4.2.3. The following sub-section completes the specification of the BP al-
gori thm ' A ' , by listing the inference rules of the set R. 
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Inference R u l e s 
The set R of inference rules adopted by the algori thm A is listed below. Each rule 
uses a variable, and represents, in fact, a set of inference rules. The correspond-
ing 'grounded' set can be obtained by replacing the variable w i t h all the possible 
expressions which i t represents. 
Two different types of variables have been used, each type being associated to 
a specific letter: 
• variable e, of type <Ei> (e :: <Ei>); 
• variable s, of type <Su> (s :: <Su>). 
The production rules for <Ei> and <Su> are those previously defined for the 
syntax <WFE>, generating the outer language Lo. 
The right-hand side (consequence) of many rules contains mult iple terms, sepa-
rated by commas (' , ')• In such cases, the rule should be interpreted as representing 
many rules, each one having the same premiss and, as single consequence, a differ-
ent term taken f rom the right-hand side of the considered rule. 
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ii) SR(e) h e 
12) SIEXP(s) h s 
13) HR(e) h e, HBEL(HR(e) ) 
U) HIEXP(s ) h s, H B E L ( H I E X P ( s ) ) , N O T ( H I E X P ( N O T ( s ) ) ) 
z 5) HBEL(SR(e)) h H B E L ( C f l 4 { S R ( e ) } ) 
16) HBEL(SIEXP(s ) ) h H B E L ( C R 4 { S I E X P ( s ) } ) 
17) HBEL(HR(e) ) h H B E L ( C # 4 { H R ( e ) } ) 
is) H B E L ( H I E X P ( s ) ) h H B E L ( C R 4 { H I E X P ( s ) } ) 
i 9 ) HBEL(SBEL(SR(e)) ) h H B E L ( S B E L ( C f i 4 { S R ( e ) } ) ) 
HBEL(SBEL(SIEXP(s ) ) ) h H B E L ( S B E L ( C H 4 { S I E X P ( s ) } ) ) 
HBEL(SBEL(HR(e) ) ) h H B E L ( S B E L ( C J e 4 { H R ( e ) } ) ) 
HBEL(SBEL(HIEXP(s ) ) ) h H B E L ( S B E L ( C H 4 { H I E X P ( s ) } ) ) 
NOT(HR(e) ) h HBEL(NOT(HR(e ) ) ) 
N O T ( H I E X P ( s ) ) h H B E L ( N O T ( H I E X P ( s ) ) ) 
HBEL(SR(e)) h HBEL(SBEL(SR(e))) 
HBEL(SIEXP(s ) ) h HBEL(SBEL(SIEXP(s ) ) ) , H B E L ( N O T ( S I E X P ( N O T ( s ) ) ) ) 
HBEL(SBEL(SR(e))) h HBEL(SR(e)) 
HBEL(SBEL(SIEXP(s ) ) ) h HBEL(SIEXP(s ) ) , H B E L ( S B E L ( N O T ( S I E X P ( N O T ( s ) ) ) ) 
where R4 = {ii, i2,13, U}. Notice that the expressions in the form ' p r e d ( C R { X } ) ' 
represent, again, a set of consequences, defined as follows: 
pred(CR{x}) = {pred(e) | e e C R { x } } 
I n words, this set contains all the expressions having predicate lpred' and, as argu-
ment, one of the elements of the closure CR{X}. 
For example, rule i7 can be rewritten as follows: 
i 7 ) HBEL(HR(e) ) h HBEL(e) , HBEL(HR(e ) ) , H B E L ( H B E L ( H R ( e ) ) 
since C R 4 { H R ( e ) } = { e, HR(e), HBEL(HR(e) ) } 1 7 . Hence, rule i7 is equivalent to 
1 7Notice that the original element HR(e) can be removed from this closure set, as simply 
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the two following rules: 
i'7) HBEL(HR(e) ) h HBEL(e) 
i?) HBEL(HR(e) ) h H B E L ( H B E L ( H R ( e ) ) ) 
Rules ii and i2 are quite straightforward: i f the speaker has a real (or inductive) 
experience, the event object of that experience w i l l have to be believed. 
Rules i3 and z4 correspond to rules i\ and z2, respectively, 'transferred' into the 
hearer model. 
Rule i3 should be read as follows: i f the speaker believes that the event 'e' is 
a real experience for the hearer, then (s)he should also believe that 1) 'e' is True, 
and 2) the hearer believes 'e' to be a real experience. 
In fact, i f we do believe someone to have witnessed an event, then we should 
also believe the event to have happened. The second consequence implies that the 
speaker expects the hearer to be always aware of the experiences that (she believes) 
the hearer has experienced. This excludes possible states of unconsciousness or 
altered sensorial perceptions in the hearer. Moreover, this implies that the system 
assumes that there is no divergence of opinions w i t h regard to real experience events 
which (the speaker believes) have been 'shared' by S and H . 
Rule z4 is analogous to z3, except for the fact that one more consequence is 
required, for inductive experiences can contain negated events. I n fact, i f the hearer 
has (inductively) experienced the support s, then (s)he cannot possibly hold the 
belief in the counter example NOT(s) at the same time, as this would invalidate 
the whole sequence of inductive experiences 1 8. 
The asymmetry between the consequences of i 3 - i 4 and those of rules i\-ii is 
only apparent. I n fact, i f we assume the premisses of rules ix and i 2 to hold, then we 
can conclude that the expressions — for the speaker model — analogous to those 
of rules i%-i± w i l l be evaluated True through the mechanism of interpretation. 
In fact, considering i\, i t is easy to see that f r o m the presence of the expres-
sion SR(e) in the state i t follows that also the belief SBEL(SR(e)) (which is the 
analogous of HBEL(HR(e) ) in i 3 ) is evaluated True. 
As far as i 2 is concerned, f rom the presence of SIEXP(s) i t follows immediately 
that SBEL(SIEXP(s)) (symmetrical of H B E L ( H I E X P ( s ) ) in i4). Moreover, the 
re-generating the premiss of the rule itself. 
1 8Notice that the variable s::<Su> can also represent a negated support event NOT(SUP()) . 
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belief N O T ( S I E X P ( N O T ( s ) ) ) is True i f f S IEXP(NOT(s ) ) does not belong to the 
state (from the default mechanism introduced for this expression); on the other 
hand, SIEXP(NOT(s) ) cannot coexist w i t h SIEXP(s) (as rule i2 would produce the 
consequences s and NOT(s ) , which are supposed to be mutual ly exclusive). Hence, 
f rom the presence of SIEXP(s) , i t follows impl ic i t ly that NOT(SIEXP(NOT(s ) ) ) 
(symmetrical of N O T ( H I E X P ( N O T ( s ) ) ) in rule i 4 ) is True. 
The two groups of rules i 5 - i 8 and 29—^12 are based on rules ii-i^. rules i5-i& 
represent the equivalent of i\-i4 transferred into the hearer model, their premisses 
and consequences being essentially unchanged except for the prefix ' H B E L ' which 
has been added in f ront of them; similarly, ig-in constitute the same rules 'trans-
lated' for the hearer's model of the speaker through the addit ion of the predicated 
H B E L ( S B E L Q ) 1 9 -
Rules ii3~iu are similar to rules i^-U and are based on the same hypothesis of 
'awareness' of the hearer, but draw the inference f rom the belief that the hearer 
did not experience a specific event: if , for some reason, we believe that the hearer 
did not witness an event 'e', then we should also believe that 'e' is not part of the 
hearer's experiences, and therefore that (s)he believes the same. 
The symmetrical cases for the speaker NOT(SR(e)) h SBEL(NOT(SR(e))) and 
NOT(SIEXP(s ) ) h SBEL(NOT(SIEXP(s) ) ) have not been included as already 
realized through the interpretation X ( ) . 
Rules i\5-i\e constitute a 'completion' of rules is—*6 (they have the same pre-
misses). Their introduction is due to the absence of the terms 
SBEL(SR(e)) and 
SBEL(SIEXP(s)) , NOT(SIEXP(NOT(s ) ) ) 
as 'explicit ' consequences in rules i\ and i2, respectively. 
The same absence would lead to the analogous completion of rules ig-iw w i th 
term HBEL(SBEL(SBEL(SR(e)) ) ) for i 9 and HBEL(SBEL(SBEL(SIEXP(s ) ) ) ) , 
H B E L ( S B E L ( N O T ( S I E X P ( N O T ( s ) ) ) ) for i w , which should be added to rules i 1 7 -
However, of these expressions, only the last one is generable by <WFE>, and 
has 'survived' in the consequences of rule 
The other two consequences in rules in and i i S — namely, HBEL(SR(e)) and 
HBEL(SIEXP(s ) ) — derive f rom the consideration according to which the hearer is 
1 9 T h e adoption of the formalism of closure C / ? 4 { } in the definition of rules 15-112 is purely 
due to explanatory reasons: these rules can be easily rendered 'explicit' and rewritten as normal 
inference rules. Notice also that in i\\-ii2 the consequences containing three levels of belief nesting 
(e.g. HBEL(SBEL(HBEL(HR(e) ) ) ) ) should not be considered, as not allowed by <WFE>. 
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likely to make the same assumptions about the speaker that the latter makes about 
the former in rules i^-i^, where the hearer is expected to be always aware of the 
real experiences (s)he has lived, excluding states of unconsciousness and uncertain 
memories. On the same basis, i n z 1 7 , the hearer (is expected to) 'deduce' that f rom 
SBEL(SR(e)) i t must follow SR(e), and similarly for z 1 8 , in the case of an inductive 
experience. 
This set R of inference rules w i l l be applied to the set of inner 2 0 beliefs S C 
Li, extending i t — through the operation of closure — into a larger set of inner 
expressions S' = CR(S) which w i l l be used as current state by the BP algorithm. 
I t should be noticed that the set of inference rules described represents finitely — 
through the use of variables — an infinite set of inference rules: i n fact, the variable 
s::<Su> can be replaced by an infinite number of support expressions, having an 
arbi t rar i ly high level of nesting; moreover, e::<Ei> represents a countable inf ini ty 
of 'pr imi t ive ' events E j , w i th i £ K. 
However, i f the given state S contains a finite number of propositions, its closure 
S' = CR(S), calculated using the given set R, is also a finite set, and the algorithm 
which calculates S' w i l l always terminate. This result holds for this specific set of 
rules R, and is proven by the theorem reported below, which concludes this section. 
T h e o r e m 4.1 Given a finite set S of expressions generated by <WFE>, the 
closure S' = CR(S) is finite. 
P r o o f Each of the two arguments of a SUP() event is allowed to be a SUP() 
event itself, yielding to expressions w i t h an arbitrary high level of nested supports. 
Since this infini te recursion is syntactically permitted only in case of a SUP() 
event, there are only two ways of obtaining an infini te set of beliefs which contain 
expressions of <WFE>: 1) to generate all the possible SUP() expressions; 2) to 
generate all the infini te number of primit ive events of type <Ei>. 
However, considering the inference rules ii~iis, none of them increases the level 
of support nesting or introduces new primit ive events E j , and, therefore, none of 
them can be used to produce an infinite set of < WFE > expressions f rom an in i t ia l 
one which is finite. 
• 
The formal definition of the inner language Li will be given in the next section. 
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4.2.3 The Inner language 
From the definition of interpretation T(), i t can be seen that the t r u t h of any query 
w' of Lo has been associated w i t h a boolean funct ion which is either the identity 
B(w') (in which case w' € Li), or an expressions containing elements taken f rom 
the three sets 51-53 of mutually exclusive and exhaustive beliefs. For example, 
Moreover, the expressions of Lo which have been associated to the identity function 
belong all to the sets S1S3. 
Hence, the expressions in 5!~53 are the 'basic' semantic units which can be 
used to identify the t r u t h of any other expression of Lo, and represent a good set 
of candidates to form the inner language Li C Lo. 
As a matter of fact, the set M, defined as 
contains all of the expressions of Li plus other propositions which do not strictly 
need to be included in Li. This 'surplus' consists of some of the contradictory 
expressions (more precisely, pairs I - F and II—II ' ) and the three default beliefs, 
SUND(e), SUND(HUNK(e) ) and HUND(SUNK(e ) ) . 
The resulting inner language Li <— <WFF> (Well Formed Formulas), ob-
tained by removing the mentioned expressions f r o m M, is described by the follow-
ing B N F formalization: 
<WFF> ::= <A> | <Sund>) \ <Hunk> \ <Hund> \ <Hbel> 
<Sund> : := S U N D ( H U N D ( < Eh>)) 
<Hunk> : := H U N K ( < £ z > ) 
<Hund> : := H U N D ( < £ / i > ) | H U N D ( S U N D ( < £ s > ) ) 
<Hbel> : := H B E L ( < , 4 > ) | H B E L ( S U N D ( < £ s > ) ) | 
<Es> : := H R ( < £ i > ) | H I E X P ( < 5 u > ) | S U P ( < ^ > , < 4 > ) | <Ei> 
<Eh> ::= SR{<Ei>) | S I E X P ( < 5 u > ) | S U P ( < y l > , < A>) \ <Ei> 
J ( N O T ( S U N D ( N O T ( e ) ) ) ) 
I ( H B E L ( N O T ( H B E L ( e ) ) ) ) 
X ( H U N D ( N O T ( S U N K ( e ) ) ) ) 
B{e) V B ( N O T ( e ) ) 
£ ( H U N D ( e ) ) V B ( H B E L ( N O T ( e ) ) 
B ( H U N D ( S U N K ( e ) ) ) 
M= [J ( 5 1 ( e ) u 5 2 ( e ) u 5 3 ( e ) ) 
e::<E> 
H B E L ( S B E L ( < A>)) \ H B E L ( S U N K ( < ^ > ) ) 
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where the production rules for the symbols <A>, <E>, <Su> and <Ei> are 
those already specified in <WFE>. 
Although the expressions NOT(SR(e)) and NOT(SIEXP(e) ) w i l l not be consid-
ered members of the inner language Li, as not associated to the identi ty function, 
the symbol <A> in the production rule <WFF>::=<A> of this formalization 
has been left unchanged, for reasons of clarity. 
Notice that the t r u th of any support query SUP (a, ft) is determined through 
a direct check for its presence in the current state S'. This implies that every 
support relation which holds must be explicit ly stated, but i t also means that the 
syntax can be easily extended to include expressions such as SUP(HBEL(a) , b): 
in fact, this can be done simply by replacing every symbol <A> w i t h <WFF> 
in al l the SUP(< A >,<A>) expressions which appear in <WFE> and <WFF>. 
I n order to complete the correct definition of the belief system, i t is necessary to 
guarantee that the properties of mutual exclusivity and exhaustivity required for 
the (outer) expressions of the sets 5i-5 3 are always satisfied (see page 87). These 
conditions can be guaranteed by imposing a set of restrictions on the inner language 
Li. In fact, any restriction imposed on the inner language Li w i l l indirectly produce 
a 'projected' restriction on the outer language Lo. 
I n other words, l imi t ing the admissible inner states S C Li of the system is 
reflected by a l imi ta t ion of the possible 'outer' states, where the outer state S* C Lo 
of a system w i t h state S C Li is defined as S* = {w E Lo \ BP(w,S) = True}. 
Hence, i f appropriate restrictions are imposed on Li, no outer state S* w i l l ever 
violate the required conditions for S1S3. 
The specific associations adopted for the three default beliefs w\ =SUND(e) , 
w2 = SUND(HUNK(e) ) and w3 = HUND(SUNK(e) ) guarantee that each default 
w i l l be evaluated True i f f none of the remaining elements of the corresponding sets 
Si(e), ^ ( e ) and 5 3(e) belongs to the (inner) state. 
For example, given e = Eh the belief SUND(Ex) w i l l be evaluated True by the 
system i f f neither E i nor NOT(Ex) belongs to the current (extended) state. 
Because of this specific characteristic of the interpretation J ( ) , the restrictions 
imposed on Li can be simply reduced to a condition of mutual exclusivity on the 
sets Si \ {u>i}, S2 \ {w2} and S3 \ {w3}. 
I n fact, for «Si(e), for example, i t is sufficient to impose the following condition 
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of mutual exclusively on Li 
« i ) - i ( e A N O T ( e ) ) 
to obtain the terms of S\ (e) to be mutual exclusive and exhaustive in Lo. Notice 
that the imposition of the restriction U\ on Li corresponds to the adoption, for the 
belief system, of the epistemic version of axiom D of the normal modal logics (see 
page 25). 
The other two restrictions U2 and W3 are deduced analogously f r o m the sets S2 
and 53. 
4.3 Implementation 
The belief system described in the previous section has been implemented in Gofer 
[78], a non-strict semantics (i.e. 'lazy1 evaluation) functional programming envi-
ronment supporting a language syntactically and semantically similar to Haskell, 
which is a pure functional language w i t h lazy evaluation and polymorphic-class 
based type checking system (see [75]). 
The choice of a functional language for the realization of the system is due 
to the specific characteristics of the BP algorithm. First of al l , its mathematical 
formulat ion, based on the definition of the recursive funct ion of interpretation I ( ) , 
and the use of the mechanism of pattern matching, are part icularly suitable for a 
functional language implementation. 
Moreover, the representation of sets of propositions can be realized through the 
list data structure, for which Gofer (and Haskell) provides specific bu i l t - in sup-
port . For example, the feature of 'lazy' evaluation allows the management of lists 
containing an infini te number of elements, as the actual value of these elements 
is calculated only when str ict ly necessary for the specific computation required by 
the user. 
The system implemented accepts in input any query correctly generated by the 
syntax <WFE>, and evaluates its t r u t h according to the BP algori thm ' A ' and 
to the set of inner propositions contained in the current state S C Li <— < WFF>. 
I t should be pointed out that the set of tautologies (and contradictions) has been 
realized in the implementation through a list of expressions — containing typed vari-
ables — which is automatically appended to the current state. Hence, for example, 
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the query g=SUND(SR(E 3 4 ) ) w i l l produce the answer (False, NOT(SUND(SR(_ 
))) ) , indicating that q is a contradiction, as its negation N O T ( ^ ) matches the 
tautology NOT(SUND(SR(:r ) ) ) , which is True for any string x ::<E>. 
As illustrated by the previous example and, more extensively, by the following 
one, besides the boolean value representing the t r u t h value of the query, the system 
has been programmed to return also the 'reasons' which have led to the specific 
result. 
E x a m p l e 4.2 Given the state 
S = { S R ( E 1 ) , H B E L ( S R ( E 1 ) ) } 
the query w = N O T ( H U N K ( E i ) ) w i l l generate the answer 
(True, H B E L ( E i ) ) 
which indicates that the belief w holds because of the presence of H B E L ( E i ) in the 
completed state S' = CR(S). In fact, using the inference rules in R, S' results to 
be 
S' = 5U { E i , H B E L ( E 1 ) , H B E L ( S B E L ( E 1 ) ) , H B E L ( S B E L ( S R ( E 1 ) ) ) } 
which contains H B E L ( E i ) . Notice that the query is evaluated True as 
X(t„') | s , = - . f l ( H U N K ( E i ) ) \s>= ^ False = True 
The 'reason' jus t i fy ing the result of a query is determined according to the following 
method: i f the result of a direct match B(w) is True, then the presence of w itself 
in the state is considered as the reason for the answer, and the expression w is 
returned. This would have happened, in the previous example, had the query w 
been any of the propositions in S'. 
I f the check B(w) is False, the reason returned is identified through the sets 
of mutual ly exclusive and exhaustive beliefs S1S3. In fact, the set containing the 
'missing' expression (in the example, S ^ E i ) 3 H U N K ( E i ) ) must contain one — 
and one only — 'alternative' belief which holds instead: this belief is returned as 
the just i f icat ion of the result. (In the previous example, the belief currently holding 
in S2 was H B E L ( E 1) ). 
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I t should be noticed that the expression H U N K ( E i ) is also a member of the set 
5 3 ( E i ) . Hence, this set contains a second reason — namely, H B E L ( S B E L ( E i ) ) — 
jus t i fy ing the result. The latter just if icat ion has been considered of secondary im-
portance, i f compared to the reason taken f r o m S^Ei ) ; in fact, the set S2 is used to 
represent the model of the hearer, whereas S3 contains the expressions describing 
the model of the speaker in the hearer's view, a less 'direct ' and normally uncertain 
set of information. 
In the actual implementation, together w i t h each the reason, the system returns 
also a qualifier and a list of links attached to i t . The qualifier indicates the type 
of the proposition which has been returned as reason. There are four possible 
qualifiers: 'Lax' (logical axiom), lDflf (default proposition), 'Act' (active belief) 
and 'Cons' (consequence derived f rom other beliefs). A 'logical axiom' is simply 
a tautology (or contradiction), that is, a belief which has been adopted as valid 
axiom by the system. 'Default ' indicates that the belief holds as a result of the 
absence of other beliefs. A n 'active' belief is simply one of the proposition which 
have been included in the core state, specified ini t ial ly. A 'consequence' is a belief 
which has been derived through the inference rules f r o m other beliefs (beliefs of 
the core state or other consequences). 
The list of links is always empty, except when the reason is qualified as 'Cons': 
in this case, the links 'point ' to the proposition(s) constituting the premiss(es) f rom 
which such belief has been derived. Notice that in the current implementation, i f 
p is derived f r o m q, and q is derived f rom r , the l ink of p w i l l point directly to r 2 1 . 
Because of the characteristics of the definit ion of the funct ion of interpretation, 
i t is also possible that one query is evaluated True (or False) because of more 
than one reason. For example, the query HUNK(SUP(a , b)) is associated wi th the 
boolean expression I ( H U N K ( a ) ) V J ( H U N K ( 6 ) ) , which, in turn , w i l l have its terms 
evaluated. I f both of the terms are True, then both w i l l constitute a valid reason, 
and should be returned in the result. 
I n order to account for such possibilities, the system has been programmed to 
return, for each query, a list of lists of reasons. The structure of list of lists allows 
to represent any possible boolean combination of reasons; in fact, any boolean 
expression can be always reduced to a disjunction of conjunctions of terms ('Or-
A n d ' form) or, equivalently, to a conjunction of disjunctions of terms ( 'And-Or' 
2 1 The 'links' have been realized simply by effecting a godelisation of the propositions present in 
the state, so that a link is represented by a natural number which 'points' to a specific proposition. 
C h a p t e r 4: A Speaker-Hearer Be l ie f S ys t em 116 
form) . Therefore, for example, the expression 
And-Or [ [a,b], [c] } 
should be interpreted as 
( ( o V 6 ) A ( c ) ) 
Suppose, i n the previous example, that only the first of the two terms H U N K (a), 
HUNK (b ) is evaluated True, whereas the other one is found to be False (because, 
for example, HBEL(b)) . I n this situation, the complete expression returned by the 
belief prover would be as follows: 
Or -And [ [ (True,Act,EVNK(a)) ] , [ (Fa/se,,4c*,HBEL(&)) ] ] 
The overall boolean value of the above expression is True because of the presence 
of the first sublist containing a single reason evaluated True. Notice that i f the 
query had been N O T ( H U N K ( S U P ( a , 6))), i.e. the negation of the previous one, the 
result would have been simply deduced by negating the result of the previous query, 
transforming the 'Or -And ' into an 'And-Or ' and negating every single reason: 
And-Or [ [ (False, Act,E\JNK(a)) }, [ (True,Act,HBEL(ft)) ] ] 
Notice that the overall boolean value of this expression has now become False. 
The system has been endowed w i t h two specific functions for the evaluation of 
a query, namely, kprove(f and icheck()\ The latter funct ion returns the complete 
And-Or (or Or-And) expression representing the result, regardless of its overall 
value. The former actually evaluates the result of check(), and returns only the 
reason(s) ( i f there are any) which make the global expression True. I f the overall 
value of the expression is False, the object '[[ ] ] ' is returned instead. 
The complete belief system is composed by nine separate modules, four of which 
(Env_man.lgs, Relations.lgs, ParserKit.lgs and OurTypes.lgs) have been taken f rom 
Dr. Maria Fox and Dr. Derek Long's implementation of the management of the 
variable unification, parsing of expressions and types definit ion developed for the 
A b N L P planning system [45]. 
4.3.1 Testing 
The testing of the system has been performed through a set of queries which force 
the execution of the code for all of the significant cases of the BP algori thm A. The 
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state given in input to the system is reported below, preceded by the command 
which has been invoked to display i t : 
? unlines (map show axioms_Set) 
SR(E1) 
SUP(E1,E2) 
E2 
HBEL(SR(ED) 
HBEL(SUP(El,E2)) 
HUND(E2) 
HBEL(SUND(E2)) 
HR(E3) 
HUNK(E4) 
Part of the list of queries adopted for testing the system is reported below, followed 
by the corresponding results produced. 
t s t l = prove set_T (NOT [HBEL [NOT [HBEL [ E l ] ] ] ] ) 
t s t 2 = check set_T (SUND [ E l ] ) 
t s t 3 = prove set_T (NOT [SUND [ E l ] ] ) 
t s t 4 = prove set_T (SUND [E45]) 
t s t 5 = check set.T (HUNK [ E l ] ) 
t s t 6 = prove set_T (NOT [HUNK [ E l ] ] ) 
t s t 7 = check set.T (E45) 
t s t 8 = check set_T (NOT [E45]) 
t s t 9 = check set_T (NOT [SBEL [NOT [HUNK [SUP [E4 . E 3 ] ] ] ] ] ) 
t s t l O = check set_T (HBEL [NOT [SUNK [SUP [E4,E3]]]]) 
t s t l l = check set_T (SUND [HUNK [SUP [E4, E 3 ] ] ] ) 
t s t l 2 = check set.T (HUND [SUNK [SUP [E4, E 3 ] ] ] ) 
? show t s t l 
Or-And [[(Cons,HBEL(El)) [ 4 4 ] ] ] 
? show t s t 2 
And-Or [[(False,(Cons,El)[41])]] 
? show t s t 3 
Or-And [[(Cons,El)[41]]] 
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? show t s t 4 
And-Or [[(DfIt,SUND(E45))[]]] 
? show t s t 5 
And-Or [[(False,(Cons,rLBEL(El))[44])]] 
? show t s t 6 
Or-And [[(Cons,HBEL(E1))[44]]] 
? show t s t 7 
Or-And [ [(False,(DfIt,SUND(E45))[])]] 
? show t s t 8 
Or-And [ [(False,(DfIt,SUND(E45))[])]] 
? show t s t 9 
Or-And [[(True,(Act,HUNK(E4))[])],[(False,(Cons,HBEL(E3)) [ 4 8 ] ) ] ] 
? show t s t l O 
Or-And [[(True,(Lax,N0T(SUNK(-1)))[])]] 
? show t s t l l 
And-Or [[(False,(Act,HUNK(E4))[])],[(True,(Cons,HBEL(E3))[48])]] 
? show t s t l 2 
Or-And [[(False,(Act,HUNK(E4))[])] ,[(True,(Dflt,HUND(SUNK(E3)))[])]] 
The parameter set_T passed to the functions check() and prove() consists of the 
extended set of beliefs (set of 'Theorems') obtained as the closure of the core set 
axioms_Set. The pointers returned at the end of the 'Cons' reasons (e.g., in test 
no. 11, the l ink [48]) refer to a specific proposition of the set set_T, which contains 
also, at the beginning, the complete list of tautologies ('logical axioms'). 
Notice, for example in test no. 10, the result indicating the match w i t h a tau-
tology. I n the proposition returned, the uninstantiated variable of type <E> is 
represented by a negative number (-1). 
The to ta l execution t ime required by the system to evaluate any of these queries 
is smaller than five seconds. However, i t should be pointed out that, in the en-
vironment used for running the tests, the code is executed by an interpreter, and 
that the program itself has not been optimised for speed. 
Chapter 5 
Integration of a Belief System 
wi th a Planning System 
This chapter analyses, f r o m an abstract point of view, the feasibility and realization 
of the integration between a belief system (implemented according to the theoretical 
paradigm described in Chapter 3) and a generic planning system. 
The first section describes the basic elements which characterize the type of 
planners considered, defines explicitly the problem of integration and introduces 
the method of integration adopted. 
The second section illustrates some theoretical results, definitions and examples 
which are useful for the following discussion. 
Finally, the last section contains the detailed description of the mechanisms 
constituting the integration algorithm and of the formal theory upon which its 
correctness relies. 
5.1 Introduction to the Problem 
Before analysing the method adopted to integrate the beliefs system w i t h a planner, 
i t is necessary to define the general characteristics of a planning system, and to 
identify clearly what the 'integration problem' consists of. 
5.1.1 The Planning System Paradigm 
The following definit ion identifies the general concept of planning problem, and 
introduces the basic components of a standard planning system: 
Chapter 5: Integration of a Belief System with a Planning System 120 
Definition 5.1 A standard Planning Problem can be identified as a triple (/ , Op, G), 
where 
1. / is the initial state, containing a collection of propositions describing a given 
'state of the world'; 
2. Op constitutes the set of operator schemes, i.e. the list of possible actions that 
can be used to transform the initial state. Each operator schema normally 
contains variables, which are instantiated to specific values at the moment of 
the operator application; 
3. G represents the set of goals, and contains all the propositions which are 
required to be 'True' in the final state. 
A solution to a planning problem consists of a plan1 which transforms the initial 
state into the final one, in which all the goals are achieved. 
Given the initial problem, the functioning of a planning system is basically de-
termined by the goal-achieving procedure, constituting the algorithm which drives 
the process of choosing the appropriate actions (steps) to be inserted in the plan 
in order to achieve a specific goal. 
Many different versions of these fundamental elements have been developed 
during the history of planning (for a useful account of work in planning, see for 
example [96]). Nonetheless, there are few basic components which, although named 
differently by different authors, can be found in most of the planners currently in 
use. 
First of all, instances of operators are almost universally intended to be inter-
preted as actions being applicable only under specific preconditions and producing a 
set of effects on the current state. The preconditions consist of a list of propositions 
which must be true when the operator is applied. 
Secondly, the goal-achieving procedure normally includes the possibility of the 
'step addition' mechanism, a process consisting of finding an operator which con-
tains in its effects the specific goal to be achieved, and adding i t to the plan. 
XA plan can be thought of as an ordered sequence <Oi, O2, • • •, On > of possibly repeated 
instances of operator schemes, called steps. 
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One of the first and most influential planners, STRIPS [38], introduced the 
idea of representing the effects of an operator with two lists of propositions, called 
'ADD' and 'DELETE' lists, containing respectively the list of predicates to be 
added to and deleted from the state at the moment of the operator's application. 
The analysis of the integration of a BP algorithm into a generic planning system 
will assume the planning problem to be defined with this kind of operators, con-
taining (at least) preconditions, add and delete lists and representable as triples 
(P,A,D). Notice that the presence of the P-A-D lists in an operator constitutes a 
necessary condition, but should not be seen as an upper limit to the complexity of 
the formalism. In other words, such lists are only taken to be the 'minimum' level 
of expressiveness required by the operator schemes in order to be suitable for the 
process of integration. As it will be pointed out in Chapter 7 (end of Section 7.3.1), 
the integration process implemented can be applied directly to more sophisticated 
operators, or easily modified to allow the use of a more expressive formalism (see 
Section 5.3.1), including, for example, operators with conditional effects. 
5.1.2 The Integration Problem 
In order to identify clearly the aim of the integration process, let us recall the main 
features which a belief system, implemented according to the theoretical model 
explained in Chapter 3, presents. 
A belief system is formally defined as a triple (Lo, Li, A), where Lo is the outer 
language, Li C Lo is the inner language, and A is a Belief-Prover (BP) algorithm 
for Lo on Li. 
One of the characteristics of the BP algorithm consists of allowing the definition 
of complex belief-situations using only a relatively small set of unequivocal inner 
expressions, still enabling the system to be queried through the wider set of complex 
expressions taken from the outer language Lo. In other words, the BP simplifies 
the process of complete definition of a belief state by reducing to Li the redundant 
language Lo, but maintains unchanged the power of expressiveness. 
Therefore, the integration of a BP in a planning system should allow the defini-
tion of the initial state / of the plan through the simple and concise inner language, 
while permitting the use of more complex outer language expressions in the precon-
ditions of the operators. In fact, a list of preconditions can simply be considered 
as a list of queries given to a belief system which adopts the current planning state 
as the current belief state. 
These considerations lead to the following definition of 'BP-Planning Problem': 
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Definition 5.2 Given a BP algorithm for Lo on Li, a BP-Planning Problem is 
a tuple (I,Op,G, BP()), where / C Li is the initial state, G C Lo is the set of 
goals, Op is the set of operators in the form (P,A,D) (with PC Lo, AC Li, DC Li), 
and BP() is the function calculated by the BP algorithm. 
Notice that both preconditions and goals are allowed to contain any outer expres-
sions, whereas the add and delete lists A and D need only to specify the essential 
inner beliefs to be added and removed from the current state S C Li. 
In order to build a correct plan which solves a given BP-planning problem, a 
planning system should use the BP{) function as an 'interface' between outer and 
inner beliefs, so that any solution found satisfies the following definition: 
Definition5.3 Given a BP-planning problem V = (I,Op,G, BP()), a Plan for 
V consists of a sequence of steps <OQ, 0\,..., On > (with Oi € Op) such that, if 
Si is the state before the application of the operator 0{ and F is the final state2, 
then the two following conditions are true: 
1. for each step 0{ =(P,A,D) in the plan, 
Vp e P, BP{p,Si) =True 
2. V# 6 G, BP(g,F) = True 
Therefore, given a specific BP-Planning Problem V = ( / , Op, G, BP()) and a plan-
ning system able to solve a generic planning problem as described in the previous 
section, the problem of the integration of the BP with the given planner consists 
of producing a new system which generates correct plans to solve V. 
Example 5.1 Consider the BP algorithm 'A described in the previous chapter, 
with set of inference rules R and interpretation J ( ) defined through the simplifi-
cations 0-8 and the function check(). 
Assume that all the operators of the set Op are represented by a single operator 
2Notice that S0 - I-
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schema defined as 0\(a, a') = (P,A,D), where: 
D 
P 
A 
{ S B E L ( a ) , S B E L ( S U P ( a , a ' ) ) , SUND(a') } 
{ a ' } 
0 
and o,a' :: <A>. 
This operator represents a simple version of the Modus Ponens rule: if the 
speaker believes a, and also believes that SUP(a, a'), then (s)he should conclude a'. 
However, the condition SUND(a') must be verified in order for 0\ to be applicable. 
Notice that since an operator produces a change in the current state, its defini-
tion must take into account the specific restrictions imposed on the inner language 
(as a result of the restrictions imposed on the outer) of the belief system, which 
must be satisfied by any state considered during the planning process. 
For example, consider the event a': it belongs to the set of mutually exclusive 
and exhaustive expressions S\(a1) = { a', NOT(a') , SUND(a') } . Hence, when 
SUND(a') is True, the current state cannot contain either of the two events a' or 
NOT(o'). 
Through the operator Oi, the opinion of Si(a') which is currently held by the 
speaker changes from SUND(a') into a' (notice that the addition of a' to the state 
implies that the belief S B E L ( a ' ) will be evaluated True). However, even though 
the event a' does belong to the add list A, the proposition SUND(a'), unexpectedly, 
does not appear in the delete list D (as a matter of fact, D is empty). 
Formally speaking, this is due to the fact that the proposition SUND(a') is not 
allowed to appear in D, as it is not a member of the inner language Li <— < WFF > 
(by definition of BP-planning problem, the lists A and D can contain exclusively 
inner expressions). Nevertheless, the actual reason for this 'absence' has to be 
found in the fact that the opinion SUNDQ has been chosen as the default belief 
of the set S\. In fact, this means that the explicit presence in the state of the 
proposition SUND(a') is avoided by assuming it to be True whenever neither of 
the other two beliefs a', NOT(a') are present in the state (see definition of the 
function check (SUND()) ). 
Therefore, the addition of the belief a' to the state will automatically cause the 
belief SUND(a') to be evaluated False. On the other hand, since the default belief 
itself was not present in the state, it does not have to be deleted. 
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Let us now assume the initial state / to be 
I = S0 = {SR(E1), SIEXP(SUP(E 1 ) E 2 ) )} 
and the goal set G to contain a single proposition: 
G = { NOT(SUND(NOT(E 2))) } 
Notice that the goal constitutes an outer expression of Lo which does not belong 
to the inner language Li. A possible real interpretation of the above events could 
be the following: 
E i = "John threw the stone into the river." 
E 2 = "The stone sank in the water." 
Within this interpretation, the goal (for the speaker) would consist of reaching a 
conclusion on the validity of the event NOT(E 2 ) = "The stone did not sink in the 
water." 
Given this BP-planning problem, representable as V = (I,Op,G, BP{) ), and 
a 'standard' planner, the integration of the BP algorithm should produce a new 
planning system able to find the plan < O i ( E 1 , E 2 ) > which, indeed, solves the 
problem V. In fact, given the initial state / , the preconditions of 0\ — with 
a = E i and a' — E 2 — follow immediately from the application of the inference 
rules ii and i 2 . Moreover, the addition of the belief E 2 to the state will cause the 
goal NOT(SUND(NOT(E 2))) to be evaluated True, according to the definition of 
interpretation J ( ) . 
The previous example underlines an important point: the restrictions (mutual ex-
clusivity of the expressions of S1S3) imposed on the inner language Li must be 
respected by the initial state / and by any other state obtained by applying the 
operators of the set Op. This requires the set of operators made available to the 
planner to satisfy the property of coherence, defined below: 
Definition 5.4 Given a set of restrictions on a language L, an operator O is Co-
herent iff, for any coherent state S C L to which O can be applied, the new state 
5" obtained from the application of O to S is still coherent. 
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The definition of coherent state has been given in Section 3.2. 
A second issue which the previous example obviously gives rise to concerns the 
method that the new planning system will have to adopt in order to find a plan 
solution for the given BP-problem. The analysis of two possible approaches which 
can be followed to solve this problem is the object of the following section. 
5.1.3 Possible Approaches to the Integration 
The definition of correct plan for a BP-planning problem suggests that the most 
direct and intuitive way of integrating the model of beliefs into a planner consists 
of using the BP inside the planner as a sort of 'interface' between outer and inner 
languages, so that every outer-language query concerning the current state will be 
'filtered' and handled by the BP. 
However, this approach presents many difficulties, which arise when trying to 
realize an actual implementation. For example, most of the planners currently 
in use allow to represent the set of operators as a collection of schemes, enabling 
preconditions, add and delete lists to contain variables of a specified 'type', like 
0\ (a, a') in the previous example. 
Although this representation is employed as a way of synthesizing a larger set 
of possible operators, the variables are normally considered as components of the 
operators themselves even during the plan-construction phase. In fact, the step 
addition process is normally realized by matching a specific goal 'g' against the 
propositions which appear in the add list of an operator: the result of the match, 
if positive, will supply the value(s) which can be substituted to the variable(s) so 
that the operator considered achieve the goal g. 
However, in case of a BP-planning problem, a simple match between a goal and 
the elements of the add list of an operator does not always produce a correct result. 
In fact, reconsider the example introduced in the previous section: the match 
of the goal g = NOT(SUND(NOT(E 2))) against the (only) term of the add list 
A of 0 i , namely, a' :: <A>, would not return any admissible instantiation of the 
variable a', as the goal g does not belong to the set of expressions of type <A> 
(g :: < P 1 > ) . Nevertheless, i f a' =Eh the operator 0\ does achieve the goal g. 
Unfortunately, this substitution is only evident if we take into account the internal 
functioning of the BP algorithm, which evaluates True the goal g i f the current 
state contains the belief E2. 
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This problem is due to the fact that while the add and delete lists contain 
only inner expressions, the goals (and preconditions) are allowed to contain more 
complex outer-language propositions, which are achieved 'indirectly', i.e. as a result 
of the presence or absence of other beliefs. Indeed, the ability of detecting whether 
a specific operator 'asserts' or 'denies' a proposition p — that is, imposes p to be 
evaluated, respectively, True or False — without using the content of the present 
state requires a complex analysis, which produces a boolean condition based on 
both the add and the delete list (for a more detailed discussion on this issue, see 
[50]). 
Apart from this kind of practical obstacle, a 'direct' integration of the BP 
presents a fundamental disadvantage: the use of the BP algorithm as a module 
inside the planner requires the modification of the structure and code of the planner, 
which should be properly tailored in order to 'embody' the belief system. 
The big drawback of this lies in the fact that the resulting system would con-
stitute the integration of a specific belief model with a specific planning system, 
having predetermined characteristics: the integration of a different BP — or even 
of the same one — into a different planner would require the whole process of mod-
ification to be repeated, with the consequent misuse of time and resources which 
would be necessary to understand and modify a completely new piece of software. 
The alternative approach, which has been adopted in the actual implementation 
of a planning system for BP-planning problems, is based on the considerations that 
follow. 
The adoption of the BP algorithm during the planning process is due to the 
fact that while the state is defined using the inner language Li, the preconditions of 
the operators and the goals can also be outer-language expressions. This requires 
the use of the BP as an 'interface' between state (and A / D lists) and preconditions 
(and goals) whenever the truth of an outer belief needs to be assessed. 
However, if also the state were allowed to contain expressions of Lo, together 
with the add and delete lists of the operators, then the whole process of planning 
could be carried out in a outer-language 'world', with no need for any use of a 
belief prover. 
In other words, if the state S were 'extended' with all of the outer beliefs which 
are evaluated True by BP(-, S), and the A / D lists of each operator were completed 
with all the outer propositions which are asserted and denied by the operator, the 
BP-problem would be transformed into an equivalent standard planning problem, 
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entirely defined on the language Lo. 
Example 5.2 Let us recall the example of the previous section, in which the initial 
state / contained only two beliefs: 
I = S0 = { SR(Ei), SIEXP(SUP(Ei, E 2 )) } 
The operator scheme 0\(a, a') = (P,A,D) was defined as 
P = {SBEL(a), SBEL(SUP(a, a')), SUND(a') } 
A = {a'} 
D = 0 
with a,a' :: <A>, and the only goal g was NOT(SUND(NOT(E 2 ))). 
If we extend the initial state / with all the beliefs of Lo evaluated True by the 
BP, we obtain the set /*, containing the closure CR(I) (which is still a subset of 
Li) and an infinite set of outer expressions: 
I* = {SR(Ex), E i , SIEXP(SUP(E!,E 2)), SUP(E!,E 2 )} 
U { SBEL(Ei), NOT(SBEL(E 2)), NOT(SBEL(E 3 ) ) , . . . , 
SBEL(SUP(E b E 2 )) , NOT(SBEL(SUP(E 3 ,E 1 ))) , . . . , 
SUND(E 3), SUND(E 4), SUND(E 5 ) , . . . } 
The extension of the operator Ox wil l give 0\ = (P*, A*,D*), where 
P* = p = { SBEL(a), SBEL(SUP(a, a')), SUND(a') } 
A* = {a',SBEL(a'),NOT(SUND(a')),NOT(SUND(NOT(a'))), 
NOT(SBEL(SUND(a'))), NOT(SBEL(SUND(NOT(a')))), SBEL(SBEL(a')), } 
D* = { NOT(SBEL(a')),SUND(a'),SUND(NOT(a')), 
SBEL(SUND(a')), SBEL(SUND(NOT(a'))), NOT(SBEL(SBEL(a')))} 
From this new 'explicit' standard planning problem, it appears clear that A* will 
contain the goal g when a' =E 2, and that the list P* of preconditions is immediately 
satisfied by the initial state /* if a —E x. 
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Notice that P* = P. In fact, even if the preconditions contained only inner 
expressions, i t would not be necessary to extend them, as they do not modify the 
state. Moreover, it should be noticed that A* and D* are finite. This is because 
the completed lists do not have to contain all the outer beliefs which result True 
(or False) after the application of 0\, but have simply to perform the necessary 
changes (additions and deletions) to maintain the coherence of the state, that is, 
to respect the restrictions imposed on Lo. For example, the belief SBEL(SBEL(a)) 
will actually be True after the application of the operator, but it does not have 
to be added to the state, as i t was already present before. In fact, one of the 
preconditions of 0\ is SBEL(a'); i f the extended state S* — to which the operator 
is applied — contains all and only the outer expressions evaluated True by the 
function BP(-, S), then the presence of SBEL(o) in S* must have been caused by 
the presence of a in S. Hence, also the belief SBEL(SBEL(a)) must have been 
evaluated True, and, thus, included in the state S*. 
I t should be pointed out that the actual implementation of this method will 
not require the generation of the complete list of expressions contained in the state 
/*: by adopting a 'lazy' approach, only the beliefs which are strictly needed by 
the discourse planning process will need to be included, reducing to a finite, small 
set the initial state actually calculated. The criterion used for the selection of the 
relevant beliefs and the motivations which justify its adoption will be explained in 
detail in Section 6.3. 
Summarizing, the indirect approach to the problem of integration, introduced 
in this section, is based on the idea of transforming the initial BP-problem into 
an equivalent standard planning problem through the application of an 'integrator' 
system. Such system will preprocess the given initial state, goals and operators 
by 'extending' them with the appropriate outer expressions, derivable through the 
application of the specific belief prover algorithm (i.e., of the BP{) function). 
The same kind of approach has been also adopted by Gazen and Knoblock 
in [56], as mentioned earlier (p. 53). In their work, Gazen and Knoblock present a 
preprocessor for converting UCPOP-planning problems into Graphplan problems 
(see Section 2.4). The UCPOP notation allows, amongst other things, the use of 
'axioms' (the equivalent of inference rules) and of operators with conditional ef-
fects. A method for the transformation of conditional operators into an 'equivalent' 
set of STRIPS-style (non-conditional) operators, alternative to the combinatorial 
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algorithm proposed by Gazen and Knoblock, has been developed by Anderson and 
Weld [7], and will be described in Section 5.2.2. 
The inference rules (or 'axioms', in this context) are treated differently: they 
are not used to 'extend' the various elements of the original planning problem, 
as in the approach described above, but, instead, are converted directly into 'de-
duce' operators, having preconditions and postconditions equivalent, respectively, 
to the premisses and the consequences of the rule. Although this approach might 
seem quite simple and promising, it presents various drawbacks, as pointed out 
by Garagnani in [53]. For example, adopting this method of conversion, since any 
'deduced' proposition p may lose its validity after each step, the preprocessing 
phase needs also to identify the operators that modify the propositions from which 
p can be derived, and to add an effect which negates p to each of these opera-
tors. This forces the 'axiom' (inference rule) to be re-applied in a latter step if 
the deduced proposition p is needed for another operator. As Gazen and Knoblock 
point out themselves, in the worst case, an axiom may need to be re-asserted after 
each step [56, p.224]. Also, as a consequence of these 'corrections', the operators 
produced are likely to be conceptually incorrect, and negate propositions which, 
according to the 'meaning' of the considered operator, should not be negated (cf. 
the 'put-on' operator of their example [56, p.225]). Finally, the planning state 
obtained by applying the steps specified by a correct plan solution does not neces-
sarily end up containing all the consequences which can be deduced at that point 
using the inference rules. 
Because of these negative aspects, the alternative method for preprocessing of 
the inference rules introduced earlier, based on their application (through the use 
of the BP() function) for the 'extension' of the initial state and of the add and 
delete lists of the operators, has been adopted instead. 
Finally, it should be noticed that the indirect (or preprocessing) approach to 
the problem of the integration offers, in general, two important advantages. First 
of all, the new (standard) problem resulting from the pre-extension process can be 
solved directly by a large number of planners, without requiring any modifications 
of the structure and code of the planning system specifically chosen for the task. 
Secondly, the process of transformation of the initial problem, which substitutes 
the actual integration of the BP algorithm, can be performed automatically and 
for a complete class of belief systems built according to the paradigm described in 
Chapter 3. 
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The following sections contain the detailed description of this approach, along 
with the formal theory upon which i t relies. 
5.2 Indirect Integration 
The indirect approach, introduced in the previous section, is based on the following 
consideration: given a set of inner belief S, instead of using, whenever necessary, 
the BP algorithm to evaluate the truth of any outer (non-inner) belief, it should 
be possible to render explicit the results of the BP, and to pre-generate the set 
S* C Lo containing all and only the expressions of Lo evaluated true by BP(-, S). 
This suggests that, instead of integrating the belief system into a planner 
by building a new planning system which makes use of the BP algorithm, it 
should be possible to render fully explicit the specific BP-planning problem V = 
(I, Op, G, BP()) given, by completing i t with all the expressions of Lo which would 
be evaluated True by the BP. This new equivalent3 problem V — (I', Op', G') would 
not require the use of a BP() 'interface' function, and could be solved by a normal 
planner as a standard planning problem which uses expressions of Lo. 
This process can be realized if the BP algorithm is transformed into an 'exten-
sion' procedure which, once supplied with the set of inner propositions S C Li, 
will generate the set S* C Lo containing S plus all of the outer propositions which 
would have been evaluated True by the function BP(-, S)4. 
The first part of this section concerns the theoretical and practical feasibility 
of this transformation. 
5.2.1 Composed Closure 
Given a specific BP algorithm, each 'inner' state S C Li will determine a specific set 
S* = {u G Lo | BP(ou, S) — True}, containing all (and only) the outer expressions 
evaluated True by the system. Therefore, the BP algorithm constitutes a filter 
through which i t is possible to see an 'outer' state S* C Lo, identified by the 
'inner' S. More formally, the function BP(-, S) calculated by a BP algorithm for a 
given state S C Li constitutes a boolean evaluation of Lo. In fact, since BP(UJ, S) 
returns a boolean value for every u> € Lo, BP(-, S) can be considered as a function 
3 A formal definition of equivalence will be given subsequently. 
4 I t is interesting to point out that this transformation can be seen as turning the 'backward-
reasoning' part of the BP — i.e. the syntactical transformations and boolean functions association 
— into a 'forward-reasoning' mechanism, consisting only of inference rules. 
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assigning each element of Lo to one element of the set { True, False}, that is, as a 
boolean evaluation of Lo. 
Definition 5.5 Given a BP algorithm for Lo on Li, the Outer Extension of a state 
S C Li consists of the set S* = {u> e Lo \ BP(oo, S) = True}. The function which 
transforms each S into its outer extension S* will be indicated as BP*(). 
By definition of 'state identified' by a boolean evaluation (see equation 3.1), it 
follows that S* = BP*(S) is the state identified by the boolean evaluation BP(-, S). 
The task performed by the BP algorithm is, in a sense, summarized by the 
set produced by the corresponding outer extension function BP*(): the function 
BP*(S) renders explicit and immediately available all the possible results which 
would have been calculated by the BP algorithm for a specific state S. 
Intuitively, in order to complete the given problem V i t will be necessary to 
have every 'implicit ' element of V pre-extended by the function BP*(), so that the 
global effects of the BP algorithm will be 'pre-compiled' into the initial problem, 
leaving the original planning system unchanged. 
More precisely, the new initial state I' = BP* (I) wil l consist of the original 
set / plus all the expressions of Lo which would have been evaluated True by the 
BP{) function, whereas every operator will have its effects extended so to add (or 
delete) the new outer propositions which the BP would have evaluated True (or 
False) after the application of the operator itself. 
The next theorem shows how, given any BP, i t is possible to identify the corre-
sponding outer extension function BP*() through an algorithmic procedure. This 
procedure constitutes the core of the proof of the theorem. 
Before presenting the theorem, though, i t is useful to introduce the concept of 
'acyclic' inference rules, which will be used to describe part of the results of the 
proof. 
Definition 5.6 A set R of inference rules is Acyclic iff Vr G R, the consequence 
'c' of rule V never appears in any of the premisses of the rules in R. 
Basically, a set of acyclic inference rules is such that the consequence of the 
application of one of the rules can never 'activate' (nor 'forbid') the application of 
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another rule of the set. 
In other words, if R is a set of acyclic rules on L, the closure CR(S) of a state 
S C L can be calculated simply by adding to S the set of consequences K which 
can be obtained directly from S: CR{S) = S U K, where 
K = {c € L \ c & S, 3r e R : r = (V h c), V \s= True } 
Theorem 5.1 (Composed Closure) Given a BP algorithm which uses a set of 
inference rules Ri on a language Li and calculates an interpretation 1 ( ) of Lo 
on Li, let BP* : 2LL —>• 2LO be the corresponding outer extension function, that 
is BP*(S) = {co E Lo \ BP(UJ,S) = True}. There exists a set Ro of (acyclic) 
inference rules on Lo 
Vx I" OJX 
V2 I- OJ2 
such that 
VSCLi, BP*(S) = CRO(CRi{S)) (5.1) 
Proof Vw € (Lo\Li), the boolean function X(cu) associated to u can be rewritten 
as a disjunction of conjunctions: 
l(u) = Px V P2 V . . . V Ph 
where each conjunction P, contains the hi terms 
Pi = ( tn A t i 2 A . . . A t i k i ) 
and each term ty can be either B(x) or -iB(x), with x £ Li. 
Consider the set Ro of inference rules on Lo built from an initial empty set by 
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adding, for each expression UJ G (Lo \ Li), the following list of inference rules: 
Px h UJ 
P2 h UJ 
Ph H UJ 
First of all, since OJ G Lo\Li and all of the premisses are functions of expressions 
of Li, the resulting Ro constitutes a set of acyclic inference rules on Lo. 
Moreover, Ro is such that MS C Li, BP*(S) = CRo(CRi(S)). 
To prove this, let us see first that BP*(S) C CRo(Cm(S)). 
Let S C Li be the current state, and let OJ G BP*(S). By definition, we have 
UJ G BP*(S) & BP(u, S) = True 
According to the definition, BP(OJ, S) = True in two possible cases: 
i) uo G (Lo\Li) A T(OJ) \s<=True 
ii) 00 G Li A to G 5' 
with S" = Cffi(5). In the first case, since oo G (Lo \ Li), then the boolean function 
associated to OJ is 
l(uj) = PiV...VPh = T„ 
But BP(oo,S) = True; hence, Tw \s>= True, which means that one of the terms 
P i , . . .Ph must have been evaluated True in the state S' = Cm(S). Since these 
terms are all premisses of inference rules in Ro, then the rule whose premiss is True 
in Cm(S) will cause the addition of OJ to the closure C ^ C ^ S ) ) . 
In the second case, since the closure of a set always contains the original set 
(see equation 3.4), then OJ G Cm(S) OJ G CRo(CRi(S)). 
Therefore, in both of the cases i) and ii),u G CRo(CRi(S)), and thus BP*(S) C 
CWCaCS)). 
Let us now prove that CRo(CRi(S)) C BP*(S). 
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Let S C Li be the current state, and c G C R o ( C m ( S ) ) . Once again, the proof 
can be divided into two cases: 
a) c e ( C R o ( C R t ( S ) ) \ C R l ( S ) ) 
b) c e C R i ( S ) 
In the first case, 'c' belongs to the 'outer' closure — obtained applying the rules 
in Ro — but not to the 'inner' closure Cm(S), obtained applying the rules in Ri. 
Therefore, c must be one of the consequences of the rules in Ro, i.e. there exists a 
rule r G Ro 
r) V\~ c 
which has been applied to produce the final outer closure CRo(CRi(S)). 
Because of the way in which the set Ro has been defined, the premiss V contains 
only inner expressions, whilst the consequences of the rules in Ro cannot be inner 
expressions, as they belong to the set Lo\Li. Therefore, the premiss V cannot have 
been made True by any of the rules in Ro, and must have been already holding in 
Cm(S). 
On the other hand, the presence of the rule r ) in Ro must have been originated 
by the interpretation of 'c' 
1(c) = P i V . . . V V V . . . V Ph 
which contains the term V. But since V was True in 5" = CRi(S) (and c € Lo\Li), 
then 1(c) |S/ = True: therefore, BP(c, S) = True, hence c e BP*(S). 
In case b), c G Cm(S) = 5" implies that c G Li, as Ri contains only inference 
rules on Li, and S C Li. From the definition of BP(), i t follows directly that 
BP(c,S) = True; consequently, c G BP*(S). 
In conclusion, in both of the cases a) and b), i t results c G BP*(S); hence, 
^Ro (CRi(S)) C BP'(S). 
Since the implicitly was proved in the first part, and no assumptions were ever 
made regarding the current state S, then we can conclude that 
VSQLi, BP*(S) =C« 0 (Ofc(S)) 
• 
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The previous theorem shows that the 'global' output of a BP algorithm can be 
calculated as the closure CR0(S') of the extended state S' = CRi(S) using a set of 
acyclic inference rules Ro. 
In other words, once identified the set of rules Ro, the BP algorithm can be 
transformed into the calculation of a composition of closures. 
Indeed, i t should be noticed that the proof describes a general method to deduce 
the set Ro from any given interpretation X ( ) , and that the computational load of 
this procedure is proportional to the number of 'associations' required to define the 
function X ( ) completely. 
This number can be assumed to be smaller than a finite constant k: in fact, 
even when the domain of the function X ( ) (namely, Lo \ Li) is an infinite set, i t is 
possible to represent finitely an infinite number of associations through the adoption 
of variables (the following example actually presents this specific situation). 
Finally, i t is important to underline that the premisses of the 'new' set of rules 
Ro correspond to the conjunctions extracted from the boolean functions adopted 
by the interpretation X ( ) . Hence, if these boolean functions present specific charac-
teristics or regularities, the analogous qualities will be transferred into the inference 
rules of Ro. 
Example 5.3 Let us recall the example introduced in Section 3.2. The outer 
language Lo was defined as 
Lo = {m(s), f ( t ) , married(u,v), wife(w,x), husband(y, z)} 
whilst the inner Li C Lo contained 
Li = {m(s), f ( t ) , married(u,v), } 
Suppose the interpretation X ( ) consists of two associations: 
l(ui) = l(wife{x,y)) 
X(oi 2 ) = I(husband(x,y)) 
married(x,y) A f ( x ) = P\ 
married(x,y) A m(x) = Q\ 
Let the set Ri = {r} contain the only inference rule on Li 
r) married(x,y) h married(y,x) 
Notice that the domain Lo\Li of X ( ) consists of the set {husband(x,y), wife(w,z)}, 
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which is infinite i f the set of possible names is infini te. 
Apply ing the method described in the theorem, Ro w i l l contain the two rules 
r o l ) Pi h u)i 
ro2) Qi h w 2 
or, more explicitly, 
r 0 i ) married(x,y) A f ( x ) h wife(x,y) 
ro2) married(x,y) Am(x) h husband(x,y) 
Notice that these two rules together w i t h r) constitute the same set of inference 
rules considered in the original example. I f the current state is S = {married(Paul, Mary), 
the extended state w i l l consist of the inner closure 
S' = Cm(S) = S U {married(Mary, Paul)} 
whereas the final outer closure w i l l be 
CR0(S') = S' U {husband(Paul, Mary), wife(Mary, Paul)} 
I t is not di f f icul t to see that this set contains, indeed, al l and only the expressions 
of Lo which would be evaluated True by the BP algori thm, that is, the set S* = 
BP*(S). 
By looking at the previous example, the implementation of an automatic procedure 
which performs the transformation of X ( ) into the corresponding rules constituting 
Ro would seem straightforward. However, this is true only i f the function I ( ) is 
defined as a finite list of explicit associations between propositions of Lo \ Li and 
boolean functions of inner propositions. 
However, the interpretation function could be available only in an implicit form, 
i.e. X ( ) could be defined recursively, or through the use of other functions (as in 
the case of the belief system described in Chapter 4). 
In such situation, a general automatic procedure that 'deduces' the explicit 
associations of each expression w 6 Lo\Li f r om the defini t ion of X ( ) and represent 
them finitely (i.e. using appropriate variables) is actually unfeasible i f the domain 
Lo \ Li is infinite. 
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This implies that, in such cases, the realization of this part of the process w i l l 
have to be done 'by hand'. 
However, even in those cases, the method described in the theorem of Composed 
Closure can be used as a 'datum point ' . Moreover, the theorem st i l l guarantees the 
existence of a set of rules Ro satisfying the requirements; the problem which is left 
to the user consists of finding these rules, and representing them finitely. 
The next subsection w i l l introduce the formal definit ion of equivalent planning 
problems, constituting the basis for the development of the theory of indirect inte-
gration, which is based on the repeated transformation of a BP-planning problem 
into an equivalent one. 
5.2.2 Equivalent Planning Problems 
According to the definition of outer extension BP*(S) of a state S, 
Vp € Lo, VS C Li, BP(p, S) = True BP*(S) 
Therefore, the definit ion of correct plan to solve a BP-planning problem, given in 
Section 5.1.2, is equivalent to the following one, i n which all the expressions using 
the BP() funct ion have been replaced w i t h the corresponding forms which use the 
BP*{) function: 
Def in i t ion5 .7 Given a BP-planning problem V = {I ,Op,G,BP*{)), a plan for 
V consists of a sequence of steps <0Q, Oi,..., On > (wi th Oj £ Op) such that, i f 
Si is the state before the application of the operator Oj and F is the final state, 
then the two following conditions are true: 
1. for each step Oj in the plan, i f P is the preconditions list of O j , then 
V p e P , PeBP*(Si) (5.2) 
2. 
VgeG, geBP*(F) (5.3) 
Notice that a BP-planning problem identified by the tuple (I,Op,G, BP()) can 
now be described using the function BP*() instead of the original BP(), since all 
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of the conditions for its solution have been rewrit ten using the function BP*(). 
Moreover, because of its definition, a BP-planning problem becomes a 'normal ' 
planning problem i f BP* = I (the identity function) and Lo — Li. 
Definit ion 5.8 Given two planning problems V , V", i f there exists a 1-1 onto 
relation between the plans which solve V and the plans which solve V", then the 
problems V and V" are equivalent. 
I n other words, in order for V , V" to be considered equivalent, there must be 
a bijective funct ion which associates every plan solution of V w i t h one (and only 
one) solution of V", and implici t ly. 
5.3 Transforming a BP-planning Problem 
This section contains the description of two algorithms, A l and A2, which con-
stitute the basis of the process of indirect integration of a BP algorithm into a 
planner. 
The integration itself consists of transforming a BP-planning problem V = 
(I, Op, G, BP*) into an equivalent problem V = (/', Op', G', BP*) having B P f = 
Id 5 . I f the funct ion BPf calculates the identity, in fact, its use i n the problem is 
not necessary: f rom the definition of plan solution of a BP-planning problem, i t 
follows immediately that V = (V, Op', G', Id) can be solved normally, as a standard 
planning problem. 
As previously mentioned, the transformation is realized by rendering fu l ly ex-
plicit the BP-planning problem V, that is, by completing every state and every 
operator w i t h al l the expressions of the outer language which would have been 'vis-
ible' only through the BP algorithm. These expressions are generated by the outer 
extension funct ion BP*, which can be deduced f r o m the BP (theorem of Composed 
Closure). 
The resulting problem w i l l be entirely defined in an outer-language 'world ' , and 
w i l l not require the use of a belief prover for the construction of the plan solution. 
Let us now suppose that the funct ion BP* can be decomposed into many sepa-
5Id represents the 'identity' function, i.e. Id(S) = S, VS1 C Li. 
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rate functions: 
BP* = fn O / „ _ ! O . . . O / 2 O 
where each component calculates a closure using a specific set of rules. 
I f that were the case, instead of integrating the whole funct ion BP* into the 
problem V in one single step, the transformation could be split into many separate 
sub-integrations: the first one w i l l integrate the funct ion / i , producing an equivalent 
problem w i t h a new outer extension funct ion 
BP{ = fn O fn-l O . . . O f2 
The second w i l l integrate / 2 , producing a new problem w i t h 
Bp; = f n o f n _ l 0 . . . o f 3 
unt i l , after n similar steps, the last integration of / „ w i l l lead to the final BP-
planning problem w i t h 
BP; = Id 
which w i l l be solved by a standard planning system. 
Indeed, because of the theorem of Composed Closure, the funct ion BP* has 
already been shown to be composed of two separate closures: 
BP* = CR0 O Cm 
Moreover, i f a set of rules R contains separate subsets of rules _R1} R2, • • •, Rk such 
that for each i £ {1,... ,k} the consequences of each subset Ri do not appear in 
any the premisses of sets Ri,..., -R,_i, then i t is possible to split the calculation 
of CR into the calculation of k separated 'sub-closures'. Notice that the need 
for decomposing the set R of rules into blocks which satisfy the above mentioned 
property arises, in practice, fo rm the presence in R of different 'types' of rules, for 
which different algorithms of integration have to be used. 
For example, suppose the set Ro to be composed of two sets Roi and Ro2 such 
that 
Roi D Ro2 = 0, Roi U Ro2 = Ro 
and such that the consequences of the rules in Ro2 never appear in any of the 
premisses in Ro\. 
I f this property holds, the calculation of the closure C R o can be divided into 
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two independent 'blocks', and realized as 
CRO = CRO2 ° C/ioj 
as none of the rules of the second group (which are used after the rules of the first 
group) can generate propositions which would have been relevant for the calcula-
t ion of C R O I . 
Since the Theorem of Composed Closure guarantees that the set Ro, derived 
f r o m the interpretation function X ( ) of the BP algorithm, is acyclic, then the 
decomposition of Ro into blocks w i l l always be possible, and any possible grouping 
of the rules is equally correct. 
By spl i t t ing Ro into two sets Ro\> and Roa, the funct ion BP* can be rewritten 
as 
BP* = C F L 0 6 o C R O A o C R I 
and the complete integration can be divided into three separated steps, each realiz-
ing the sub-integration of one of the three functions, that is, effecting the integration 
of a different set of inference rules. 
The algori thm A l , explained below, has been designed to be used for the first 
and th i rd steps of the integration, i.e., for the rule sets Ri and Rob, which result 
to contain rules of the same type, i.e., i n the fo rm p\- c. 
5.3.1 A l 
Let V = (I, Op, G, BP*) be a BP-planning problem such that BP* = f0 o f u w i t h 
fi = C H , fo = C#o, and R,Ro two sets of inference rules on Lo. 
If: 
1. R is acyclic6; 
2. R contains only inference rules in the fo rm p h c, w i t h p, c € Lo; 
then the algori thm A l , consisting of the application of the two procedures fii and 
F-i, transforms V into an equivalent BP-planning problem V' = (I1, Op', G', BP*), 
where: 
The definition of acyclic set of rules has been given at page 131. 
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• /' = 
. Op' = Tx{Op) 
• G' = G 
• BP* = f0 
The formal proof of the correctness of this transformation w i l l be given after the 
complete description of the algorithm, which includes the definitions of and 
r i ( ) . 
Intuit ively, the transformation A l integrates into the planning problem itself 
the effects of the funct ion fa — QR: as a result, the funct ion BP* — f 0 ° U is 
reduced to £ P j * = fa in the new problem V . 
I n this new problem, each state w i l l explicit ly contain all the propositions which 
would have been previously added by /», i.e. by the closure CR. I t follows that 
the new 'extended' in i t i a l state / ' should contain all the propositions which would 
have been generated by CR(I): hence, C R ( I ) C 
This gives a first idea of the fo rm of the transformation f^i ( ) , producing I' f rom 
I. However, let us f irs t ly analyse the funct ion T i Q , whose specifications w i l l also 
lead to the complete definition of . 
r \() transforms each operator O G Op into a new operator O' = 7 i ( 0 ) which 
may contain conditional effects. As we shall see, the presence of conditional effects 
is due to the use of the inference rules. 
Let O = ( P , A , D ) be the operator which is being considered. The new operator O' 
w i l l consist of a list of triples [(P1, A', D'), e 1 ; e^, • •., e n ] , where the head (P1, A', D') 
represents the main effect of the operator, and the following ej are conditional effects 
6j = (Pi, A{, Di). 
The new precondition list P' w i l l simply be equivalent to the original P. 
Consider now the add list A. The new operator O' must add all the propositions 
which would have been added by O. Hence, A C A'. Moreover, O' should also add 
all the 'new' propositions which the closure CR(A U S) would have contained after 
the addition of A to the state S. 
For example, suppose that p € A, and that one of the inference rules of R 
consists of p h c: the consequence 'c' should appear in the new add list A', for 
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i t would have belonged to CR(A) C CR(A U S) 7 . So should all the possible 
consequences of the set A obtained using the inference rules of R; in other words, 
A' w i l l have to contain the set CR(A). 
Consider now the new delete list D'. The operator O deletes all the propositions 
in D\ should O' delete the set D, too? Suppose that an element d G D is such 
that the set R contains a rule p h d. I f the proposition p is s t i l l present in the 
state after the application of 0, the closure CR of this state w i l l contain, again, 
the proposition d, as the rule p h d w i l l generate a new element d f rom p. 
Therefore, the elements of D w i l l have to be deleted by O' under a specific 
condition, that is, that the considered proposition d be not the consequence of a 
rule p h d such that p is present in the current state (or w i l l be present in the state 
after the application of the operator O). 
In order to formalise this condition, let us define the set of 'premisses' of a 
proposition c as 
Prem(c) = { p { , . . .pk} (5.4) 
where the terms pi,.. .pk constitute the premisses of all the inference rules in R 
having consequence 'c' and premiss pi $ D (iipi € D, the premiss pi w i l l not belong 
to the state after the application of O). 
The 'negation' of this expression, wr i t ten as 
-> Prem(c) 
w i l l represent the set of negated propositions {->pi, ~^P2, • • •, ~*Pk}, corresponding, 
when interpreted as a conjunction, to the boolean expression 
->pi A -ipz A . . . A -ipk 
According to the previous considerations, each proposition d G D (which does 
not belong to A') w i l l produce the addition of a conditional deletion 
d = (PuA^Di) = ( - P r e m ( d ) , 0, {d}) 
to the list ( ini t ia l ly empty) of conditional effects [ e i , . . . en] in O' 8 . 
7Notice that, because of the specific form of the rules in R, assumed by point 2. of the 
hypotheses, it is not difficult to prove that VA, B C L, CR{A U B) = CR(A) U CR(B). 
8Notice that the use of the condition -^Prem(d) as precondition list requires the negated 
premisses ->pi,..., ->pfc to be expressed each by a single expression of Lo. This requirement is 
satisfied by the language Lo 4- <WFE> (see page 85). 
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In other words, d w i l l be deleted by O' i f f i t would have not appeared in the 
closure CR(S U A \ D), where S is the state to which the operator O is applied. 
The new unconditional delete list D' can be left empty. However, in case 
Prem(d) = 0, the current state cannot contain any premiss of rules which could 
have prevented the deletion of d. Hence, the condition ~^Prem(d), w i t h Prem(d) = 
0, should be evaluated True, and the resulting effect w i l l consist of an unconditional 
deletion, which can be merged (at the very end) w i t h the main deletion D'. 
Consider now the list LD = [ei,..., em] of newly added conditional effects, w i t h 
ei — ( - iPrem(d) , 0, {d}). Suppose a proposition d constitutes the premiss of one of 
the inference rules of R, e.g. d h c. I f the condition ->Prem(d) is verified, and d is 
deleted, should c also be deleted? 
The answer is 'yes' iff its presence in the state was caused solely by the presence 
of d. Indeed, there might be another proposition q in the current state such that 
q h c, in which case c should not be deleted; in alternative, 'c' could have been 
present in the state since the beginning of the plan (i.e., c £ I): in this case, c 
should not be deleted, either. 
Given d such that (->Prem(d), 0, {d}) = G LD and 
r ) d h c 
where r is one of the inference rules in R, there are two possible cases: either c e Li, 
or c ^ Li. 
First, consider the case of c ^ Li. In this case, c cannot have been one of the 
propositions asserted in the in i t ia l state, which is a subset of Li; neither can i t have 
been added by the main effect of one of the previous operators, for every add list 
A must be a subset of Li, too. 
Therefore, i f c is in the state, i t must be a consequence of one (or many) of 
the inference rules. Hence, i f c ^ A', the following conditional deletion should be 
appended to the list of effects of 0'\ 
ej = {P^A^Dj) = (-,Prem(d) U ^Prem(c), 0, { c } ) (5.5) 
Notice that the presence of the condition ->Prem(d) is actually superfluous. In fact, 
because of the acyclicity of R, the set Prem(d) is always empty i f d constitutes the 
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premiss of a rule d h c of R 9 . 
This process must be repeated for each d which appears as one of the delete 
lists of LD. Notice, though, that because of the hypothesis of acyclicity of R, i t is 
not necessary to iterate the process and reconsider the deletions produced by this 
second list L'D of new conditional effects. 
This follows f r o m the fact that all the propositions c conditionally deleted by 
this new list are consequences of rules, and cannot appear as premisses of other 
rules of R. Hence, their (possible) deletion can not produce any further propaga-
tory effect. 
Consider now the second possibility, i n which c (consequence of a rule r con-
taining d as a premiss) does belong to Li. 
I n this case, c could have been present in the state since the in i t i a l situation, 
or even added afterwards by one of the operators. I n order to check whether c was 
added to the state because of the presence of a rule r, i t is necessary to distinguish, 
somehow, between inner propositions added 'directly ' (i.e. asserted in the in i t i a l 
state or added by the main effect A of an operator) and those 'derived' f rom others 
already present 1 0 . 
In order to effect this distinction wi thout keeping a track of the 'origin ' of each 
of the propositions present in the state, i t is necessary to have automatically marked 
every inner expression p which is derived through the inference rules. 
This marking can be realized by adding to the state a proposition-marker 
CONS(p) every t ime a new proposition p, obtained using an inference rule, is 
added to the current state 1 1 . 
A marker CONS(p) must be introduced i f f the inner proposition p, deduced 
as a consequence of some rule, was not already present i n the state (and must be 
removed only when the proposition p is removed) 1 2 . 
The necessity of marking each newly introduced inner expressions which is de-
rived f r o m the inference rules of R leads to the complete definit ion of the extension 
fii, used to calculate the in i t ia l state I' = of the new problem. I n fact, i t has 
9 The introduction of ->Prem(d) was originally due to the fact that this effect is 'deduced' as a 
consequence of the possible application of a conditional deletion a 6 LD, e.% = (-iPrem(d), 0, {d}). 
1 0Notice that this distinction is necessary only for inner expressions, for the outer expressions 
are always derived from inference rules. 
n T h e arbitrarily chosen predicate 'CONS' must not belong to the language Lo. 
1 2 T h e addition of these markers can be considered as an 'extension' of the language of the new 
BP-planning problem. 
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been shown that / ' must contain C R ( I ) ; hence, each element j G (CR(I) \ I ) — 
representing a consequence of / — w i l l require the addit ion of a marker C O N S ( j ) 
to V. 
More formally, given a set S C Lo, i f we define 
C O N S _ 5 = { C O N S ( p ) \ p e S } 
the transformation fix ( ) can be specified as follows: 
Q^S) = C R ( S ) U C O N S - ( C K ( S ) \ S) (5.6) 
The same reasoning would seem to be applicable to the add list A' of the new 
operator 0'\ for each element a G (CR(A) \ A), the expression C O N S (a) should 
be added to A'. However, this would not always be correct. 
In fact, even i f a proposition 'c' is a consequence of A, i t could have been already 
present in the current state S as (unconditional) addit ion of a previous operator, 
or even carried on since the in i t i a l state / . Hence, the addition of the marker 
C O N S ( c ) , in these cases, would be inappropriate, as, by definit ion, C O N S ( c ) must 
be added i f f the proposition c was not already present i n the current state. 
The solution to this problem consists of using a conditional addition instead of 
adding the marker directly to A'. In other words, for each element a G (CR(A) \ A), 
a new conditional effect 
d = (Pi,Ai,Di) = ( { - a } , { C O N S ( a ) } , 0) 
must be added to the list of conditional effects of O', whereas the new add list A' 
w i l l simply be calculated as CR(A). 
Finally, since a marker must be removed only when its argument is removed 
f rom the state, for every expression d which appears i n a (conditional) delete list 
Di, i f d G Li, then the proposition-marker C O N S ( d ) must be appended to the list 
A -
Having fu l l y introduced the presence of markers in the language of the new BP-
planning problem, i t is now possible to use them to express the required condition 
for the conditional deletions. 
Each effect e; = (->Prem(ci), 0, { Q } ) G L'D, appended to the operator O' as a 
consequence of a conditional deletion (that is, ej ^ LD) and such that Q G Li, w i l l 
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become 
d = (^Prem(Ci) U CONS_{cJ , 0, {a, C O N S ( c j ) } ) 
In fact, this guarantees that the proposition is deleted i f f 1) none of the rules 
which can generate i t w i l l be applicable to the state, and 2) the presence of Q in the 
state is due only to an inference rule d h q whose premiss is either being removed 
or does not belong to the current state. 
Summarizing the results of the previous considerations, the transformations Q,\ 
and T\ of algori thm A l can be defined as follows: 
o ^ ( 7 ) = C B ( 7 ) U C O N S . ( C « ( 7 ) \ 7); 
• T^Op) = Op', such that VO' G Op', O' = 71 (O), and 
7 l ( P , A, D) = [(P', A', D'), e u ..., en], where 
- P' = P; 
- A' = CR(A); 
- D' = 0; 
- the list of conditional effects [ e i , . . . , en] is composed of three separate 
lists, LA,LD and L'D, obtained in the following way: 
1. Va G (A' \ A), append to the list LA the conditional addition 
( { - a } , {CONS(a )} , 0) 
2. Vd G D, i f d £ A', append to the list LD the conditional deletion 
(- .Prem(d), 0, {d, CONS(d)}) 
3. Vej G LD, consider the conditionally deleted proposition d: 
Vc G (CR({d}) \ {d}), i f c ^ A', then 
(a) i f c 0 Li, then append to L'D the conditional deletion 
( - P r e m ( c ) , 0, { c } ) 
(b) i f c G Li, then append to L'D the conditional deletion 
(-iPrem(c) U CONS_{c}, 0, {c ,CONS(c )} ) 
Before analysing the correctness of this algorithm, i t should be pointed out that 
its applicability relies upon two main assumptions concerning the characteristics 
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of the inference rules of R. First of all , the left hand side of each rule is allowed to 
contain only one term; secondly, the set of rules R must be acyclic. 
Although w i t h these assumptions the algorithm A2 has been formally proved 
to be correct, their relaxation does not necessarily imply that the BP-planning 
problem cannot be integrated. 
In fact, even i f one of these hypotheses does not hold, i t is s t i l l possible to specify 
a different and more sophisticated algorithm which performs the integration, but 
the formal correctness of which w i l l be harder to prove and w i l l rely upon other 
hypotheses. 
For example, i f the set R were not acyclic, points 2 and 3 of the algorithm, 
calculating the conditional deletion lists Lp and L'D, would constitute the first 
two cycles of a loop, in which every iteration executed would possibly produce a 
new list of conditional effects derived f r o m the previous one. The condition for 
the termination of this loop would rely on the specific characteristics of the rules, 
and, more precisely, on the finiteness of the procedure calculating the set C # . A n 
algorithm which implemented such characteristics was not found to be obviously 
defective on testing. 
Another important aspect of the algori thm A l consists of the fact that i t can 
easily extended to pre-process operators w i t h conditional effects: given an operator 
containing a list of triples = (Pi, Ai, Di) (where e 0 = (P, A, D) constitutes the 
main precondition and effects), A l can simply be repeatedly applied to each tr iple 
of the list, and its output — lists of conditional effects — appended to the operator. 
Moreover, i t should be noticed that the requirement of acyclicity of the set R 
can be replaced by a weaker condition, requiring only that R be able to be divided 
into an ordered sequence of (acyclic) blocks of rules, such that the premisses of the 
rules of each block do not appear as premisses in any of the rules of the preceding 
blocks (as described at page 139). 
Finally, i n [53], Garagnani proposes an extended algori thm to perform the inte-
gration of an acyclic set of rules w i t h left hand sides containing boolean expressions 
w i t h many terms, in the fo rm p\ A p2 A . . . A pk \~ c. Such algorithm consists es-
sentially of a variation of A l , and allows the use of operators w i t h conditional 
effects. 
Before embarking ourselves in the formal proof of the correctness of the algo-
r i t h m A l , i t w i l l be useful to examine the results which i t produces when applied 
to a practical example. 
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E x a m p l e 5.4 Consider the ' translation' into the hearer-model domain of the 
Modus Ponens operator adopted in Examples 5.1 and 5.2: 
Persuade (a , b) 
P = { HBEL(a ) , HBEL(SUP(a ,6)) , HUND(b) } 
A = { HBEL(fc) } 
D = { HUND(fc) } 
This operator represents a simplified version of the 'Persuade(a, 6)' operator scheme 
which w i l l be adopted in Chapter 6 for the implementation of a real discourse 
planning system (see Section 6.3.1). Consider also the two following operators: 
Spoil(a , b) 
P — { HBEL(a ) , HBEL(SUP(6,a) ) , NOT(HBEL(6) ) } 
A = { HUND(a) } 
D = { HBEL(a) } 
A s s e r t - R e a l ( a ) 
P = { SR(a), HUNK(SR(a) ) } 
A = { HBEL(SR(a)) } 
D = 0 
These three operator schemes represent the basic strategies of persuasion upon 
which the discourse planning system implemented in Chapter 6 w i l l rely. Their 
characteristics and functioning w i l l be explained in details in Section 6.3.1; for the 
moment, and for the aims of this example, i t w i l l be sufficient to give only an 
intuit ive description of their meaning. 
The intention which lies behind 'Spoil(a, b)' consists of leading the hearer to 
become uncertain about a belief 'a' — relying upon specific supporting evidence 
'6' — by pointing out the uncertainty of the support belief '6' i t se l f 1 3 . 
The operator 'Assert-Real(o)', instead, represents a 'p r imi t ive ' speech act, in 
which the speaker simply asserts that the event 'a' constitutes a real experience and, 
in virtue of the Sincerity Axioms, expects the hearer to believe such assertion 1 4. 
Let us now examine the effects that the transformation T i has upon these op-
erators, assuming the set of inference rules R to contain the rules i$, i-?, i^}, 
1 3 T h e condition NOT(HBEL(6)) could be already holding in the initial situation, orelse be 
achieved as a subgoal. 
1 4 A s mentioned before, the model exclude the possibility of agents being unreliable about their 
own real experiences. 
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taken f r o m the list of rules for the belief system described in Chapter 4 (see 
page 107); these five rules have actually been adopted as set of rules for the system 
implemented in Chapter 6. 
Af te r the application of A l , the new 'Persuade' operator w i l l be identical to the 
original, except for the addition of the marker CONS(HUND(6)) to the delete list 
D due to step 2 of the algorithm: 
7 i (Persuade ( a , b)) 
P = { HBEL(a ) , HBEL(SUP(a ,6)) , HUND(6) } 
A = { HBEL(f t ) } 
D = { HUND(6) , CONS(HUND(6)) } 
Notice that P rem(HUND(6) ) = 0, hence the conditional deletion has been ' in -
globated' into the main effects of the schema. Similarly, A l adds a conditional 
deletion to Spoil (a, b), which, in this case, cannot be inglobated in the operators' 
main effects: 
7x (Spoi l (a ,6) ) 
P = { H B E L ( a ) , HBEL(SUP(6,a)) , NOT(HBEL(fc)) } 
A = { H U N D ( a ) } 
D = 0 
P i = { NOT(HBEL(SR(a ) ) ) , N O T ( H B E L ( H R ( a ) ) ) } 
A i = 0 
D x = { HBEL(a ) , CONS(HBEL(a)) } 
The lists of conditional effects which A l bui l t in order to produce the new operator 
are LA = [], LD = [ex = (Pi,A]_,Di)\ and L'D = [ ] . The conditional effect e\ in 
LD, generated by the step 2, presents, as condition, the result of the expression 
- i P r e m ( H B E L ( a ) ) ; In other words, its two terms constitute the negation of the 
premisses of the two inference rules is and i j , whose consequences match w i t h 
H B E L ( a ) 1 5 . 
Finally, 'Assert-Real(a)' is extended into the operator scheme reported below: 
5Notice that this transformation has been simplified by assuming a ::<Ei>. 
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7 i ( A s s e r t - R e a l (a ) ) 
P = { SR(a), HUNK(SR(a) ) } 
A = { HBEL(SR(a) ) , HBEL(a) } 
D = 0 
P i = { N 0 T ( H B E L ( a ) ) } 
A x = { CONS(HBEL(a)) } 
D-! = 0 
In this case, the three lists of conditional effects were LA = [ei], LD = [] and 
L'D = [ ] . The add list A of the main effect (e 0) has been extended through rule i^, 
and the marker CONS(HBEL(a)) w i l l be added i f f HBEL(a) is not already holding 
at the moment of the operator application. 
In conclusion, after the subsequent transformation of the given in i t i a l state 
/ into I' = f2i(7) (as defined by A l ) , the inference rules of R w i l l have been 
completely integrated into the planning problem, allowing the system to ignore 
them during the whole process of planning: the new set of operators and in i t ia l 
state can simply be adopted by any standard planner to achieve the assigned set 
of goals. 
I t should be noticed that although this transformation can be applied to op-
erator schemes which contain variables (as illustrated by the previous example), 
practical considerations have led to actually implementing the integrator system 
so that i t effects, ini t ial ly, the instantiation of all the variables contained in the 
operator schemes to produce a set of grounded operator instances on which the 
transformation algorithms w i l l then be applied. Such considerations w i l l be ex-
plained in detail in Section 6.3. 
5.3.2 Correctness of A l 
The proof of the correctness of A l is based on various properties concerning the 
transformations fli and Ti. 
First of al l , f rom the definition of f2i 
VS C Li, Qi(S) = CR{S) U CONS_(C f i (S) \ S) 
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i t follows immediately that 
VS C Li, CR(S) C ^(S) (5.7) 
and, since the marker 'CONS' does not to belong to the language Lo, 
VSCLi, Ql(S)f]Lo = CR(S) (5.8) 
These two propositions formalise the character of S7i, which might add more 
expressions than the normal operation of closure calculated using the set of rules 
R, but i t is such that the elements in excess do not belong to the language Lo. 
The fact that the new in i t i a l state / ' is calculated as Oi (I) indicates that these 
new expressions, not belonging to Lo, are allowed to be used in the state descrip-
tions of the new problem V, and, therefore, w i l l have to be included in the new 
inner language Li'. 
I f we identify the set A of new expressions which can be used in the new problem 
as 
(notice that VL\{Li) D CR(Li) D Li), then the new inner and outer languages for 
the new problem V w i l l be, respectively: 
w i t h A n Lo = 0. 
I t should be noticed that the outer extension funct ion f0 of the new BP-planning 
problem V can be considered as defined on a wider domain than the original 2Lo. 
In fact, since f0 calculates the closure of a subset of Lo, any expression given 
in input to f0 which is not an element of Lo is simply reported in output, as 
i t cannot generate any application of inference rules (which have, as premisses, 
boolean functions of Lo). This allows f0 to accept, as arguments, sets of expressions 
containing also elements not belonging to Lo. 
More formally, the function f0, considered defined on the 'extended' domains 
f0 : 2Lo> —> 2 i o ' , satisfies the following property: 
A = Qi(Li)\Li (5.9) 
Li' = n1(Li) = LiUA 
Lo' = Lo U A 
(5.10) 
(5.11) 
VS C Lo, V D C A , f0(SuD) = f0(S)UD (5.12) 
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The second and most important property concerning the transformation func-
tions involves both fix and r \ . 
Consider, in the original planning problem V, the change produced by an op-
erator O applied to the initial state / 
/ A s, 
indicating that the application of O to / produces the new state Si. 
The new problem V' starts with an 'extended' initial state V = and 
adopts a new set of (extended) operators Op' = Ti(Op) , where Ti is realized 
by transforming each operator O = (P, A, D) e Op into a new conditional-effect 
operator O' = 71(G) 1 6 . 
Because of the way in which the transformation of the operators has been 
defined, the corresponding change in the new problem-world 
produces a state S[ which is exactly £li(S\). 
In other words, every step 
St —> St+\ 
of a plan in the original problem has a corresponding step 
in the new problem plan, and vice versa. More formally, given two states St and 
fli(St), and two operators O G Op and O' = 7 i (0 ) G Ti(Op), the application of O 
to St and of O' to fix(5t) 
St —> St+i 
| (5.13) 
nx(5 t) 7 ^ s't+1 
produces two states St+i and S't+1 such that S't+1 = fli(St+\). 
Because of this property, since the plan of the new problem V starts from 
an initial state / ' = fii(I), then every following state Q.i(St) of the plan in V 
(including the final state) will correspond to a state St of a plan in V. 
Therefore, the two BP-planning problems V and V can be shown to be equiv-
1 6 Notice that 71 is 1-1. 
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alent. The formal proof of this equivalence is the object of the following theorem: 
Theorem 5.2 (Al-equivalence) LetV = (I,Op,G, BP*) be a BP-planning prob-
lem, with BP* — f0° fi, where: 
9 fQ calculates a closure, i.e., there exists a set Ra of inference rules on Lo such 
that f0 = CRO; 
• fi = CR, and the set R of inference rules on Lo is acyclic and contains only 
rules in the form p\~ c, with p,c € Lo. 
Then, the new BP-planning problem V = ( T(Op), G, f0 ) 17 produced by 
Al is equivalent to V. 
Proof Consider a sequence of steps Z=< 0\, O2, • • •, On > with Oi G Op, and 
associate it with the sequence Z'=<ji(Oi),..., 71 (O n ) > of operators £ T(Op). 
This association represents a bisection, as the transformation 7i is 1-1, and each 
operator in T(Op) has been generated by one (and only one) operator in Op. 
We need to prove that if Z solves V, then Z' solves V , and vice versa. 
Let 
/ ^ Si ^ > S2 ... Sn = F 
be the sequence of states obtained applying the plan Z, and 
Q ^ / ) 7 ^ S [ ^ ] . . . " ^ S'n = F' 
the sequence generated by Z'. 
Because of the property 5.13, since ft!(I) S[, then S[ = Oi(Si) . Analo-
gously, S'2 = fti(52), S'3 = fii(S3), etc. 
Let us see that if Sn = F is a final state for V (i.e. it contains the goal set G) 
then S'n = F' = Qi(Sn) is a final state for V', and vice versa. 
F is a final state for V i f f 
VgeG, geBP*(F) (5.14) 
by definition of correct plan solution of a BP-planning problem (see equation 5.3). 
This is equivalent to 
G C f0( CR(F) ) 
1 7Notice that V contains operators with conditional effects. 
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But since G' = G, this condition is the same as 
G' C f0( CR(F) ) 
Both members of the above relation are C Lo, as CR(F) C LO, and /„ calculates 
a closure using inference rules on Lo. Thus, for any set D C A — which implies 
D n Lo = 0 — the previous relation holds i f f 
G' C f 0 ( C R ( F ) ) u D 
Because of property 5.12, this corresponds to 
G'Cfa( CR(F)UD) 
But the set D can be chosen so that D = ( £li(F) \ CR(F) ); hence, the previous 
expression becomes 
G ' C / o ( f i 1 ( F ) ) = / 0 ( F ' ) (5.15) 
This condition expresses the fact that F' is a final state for the new problem V'. 
Since it results that 5.14 holds i f f 5.15 holds, then we have proved that if Sn = F 
is a final state for V then S'n = F' is a final state for V , and vice versa. 
The second part of the proof concerns the other condition (see equation 5.2) 
required by the definition of plan solution for a BP-planning problem. This condi-
tion requires that for every operator 0{ used in a solution, if P is its precondition 
list, then 
P C BP* (Si) 
where Si is the state to which is applied. 
Let us see that if the operator Oi has preconditions P C Bp*(Si), then the 
corresponding operator 7 i (0 j ) has preconditions P' C / 0 (5 t ' ) , and vice versa. 
The condition 
PCBP*(Si) (5.16) 
is equivalent to 
P' C f0( CR^) ) 
as P = P'. As before, since both members are C Lo, this relation holds i f f 
P' Q f o ( C R ( S , ) ) U D 
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for any D C A. Applying the property 5.12, we obtain 
P' C f0( (S,) U D ) 
By choosing D = ( fli(Si) \ C/^Si) ), the previous expression is equivalent to 
i " C / 0 ( n 1 ( 5 i ) ) = /o(Sj) (5.17) 
Since it results that 5.16 holds i f f 5.17 holds, then we can conclude that if the op-
erator Oi has preconditions P C BP*(Si), then the corresponding operator 7i(OJ 
has preconditions P' C f0(S[), and vice versa. 
Since both of the conditions 5.2 and 5.3 are equivalent for each pair of sequences 
Z and Z', then Z solves V i f f Z' solves V. 
Hence, the problem V is equivalent to V. 
• 
5.3.3 A2 
The second transformation algorithm A2 has been designed to effect the integra-
tion of the group of rules Roa, corresponding to the second step of the process of 
integration of the outer extension function 
BP* = C R O B o C * 0 o o C R i 
The set Roa can be any subset of the set Ro, which is acyclic, as derived from the 
interpretation function I ( ) of the BP algorithm applying the method used in the 
proof of the theorem of Composed Closure. 
As mentioned before, the properties of the boolean functions adopted by the 
interpretation I() are reflected by the properties of the corresponding inference 
rules of Ro. 
So, for example, let w € (Lo \ Li) have the interpretation 
l(w) = (ex V e2) 
where ei,e2 S Li. (Notice that this corresponds to the definition of interpretation 
for the default belief w =SUND(e), with ex = e and e2 =NOT(e), for the language 
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<WFE> adopted by the belief system described in Chapter 4.) 
This association will be transformed into the rule r of the set Ro 
r) - i (ei V e-i) V~ w 
As a matter of fact, the set Roa is built by collecting all the rules of the set Ro 
which are in the form 
r) ->qi A -192 A . . . A ~^qk h c 
with qi G Li and c G (Lo \ Li). 
A2 assumes these rules to be derived from the interpretation of a default belief 
'c', such that the terms 
• • • , ? * } 
are subject to a relation of restriction which imposes their mutual exclusivity. 
As we shall see in the following paragraphs, this assumption simplifies the trans-
formation which A2 needs to carry out on the set of operators Op of the original 
problem V to obtain the new set of operators Op' = T2(Op), integrating CRob. 
A2 
Let V = (I, Op, G, BP*) be a BP-planning problem such that BP* = CRb o C ^ , 
where the sets of inference rules Rb and Ra have only consequences belonging to 
Lo\Li, and Ra contains only rules in the form 
ri) - " ( g n V . . . V g i i t i ) h c i 
r*) - • ( g 2 i V . . . V t o 2 ) ^ c 2 
r n ) -'(qni V . . . V qnkn) r- c 
with G L i 1 8 and c x / for any x, y G { 1 , . . . n } , a; =^ y (i.e., the rules have all 
different consequences). 
If: 
1. W j G Ra, there exists a restriction on Lo such that the expressions of the 
Notice that this implies that the set Ra is acyclic. 
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set {qn,... ,qiki} result to be mutually exclusive 1 9 , 
then the algorithm A2, consisting of the application of the procedure r^, transforms 
V into an equivalent BP-planning problem V — (/', Op', G", BPf), where: 
• r = cRa(i) 
• Op' = r2(oP) 
• G' = G 
• B P i = cRb 
The role of the transformation algorithm A2 consists of integrating the set of rules 
Ra into the BP-planning problem, producing a new problem with a simpler outer 
extension function BPf = CRB. 
The idea which lies behind the method of integration adopted by A2 is the 
same idea upon which the definition of the algorithm A l relies, namely, that of 
'completing' the initial state / and the effects of the operators in Op with all the 
outer propositions introduced by the closure function C ^ . 
However, it is already possible to recognize that A2 wil l constitute a 'simplified' 
version of A l , as the transformation Oi has been substituted with the simple closure 
CRA. This avoids the introduction of new expressions not belonging to the outer 
language Lo (the set A ) , and the definitions of the new inner and outer languages 
for the new BP-planning problem resulting from A2 will be 
Li' = CRa(Li) 
Lo' = Lo 
The proof of the correctness of A2 is based on the specific properties of the trans-
formation r 2 , which will be defined in the next paragraphs; these properties are 
analogous to those of the function Tx for A l (see proposition 5.13). 
However, as a consequence of the assumption 1., the transformations which A2 
needs to carry out on each operator O e Op to produce the new set Op' are much 
simpler. 
In fact, the operators of the given BP-planning problem V have been supposed 
to be coherent (see page 124), that is, to produce a coherent state whenever the 
state to which they are applied is coherent. 
1 9 This condition could be seen as requiring the rules to be asynergistic, in the sense given to 
this term by Chapman in [20]. 
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Because of this, i f the propositions {q\, • • • ,qk] are mutually exclusive, only one 
of them can appear in the add list A, and only — a different — one can appear in 
the delete list D. 
Moreover, the default belief c, belonging to Lo\Li, is not allowed to be used in 
A or D, which must contain only inner expressions (by definition of BP-planning 
problem). Hence, the deletion of a certain not mirrored by the addition of 
another qj ^ qi will cause the default 'c' to be evaluated True in the state following 
the application of the operator. 
Taking these considerations into account, i t is possible to specify the algorithm 
for the transformation T2-
r 2 
The algorithm calculating the function T 2 consists of 'extending' each operator 
O = (P, A, D) G Op into a new operator O' = (P', A', D') = j2(0) such that 
• P' = P 
• A' = A U A* 
• D' = DUD* 
where A*, D*, containing only expressions of the set { c i , c 2 , . . . , c n } C (Lo \ Li), 
are obtained as described by the following steps: 
1. let A* = 0, D* = 0; 
2. Va G A and for each rule r G Ra containing a in its premisses 
r) - (qi V q2 V . . . V a V . . . V qk) h c 
such that q2,..., q^DD = 0, add 'c' to D*, i f i t was not already present; 
3. \/d e D and for each r e Ra containing d in its premisses 
r) -> (qi V q2 V . . . V d V . . . V qk) h c 
such that {q\,q2, •. •, qk} H A = 0, add 'c' to A*, i f it was not already present. 
Notice that y2 is 1-1, and it does not introduce conditional effects in the new set 
of operators. Moreover, i t should be noticed that this algorithm can be easily 
extended to operators which contain conditional effects. 
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In fact, the effects of A2 on an operator O = (P,A,D) simply consist of ex-
tending the add and delete lists A and D by adding to them two sets, A* and D* 
respectively, determined through the set of inference rules. The same extension 
can be carried out on each conditional effect ej = (Pj, Ai, Di) of a list [e\,..., en] 
present in the operator. 
The properties valid for the transformation of an operator containing a single 
effect (P, A, D) will also be valid for the transformation of an operator containing 
a list of effects. This is due to the fact that the extension lists of the effects are 
totally independent from each other, and so are the changes they produce on the 
state at the moment of the application of the operator. 
The formal proof for the correctness of this algorithm is given in the following 
section. 
5.3.4 Correctness of A2 
Given two set of rules Rb,Ra which satisfy the requirements specified for the ap-
plication of A2, the following Lemma formally proves the validity, for the function 
7 2 ( ) , of the property analogous to 5.13, which concerned the transformation 7 i ( ) : 
Lemma 5.1 Given two coherent states St and C^(S'^) and two operators O = 
(P,A,D) e Op and O' = 72(G), with O coherent and such that An D = 0, 
D C P 2 0 , then the application of O, O', respectively, to the states St and C ^ S t ) 
St —> St+i 
I (5.18) 
c^(st) ^ s[+l 
produces two coherent states St+\ and S't+l such that S't+1 = C ^ S j + i ) . 
Proof Since S't+l and S't+1 are obtained from the states St and C# 0 (S t ) applying 
O and O', then 
S m = (AuSt)\D 
S; + 1 = (A'uCRa(St))\D' 
2 0 T h e condition D C P means that, before deleting a proposition d, an operator in Op must 
verify that d is actually present in the state. 
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with A' = A U A*, D' = D U D* 2 1 . Since A n D = 0, the expression (A USt)\D 
is equivalent to A U (St \ D). Moreover, because of the way A' and D' are built in 
A2, from A n £> = 0 it also follows A ' f l D ' = 0. 
In order to show that S't+l = C ^ S j + i ) , we need to prove the two following 
relations: 
a) CRa(St+1) C S't+1 
b) S't+1CCRa(St+1) 
a) Let c G CRa(St+i); we need to prove that c G S j + 1 . The analysis can be divided 
into two cases: 1) c G S t+i or 2) c ^ S ( + i . 
1) I f c G St+i = AU St \ D, then c € Li, as S t and the list A (and D) contain 
only elements of the inner language. Since D* contains only elements of Lo \ Li, 
then c 0 D*. Therefore, 
c G (A U St \ D) \ D* = A U St \ {D U D*) 
C ( i U # ) U C ^ ( 5 ( ) \ ( 5 U ^ ) = 5 ; + 1 
(Notice that S t C 0 ^ ( 5 0 because of property 3.4). Hence, c £ S j + 1 . 
2) Suppose now c ^ St+i, even though c G C / t o (S t + i ) . I f this is the case, then 
the presence of c in CRa(St+i) must be originated by a rule r in Ra 
r) -i<ji A -1^ 2 A . . . A —iqrjfc c 
such that none of the premisses in Pr = {qi, q2,..., qk} belongs to St+\ = AuSt\D. 
Since the consequences of all the rules belong to Lo\Li, then c D, which contains 
only elements of Li. Again, there are two possible cases to be considered: either 
none of the premisses in Pr belongs to D, or (at most) one premiss d G Pr belongs 
to D. 
In the first case, since Pr n St+l = 0 and PrC\(AU St) = 0, then Pr n St = 0; 
hence, c G C ^ S t ) . For a given c, only one rule r of Ra can have c as consequence 
(all the rules in R must have different consequences); hence, c cannot have been 
2 1Notice that O is applicable to 5 f + 1 iff O' is applicable to CR0a(St). This will be shown in 
the next theorem ('A2-Equivalence'). If both of O and O' are not applicable, then the Lemma 
clearly holds, as the two initial states are left unchanged. 
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added to D* by A2, as this would require one element of the premisses in Pr to be 
in the add list A, whereas Pr D (A U St) = 0. On the other hand, i f c G" D*, then 
c ^ D' , hence c G 5J + 1 , as c € CRa(St). 
In the second case, 3 d £ Pr such that d e D. A l l the premisses in P r \ D 
cannot belong to A, as none of the premisses in Pr belongs to A U St \ D. Hence, 
Pr f l A = 0 (since A f l D = 0 ) ; this forces A2 to add c to the set A*, which implies 
c G S't+l (as A ' n D * = 0 ) . 
6) Let s G we need to prove that s G CRa(St+i). Since s G S't+1 = 
(A U A*) U CRa(St) \ ( D U £>*), then s G" ( D U D * ) . The analysis can be di-
vided into the following cases: 1) s G A; 2) s G A* (and s G" .4); 3) s G C / ^ S t ) -
1) If s G A, then s £ y l U 5 i \ D , which is a subset of its closure CRa (AuSt\ D) 
(property 3.4). Hence, c G C f l a ( , 4 U St \ D) = CRa(St+1). 
2) Consider s E A* (and s G" .A). The presence of s in .4* must have been 
originated by A2 because of the existence of a rule r in Ra 
r) A -"(ft A . . . A h s 
such that (at most 2 2) one of the premisses in Pr — {qit q2,..., <7fc} belongs to D, 
under the condition that Pr D A = 0. I f this is the case, then the considered 
operator O deletes one of the mutually exclusive expressions of Pr without adding 
another one (notice that s A). 
Since the state St is coherent (by hypothesis), none of the rest of mutually ex-
clusive premisses Pr\D can be present in the state St. But this implies that none 
of these elements is in S t + 1 either, as Pr n A = 0. Hence, Pr n St+i = 0; therefore, 
s G Cj^iSt+i), as r G Ra. 
3) Consider s G C ^ ( 5 t ) . I f s G then it follows immediately that s G 
Al)St\D, from which s e C ^ U 5 t \ D ) = C * a ( S m ) . 
On the other hand, if s G" St but s G C ^ S t ) , then there must be a rule r of 
Ra 
r) -i(7i A -i<72 A . . . A - ^ f c h s 
Because of the assumption of coherence of the operators. 
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such that none of the premisses in Pr = {p,q,... ,r} belongs to St- Again, there 
are two possible cases: Pr n A ^ 0, and Pr f l A = 0. 
The first case, in which 3 a G Pr such that a G A, results to be contradictory. 
In fact, the assumptions of this Lemma specify that the operator O must be 
such that 1) D is a subset of the preconditions of O, and 2) O is applicable to 
the current state St. According to the definition of correct plan for a BP-planning 
problem, O is applicable to the state St i f f its precondition list P is a subset of the 
outer extension BP*(St) (see condition 5.2). 
But BP* = CRb o C / k , and Rb, Ra are such that their consequences belong to 
Lo \ Li. Hence, since D C Li, if 3d G D, in order for O to be applicable to St it 
must be d G St (for hypothesis, D C P). 
Since none of the premisses in Pr belongs to the state St, then S'd G D such that 
d G Pr, i.e., D n Pr = 0. Because of the way D* is built by A2, if 3a G A : a G Pr 
and D D Pr = 0 then s must have been added to D*, which contradicts the fact 
that s (D U D*), as mentioned at the beginning of case b). 
Being the first case contradictory, it must be true that Pr D A = 0. I f none of 
the elements of Pr belongs to A U St, none of these elements appears in A U St \ D, 
either. Therefore, 
seCRa(A\JSt\D) = C R a ( S t + l ) 
from which s G C^St+i). 
Finally, after having proved that S't+1 = CRa(St+i), we need to show that the 
two states St+i, S't+l are coherent. St+i is coherent as obtained from St through O, 
which is coherent. But if 5 t ' + 1 = C ^ 0 ( S ' t + i ) and St+\ is coherent, then also is 
coherent, as the rules in Ra cannot 'introduce' incoherence. 
• 
The following Theorem uses this Lemma to prove formally the equivalence 
between the two BP-planning problems V and V , where V' is the result of the 
transformation performed by the algorithm A2 on V: 
Theorem 5.3 (A2-equivalence) LetV — (I, Op, G, BP*) be a BP-planning prob-
lem, with BP* = f0° fi, where: 
• fi = CRa, f0 = CRb, and the sets of inference rules Ra, Rb satisfy the 
requirements for the application of the algorithm A2; 
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• VO 6 Op, 0 = (P, A, D) is coherent and An D = 0, D C P. 
TTie new; BP-planning problem V = ( C R o ( J ) , r2(Op), G, / 0 ) produced by A2 is 
equivalent £o P. 
Proof The proof of this theorem is a simplified version of the proof for A l . Con-
sider a sequence of steps Z=< 0\, 02,... ,On> with Oi G Op, and associate it with 
the sequence Z'=<j2(Oi), . . . ,72(O n) > of operators G T2(Op). This association 
represents a bisection, as the transformation 72 is i - i , and each operator in T2(Op) 
has been generated by one (and only one) operator in Op. 
We need to prove that if Z solves V, then Z' solves V , and vice versa. 
Let 
/ Si S2 ... Sn = F 
be the sequence of states obtained applying the plan Z, and 
C R M ) 1 ^ S[12-^ . . . ^ ] S'n = F' 
the sequence generated by Z'. 
7 2 ( ^ 1 ) 
Because of Lemma 5.1, since C R 0 ( / ) S[, then 5J = C j J S x ) (and S[ is 
coherent). Analogously, S2 = CRa(S2), S'3 = C j R o ( 5 3 ) , etc. 
Let us see that i f Sn = F is a final state for V (i.e. i t contains the goal set G) 
then S'n = F' = Cna(Sn) is a final state for V , and vice versa. 
F is final state for V i f f 
VgeG, geBP*{F) (5.19) 
by definition of correct plan solution of a BP-planning problem (see equation 5.3). 
This is equivalent to 
GCf0(C^{F)) 
But since G' = G, this condition is the same as 
G'Cf0(CRa(F)) 
which becomes directly 
G' C f0(F') (5.20) 
This condition expresses the fact that F' is a final state for the new problem V'. 
Since i t results that 5.19 holds i f f 5.20 holds, then we have proved that i f Sn = F 
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is a final state for V then S'n = F' is a final state for V , and vice versa. 
The second part of the proof concerns the condition 5.2, requiring that for every 
operator Oi used in a solution, if P is its precondition list, then 
P C BP* (Si) 
where Si is the state to which Oi is applied. 
Let us see that if the operator 0{ has preconditions P C Bp*(Si), (i.e. Oi is 
applicable to the state Si) then the corresponding operator 72 (Oj) has preconditions 
P' ^ fo(S'i) (i.e. 72(Aj) is applicable to S-), and vice versa. 
The condition 
P C BP*(Si) (5.21) 
is equivalent to 
P' c / 0 ( C R ( S 0 ) 
as P = P'; but this is equivalent to 
P' C f0(Sl) (5.22) 
Since it results that 5.21 holds i f f 5.22 holds, then we can conclude that if the op-
erator Oi has preconditions P C BP*(Si), then the corresponding operator 72(Oj) 
has preconditions P' C f0(S'i), and vice versa. 
Since both of the conditions 5.2 and 5.3 are equivalent for each pair of sequences 
Z and Z', then Z solves V i f f Z' solves V'. Hence, the problem V is equivalent to 
V. 
• 
5.3.5 The integration process 
The entire process of integration of a BP algorithm into a planning system is based 
on the application of algorithms A l and A2 in conjunction with the Theorem 5.1 
(of the Composed Closure). 
In fact, the procedure described in the proof of the latter allows any outer 
extension function BP*() (containing, in an extended form, the same 'information' 
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of the BP() function) to be written as the composition of two closures 
BP* = CRo o CRi 
Since the set Ro results to be acyclic, it can be further divided into two sets, Roa 
and Rob, which are integrated separately through the application of A l and A2, 
respectively. 
Thus, the whole integration process can be represented by the sequence of 
problem transformations shown by the diagram in Figure 5.1. 
BP *= c ° c 
Ro Ri 
c ° c 
Roh Ro„ 
b a 
c 
*»» 
Id= BP* 
I 
A l A2 A l 
I ' 
Op Op 
Figure 5.1: Integration process. 
Each phase of the process produces a new BP-planning problem equivalent to 
the previous one, until the last problem is solvable by a standard planning system. 
Nevertheless, there are two points which should be noticed. 
First of all, although the input and output of each 'block' consist both of a BP-
planning problem, the set of operators produced by A l contains conditional effects, 
whereas the set in input to it should contain exclusively non-conditional (STRIPS-
like) operators (P, A,D). To allow conditional effects to be pre-processed, A l will 
have to be applied to each triple (Pi,Ai,Di) of each conditional operator in input 
Moreover, A l will have to be applied more than once in the first phase if the initial 
set Ri is not acyclic and needs to be split into separate blocks. 
Secondly, the applicability of the process of integration relies upon a set of 
hypotheses and restrictions made during the introduction and formalization of the 
indirect method of integration, which, for clarity, have been summarized below. 
1. The first obvious assumption consists of the fact that the problem to be solved 
must satisfy the requirements necessary to be classified as a BP-planning 
problem. That is, there must be two languages, Li C Lo (inner and outer), 
an outer extension function BP*() = CRooCRi, derived from a BP algorithm 
which calculates an interpretation I ( ) of Lo on Li using a set of rules Ri on 
Li, an initial state I C Li, a set of goals G C Lo and a set of operators Op 
with specific characteristics (see definition at page 122). 
2. The inference rules of Ri are in the form p h c (with p,c € Lo) and Ri 
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is acyclic. In alternative, if Ri is not already acyclic, i t must be possible 
to divide it into an ordered sequence of acyclic blocks, such that the conse-
quences of each block do not appear as premisses of the previous blocks (this 
hypothesis is required for the applicability of A l ) . 
3. The rules in Ro, the set of rules obtained from I ( ) through the method 
described in Theorem 5.1, are in one of the two following forms: 
a) - i (qi V q2 V . . . V qk) h c 
b) p\- c 
with qi G Li, p G Lo, c G (Lo \ Li) and such that: i) 'grounding' p makes c 
grounded too, and ii) the rules of type a) are obtained from the interpretation 
of a default belief X(c) = -> ( ( f r V . . . V t ^ ) , which imposes a restriction of mutual 
exclusivity and exhaustivity on the terms {<?i, . . . ,<&, c} 2 3 . 
4. Each operators O G Op must be coherent, and such that if O = (P, A,D), 
then A f l D = 0 and D C P (these hypotheses are necessary for the appli-
cability of A2, although the set of rules in Ro of type b) is integrated by 
A l ) . 
As already discussed, these assumptions guarantee that the application of A l and 
A2 will produce the expected results, but their necessity is only contingent to the 
specific adoption of such algorithms, and can be avoided with the development of 
more sophisticated procedures of integration. 
Moreover, as it will be shown in the next chapter, most of these hypotheses are 
quite 'naturally' satisfied when considering a real domain example. 
Any belief system defined according to the paradigm described in Chapter 3 
and satisfying these hypotheses can undergo the process of indirect integration, 
and become part of an automatic system for the solution of BP-planning problems. 
However, involved in the global process of integration, there is a more 'practical' 
issue which has not been analysed properly, yet. It concerns the finiteness of the 
process. The presence of infinite sets in the problem can result from the adoption 
of infinite languages Lo and Li. The non-finiteness of the languages has an impact 
on the whole process of integration. 
2 3Notice that the sets Rot, and Roa will contain the collection of all the rules of Ro in the form, 
respectively, b) and a). 
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In fact, for example, the interpretation function J ( ) must associate each ex-
pression of the domain Lo \ Li to a boolean function of inner propositions. I f the 
set Lo \ Li is finite, this association is representable simply with a finite list of 
pairs, and can be transformed into the equivalent (finite) set of rules Ro, using the 
method described in Theorem 5.1. But if the set Lo\Li contains an infinite number 
of expressions, the list of associations results to be infinite: hence, the process of 
conversion of this list into the set of rules Ro will never terminate. 
In order to guarantee the finiteness of the process of integration, i t is necessary 
at least to give a finite representation of the infinite sets; this can be done only 
with the use of expressions containing typed variables, which can be substituted 
with values taken from specific sets containing infinite elements. 
As a matter of facts, this is what has been done, implicitly, to define the in-
ference rules of Ri for the belief system described in Chapter 4. For example, the 
inference rule 
i x ) SR(e) h e 
(with e :: <Ei>) represents finitely an infinite set of rules, since the production 
<Ei> can generate an infinite list of events E i , E 2 , . . . , E n , . . . . 
The introduction of variables in the definition of the interpretation X() might 
lead to the presence of variables in the result of the closure C ^ . In fact, consider, 
for example, the definition of J ( ) given in Chapter 4, which contains (vice versa) 
the following association: 
X(HUNK(SUP(e, e'))) = £(HUNK(e)) V £?(HUNK(e')) 
with e,e' :: <Ei>. The conversion of this association into inference rules will 
produce the two rules of Ro 
r i ) HUNK(e) h HUNK(SUP(e, x)) 
r i + l ) HUNK(e) h HUNK(SUP(x, e)) 
where e,x :: <Ei>. 
Whatever the expression in the premisses is matched with, the variable x of the 
consequences will always be uninstantiated. Hence, i f any of these rules is applied 
during the calculation of the closure C# 0 ( j(7), performed by A l in the last phase of 
the integration process, the resulting initial state of the BP-planning problem will 
contain expressions with variables. 
The presence of variables in the propositions of a state may not always be 
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allowed by a planning system, especially when these variables represent an infinite 
set of expressions. To eliminate this problem without changing the definit ion of the 
interpretation which caused the introduction of variables, i t might be necessary to 
restrict to a finite set the domain of each variable, and substitute each expression of 
the state containing variables w i th the set of expressions obtained by instantiating 
the variables in every possible way. 
However, an arbitrary restriction of the variable domain could corrupt the cor-
rect functioning of a system. A more suitable approach consists of allowing a 'lazy 
evaluation' of the infinite sets of expressions. This means considering the domain 
of the variables to be 'v i r tua l ly ' infinite: since only a small port ion of these values 
w i l l actually be used during the planning process, i t w i l l be sufficient to instantiate 
the variables, at ' run t ime' , wi th only those values which w i l l be str ict ly needed for 
the specific computation required. I t should be noticed that the idea of restricting 
the domain of the variables to the sets of values needed for the specific problem 
considered can be used to optimise the performance of planning systems in general, 
even when the language adopted is finite. In fact, even i f the number of possible 
instances of a variable is finite, there can s t i l l be a large number of possibilities, 
and the restriction of the domains to smaller sets can notably reduce the search 
space examined during the planning process. 
As next chapter w i l l illustrate (Section 6.3), the same idea has been adopted 
for the actual implementation of the integration of a specific belief system, realised 
according to the indirect (or 'preprocessing') method of integration described so 
far. 
5.3.6 Conclusions 
The aim of this chapter was to analyse the feasibility and method of realization 
of the integration between a belief system implemented according to the paradigm 
described in Chapter 3 and a generic planning system. 
The theoretical analysis has shown that, under the assumptions summarized in 
the previous section, any BP algorithm can be integrated into any standard plan-
ning system. Since the system described in Chapter 4 has been defined according to 
the specific requirements for a BP algorithm and satisfies the necessary hypotheses 
concerning the rules in Ri and Ro, the results of this chapter confirm its suitabili ty 
for integration (preprocessing) into a wide range of planners. 
Al though the indirect method of integration described can require the 'hand-
coding' of the inference rules in Ro, derived f rom J ( ) , i t presents the big advantage 
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of freeing the programmer f rom any modification of the code of the 'host' planning 
system, shif t ing the human intervention f r o m the correction of a pre-existent piece 
of software to the development of a separate 'integrator' system, which can be 
designed, implemented and modified as an independent module. 
The next chapter w i l l illustrate, as an example, the implementation and integra-
t ion of a belief system for persuasive discourse planning, which has been developed 
and preprocessed according to the two described paradigms. 
Chapter 6 
A Persuasive Discourse Planning 
System 
The aims of this final chapter are: 1) to show how, in practice, the integration of a 
belief system for discourse planning defined according to the paradigm of Chapter 3 
has been realized, and 2) to illustrate the results of the system implemented, which 
constitutes an example of persuasive discourse planner. 
The first section describes the specific BP algori thm adopted by the belief sys-
tem. The second section gives a brief summary of the high-level steps of the algo-
r i t h m for the integration, whereas the th i rd one contains a more detailed description 
of the practical aspects concerning the actual implementation of the system, and 
introduces the set of operators which have been given to the planner to solve the 
BP-planning problems. 
The four th and last section illustrates some examples of persuasive discourse 
plans, produced in different belief situations and to achieve different goals. 
6.1 The Integrated belief system 
The belief system adopted for the integration has been realized according to the 
same theoretical framework upon which the model described in Chapter 3 relies. As 
such, i t can be described as a tr iple (Lo, Li, A), where A is the BP algorithm which 
calculates the interpretation of the (outer) language Lo on the (inner) language of 
beliefs Li. 
The following paragraphs introduce and discuss the formal features of these 
languages and the other characteristics of the BP algori thm. 
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6.1.1 The outer language 
The outer language Lo recognized by the system consists of a simplified version of 
the two-level nesting <WFE> outer language previously formalized. Its syntax is 
defined by the following B N F production rules, where < WFE1 > should be used 
as in i t ia l symbol: 
< WFE1 > := <Pred>(<A>) \NOT(<Pred>(<A>)) 
<Pred> ~ SBEL | SUND | H B E L | H U N D | H U N K 
<A> := <E> | N O T ( < £ > ) 
<E> : = S R ( < £ s > ) | UR{<Es>) | <Es> 
<Es> := SUP(< En>, < En>) \ <Ei> 
<En> := <Es> | N O T ( < £ s > ) 
<Ei> : = E o | E i | E 2 | E 3 | . . . | E n | . . . 
There are three main differences which distinguish this syntax f rom the original 
<WFE>: 
1. <WFE1 > allows only one level of belief nesting instead of two; 
2. the arguments of a SUP( ) expression must be either a SUP( ) expression, a 
pr imit ive event <Ei>, or one of their negations, whereas in <WFE> they 
could have been any expression generated by < A >; 
3. the new definit ion of the production rule for the symbol <E> eliminates the 
groups of SIEXP and H I E X P expressions (Speaker/Hearer Inductive Expe-
riences). 
As a consequence of the first l imi ta t ion , all the propositions belonging to the 
hearer's model of the speaker's belief (such as H B E L ( S B E L ( E i ) ) ) are not permit-
ted. Nevertheless, i t should be noted that beliefs such as H B E L ( S R ( E 2 ) ) are st i l l 
allowed, as they express the hearer's model of the speaker's real experience, and 
not of the speaker's beliefs. 
The second simplification l imits the range of support relationships actually ex-
pressible. I n this syntax, for example, real-experience events in the form SR() , 
H R ( ) can not have any supporting event. This excludes expressions such as 
SUP(E 2 ,SR(E 3 ) ) or S U P ( H R ( E 4 ) , E 5 ) . 
Finally, because of the t h i r d simplification, the two HIEXP(s ) and SIEXP(s) 
expressions, used in <WFE> to indicate that a SUP() relationship s was the 
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result of induction based on a collection of repeated causal experiences, w i l l now 
be represented by HR(s) and SR(s), respectively. Hence, in this context, a support 
event SUP() which was derived through the process of induction on multiple expe-
riences w i l l be treated like a real experience itself, representing an unquestionable 
belief resulting f rom the experiences of the subject. 
Al though the above language restricts the power of expressiveness of the origi-
nal <WFE>, its syntax maintains intact the basic structure and characteristics, 
allowing the presence of non-limited levels of nesting for SUP() expressions, three-
valued uncertainty (for both the speaker's and hearer's models), belief grounding 
through rationali ty or experience and identification of hearer non-knowledge via 
the adoption of a ' H U N K ' predicate. 
Therefore, the simplified language defined by <WFE1>, although developed 
mainly as part of an explanatory example, can be used to illustrate how the practi-
cal issues involved in the process of indirect integration of a belief system discourse-
planning 'oriented' can be solved; moreover, as the final results w i l l show, i t s t i l l 
enables the description of realistic belief situations which generate the construction 
of sophisticated discourse plans. 
6.1.2 The Interpretation 
As described in Chapter 3, the funct ion of interpretation X ( ) associates every outer 
language (<WFE1> generated) expression w i t h a boolean funct ion defined over 
a subset of the outer language itself. The set of expressions obtained as the union 
of al l the domains of the boolean functions w i l l constitute the inner language. 
The specific BP algorithm implemented effects this association through the ap-
plication of the steps described below. 
Let w be an expression of Lo <— <WFE\>\ the boolean funct ion associated 
to w is 
I(w) = check(w') 
where w' and the function check{) are defined as follows: 
1. w' is obtained f rom w by applying, whenever possible, the following syntac-
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t ical transformations: 
SUND(NOT(e)) SUND(e) 
HUND(NOT(e ) ) - » HUND(e) 
H U N K ( N O T ( e ) ) ->• HUNK(e) 
SBEL(a) a 
for any string a and e such that the left-hand sides of the reductions are 
expressions of < WFE1 >. I t is important to notice that these simplifications 
should be applied to every part of the expression (i.e. even inside other 
predicates). For example, the expression NOT(SBEL(a) ) should be reduced 
to NOT(a ) . 
2. The funct ion check() is defined as follows: 
check(w') = 
where the symbols ' = ' , ':: ' , and '_' have the same meaning adopted in 
Chapter 4. 
The only boolean functions which are worth noticing are those associated w i t h 
the expressions NOT(SR(e)) , SUND(e) and H U N K ( e ) . 
The first one assumes NOT(SR(e)) to be true i f f the proposition is explicitly 
stated, and is identical to the corresponding interpretation defined for <WFE>. 
The other two functions realize the mechanism of default belief for the two 
expressions S U N D ( ) and H U N K ( ) : i f the current state does not explicit ly contain 
the speaker's belief (or unbelief) towards an event (represented respectively by 'e' 
or ' N O T ( e ) ' ) , then the system w i l l assume the belief SUND(e) to hold. Similarly, 
the absence of any particular model of the hearer's at t i tude in relation to an event 
is equivalent to assuming that the hearer does not know the event (i.e. HUNK(e) ) . 
I t is interesting to note that the definition of the boolean funct ion for NOT(SR(e)) 
- .B(SR(e) ) 
B(w') 
->check(x) 
B(w') 
- ( £ ( e ) V fl(NOT(e))) 
- i ( B ( H B E L ( e ) ) V £ ( H U N D ( e ) ) V 
£ ( H B E L ( N O T ( e ) ) ) ) 
i f w' ^ N O T ( S R ( e ) ) ; 
i f w' :: <A>; 
i f w' =NOT(a;) ; 
iiw' = H B E L ( _ ) or w' ^ H U N D ( _ ) ; 
i f w' ^ S U N D ( e ) ; 
i f w' = H U N K ( e ) ; 
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forces any (outer) belief having the form SUND(SR(e)) to be evaluated False by the 
BP algorithm: in other words, this expression is considered contradictory, exactly 
like in the model for <WFE>. 
I t is not di f f icul t to see that every possible < WFE1 > expression is taken into 
consideration by this algorithm. 
6.1.3 The Inner language 
The union of the domains of definition of all the boolean functions associated to 
the outer expressions constitutes the inner language Li (clearly a subset of the 
outer one) identified by this specific BP algorithm. As i t can be seen f rom the 
definition of the funct ion check(), Li does not contain expressions such as SBEL(a), 
SUND(a), H U N D ( N O T ( e ) ) , H U N K ( a ) , or NOT(<Pre<2>(a ) ) . In fact, i t is easy to 
discover that the inner language identified by check() contains only the expressions 
generated by the three constructs <A>, H B E L ( < A > ) and H U N D ( < . E > ) . 
Moreover, since any expression in the fo rm SUND(SR(< i ? s > ) ) has been con-
sidered contradictory, the same assumption should be adopted for the symmetrical 
case H U N D ( H R ( < i ? s > ) ) . In order to force these expressions to be always evalu-
ated False i t is sufficient to exclude them f rom in the inner language, so that they 
w i l l never appear in the set of beliefs. 
Summarising, the inner language can be generated simply by the two following 
production rules, where the in i t i a l symbol is <WFF1>, and <A>, <Es> are 
defined as in <WFE1>: 
As a matter of fact, the expressions w in the fo rm NOT(SR(e)) , derivable f rom 
the symbol <A>, should not be considered as elements of the inner language 
Li <— <WFF1>, as they are associated, via X ( ) , to a specific boolean function 
(namely, - i(B(SR(e))) ) which differ f rom the ' identi ty ' funct ion B(w), to which 
all the w £ Li are supposed to be associated. 
Hence, the syntax < WFF1 > should be modified so as to contain all the 
expressions generated by <A>, but avoid the production of those in the form 
N O T ( S R ( ) ) . However, for reasons of clarity, the previous syntax has been left 
unchanged, although the set of expressions having the mentioned form w i l l be 
considered as belonging to Lo\Li. 
<Eh> 
<WFF1> <A> | H B E L ( < A > ) | H U N D ( < £ / i > ) 
S R ( < £ s > ) | <Es> 
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T h e Inference R u l e s 
Having formally defined the inner language, i t is now possible to introduce the 
set Ri of inference rules. These have been simply identified by selecting, amongst 
the rules defined for <WFF> in Chapter 4, those which contained expressions 
admitted by the new restricted language <WFF1>. 
As a result, only the five rules {ii, 17, iu} have been able to be included: 
H) SR(e) h e 
12) HR(e) h e, HBEL(HR(e) ) 
13) NOT(HR(e) ) h HBEL(NOT(HR(e ) ) ) 
U) HBEL(SR(e)) h HBEL(e) 
i b ) HBEL(HR(e) ) h HBEL(e) 
w i t h e :: <Es>. 
Notice that this list of inference rules can be considered complete, w i t h respect 
to the set of possible rules w i t h only one left hand side and containing exclusively 
inner language expressions. 
For example, the five inference rules showed below, having single left hand side 
and containing only inner language expressions, have been considered but rejected: 
• NOT(SR(e)) h NOT(e) 
• NOT(HR(e) ) h NOT(e) 
• HBEL(NOT(SR(e) ) ) h HBEL(NOT(e ) ) 
• H B E L ( N O T ( H R ( e ) ) ) h HBEL(NOT(e ) ) 
• S U P ( e i , e 2) h SUP(NOT(e 2 ) , N O T ( e i ) ) 
The incorrectness of the first four is obvious: believing that 'e' is not a real experi-
ence does not support the belief in NOT(e) . The non applicabili ty of the f i f t h one 
has been already discussed in Section 4.2.1. 
Restr ic t ions of < WFFl > 
The interpretation I ( ) contains two default belief mechanisms, defined for the 
expressions H U N K ( ) and S U N D ( ) . Since I ( ) w i l l be converted — by the process 
of integration — into a set of inference rules Ro, the terms involved in the boolean 
functions associated to the default belief must be subject to a restriction of mutual 
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exclusivity . 
The restrictions imposed on the inner language Li of the belief system consists 
of the two following boolean functions: 
« i ) - (e A N O T ( e ) ) 
U2) - ( ( H B E L ( e ) A H B E L ( N O T ( e ) ) ) V 
(HBEL(e) A HUND(e)) V 
(HUND(e) A H B E L ( N O T ( e ) ) ) ) 
U\ \s and U2 \s must be always True, for any current (extended) state S C Li of 
the system, for any string e admitted by the < WFF1 > syntax in those positions. 
Similarly to the system described in Chapter 4, the effects of the restrictions 
imposed on Li group the expressions of Lo into two classes of sets such that the 
propositions belonging to the same set results to be mutual ly exclusive and exhaus-
tive. The two classes of sets are as follows: 
^ ( e ) = { e , N O T ( e ) , S U N D ( e ) } 
5 2 (e) = { H B E L ( e ) , H B E L ( N O T ( e ) ) , HUND(e) , H U N K ( e ) } 
Notice that the operators which w i l l be used by the planning system for the con-
struction of discourse plans w i l l be required to be coherent w i t h these restrictions, 
i.e. to be such that their application to a coherent state w i l l always produce a new 
coherent state. 
6.2 Integration 
The process of integration of the belief system described in the previous section is 
based on the indirect approach, consisting of the transformation of any given BP-
planning problem V into an equivalent standard problem V which can be solved 
normally. 
The whole transformation requires the conversion of the interpretation function 
X ( ) into a set Ro of inference rules; since J ( ) has not been defined as an explicit 
list of associations, this preliminary conversion had to be performed 'by hand'. 
1 There is actually also a third default mechanism in Z ( ) , defined for the expression 
NOT(SR(e)). However, its boolean function contains only one term; thus, there is no need for 
any further restrictions of mutual exclusivity, as this should be imposed on a single proposition. 
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The results of this in i t i a l phase consist of the following list of rules, constituting 
the set Ro: 
01) - .SR(e ' ) h NOT(SR(e ')) 
0 2 ) - . (e V NOT(e)) h SUND(e), SUND(NOT(e)) 
0 3 ) - (HBEL(e) V HUND(e) V 
H B E L ( N O T ( e ) ) ) h H U N K ( e ) , H U N K ( N O T ( e ) ) 
0 4 ) a h SBEL(a), NOT(SUND(a ) ) , N O T ( S B E L ( N O T ( a ) ) ) , 
N O T ( S U N D ( N O T ( a ) ) ) 
0 5 ) HBEL(a) h N O T ( H B E L ( N O T ( a ) ) ) , N O T ( H U N D ( N O T ( a ) ) ) , 
N O T ( H U N K ( N O T ( a ) ) ) , N O T ( H U N D ( a ) ) , 
N O T ( H U N K ( a ) ) 
0 6 ) HUND(e") h H U N D ( N O T ( e " ) ) , N O T ( H B E L ( e " ) ) , 
N O T ( H U N K ( e " ) ) , N O T ( H B E L ( N O T ( e " ) ) ) , 
N O T ( H U N K ( N O T ( e " ) ) ) 
or) SUND(e) h NOT(SBEL(e) ) , NOT(SBEL(NOT(e ) ) ) 
o 8) HUNK(e) h N O T ( H B E L ( e ) ) , N O T ( H B E L ( N O T ( e ) ) ) , 
N O T ( H U N D ( e ) ) , N O T ( H U N D ( N O T ( e ) ) ) 
w i t h e :: <E>, e' :: <Es>,e" :: <Eh> and a :: < A > . 
First of all , i t should be noticed that the list has been divided into three acyclic 
blocks — Roa = {oi}, Ro\) — {02,03} and Roc containing all the remaining rules 
— which w i l l be integrated separately and in the given order, using the algorithms 
A l and A2 . 
Moreover, because of the way A l and A2 work, after each integration, the 
inner language Li' of the new equivalent problem w i l l contain also the expressions 
which appeared as consequences of the integrated block. In fact, as specified in the 
description of A l and A2, Li' = Qx(Li) ( in A l ) and Li' = CR(Li) (for A2) . 
This means that some of the expressions which were not elements of the inner 
language Li of V could be members of the new inner language Li' of V . Hence, 
these expressions, in i t ia l ly not allowed in the premisses of the rules of V which are 
being integrated 2 can appear in the premisses of the rules of the new problem, i.e., 
of the following blocks. 
2 The requirements for A l and A2 specify that every rule of Ro must have premisses containing 
only inner language terms. 
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This happens, for example,in the case of the default expressions SUND(_) and 
HUNK(_) , which are consequences of block Rob and premisses of Roc. 
Let us explain how these inference rules can 'replace' the effects of the inter-
pretation funct ion I ( ) . 
Rule 0\ realizes the task previously performed by the funct ion check() to cal-
culate the t r u th value of the expression NOT(SR(e)) , associated w i t h the boolean 
function - iB (SR(e ) ) . The rule should be interpreted as follows: for each expression 
e' generable f r o m <Es>, i f the proposition SR(e') is not present in the state, then 
the expression NOT(SR(e)) should be added to the state. 
Analogously, o 2 and 03 replace the boolean functions used to calculate the t r u t h 
of the default expressions SUND(e) and H U N K ( e ) , respectively. For example, o 2 
w i l l add SUND(e) and SUND(NOT(e)) to the state for each expression e :: <E> 
such that neither e nor NOT(e) are present in the state. 
Af te r completing the state w i t h all the default expressions deduced f rom the 
absence of associated inner beliefs, the three rules 04~o6 w i l l append all the 'outer' 
language expressions derivable f rom the inner beliefs currently present in the state. 
Notice that the additions of the beliefs SBEL(a) in o 4 and HUND(NOT(e" ) ) 
in o 6 'substitute', respectively, the syntactical transformations SBEL(a) —¥ a and 
H U N D ( N O T ( e ) ) ^ H U N D ( e ) . 
Similarly, the two pairs of negated defaults added by o 5 and o 6 replace the 
analogous transformations for SUND(NOT(e) ) and H U N K ( N O T ( e ) ) . 
Finally, o 7 and o 8 complete the state w i t h al l the outer beliefs which follow 
f rom the defaults previously added by 02 ,03 . I t should be also pointed out that ex-
pressions like SUND(SR( )) or H U N D ( H R ( ) ) — excluded f r o m the inner language 
<WFF1 > — cannot be generated by any of these inference rules 3 . 
Having converted the interpretation I ( ) into the set of rules Ro, i t is possible 
to rewrite the outer extension function of the BP as 
BP* = CRO O C R I 
where Ri is the set . .,15} of rules on Li introduced earlier in this section. 
Notice that Ri needs to be divided into two separate blocks, not being already 
acyclic: in fact, the consequence HBEL(HR(e ' ) ) of i 2 constitutes the premiss of i 5 . 
Assuming to identify the two blocks composing Ri as Ri\ and Ri% (which rules 
3Notice that o 2 will never generate SUND(SR( )) because of the presence of o\. 
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they w i l l contain is not relevant, so long as i2 G Ri\ and i5 G R12), the entire 
integration process w i l l consist of reducing the outer extension function 
BP* = Id o ( C f l 0 c o Coo, o C * 0 J o (CRl2 o C f f i l ) 
to the identity funct ion Id through the following sequence of transformations: 
V -)• Al(Rii) Al(Ri2) -> A2(Roa) -> A2(Rob) A l ( i t o c ) ->• (6.1) 
The argument of each of the various applications of A l and A2 represents the 
specific set of rules which is being integrated in that step. 
The whole integration w i l l consist of applying this sequence of transformations 
to any set of operators Op and in i t ia l state J 4 , producing a resulting problem 
V = {Op1,1') which can be solved by a standard planning system. 
Therefore, the resulting system w i l l constitute an 'integrator' of BP-planning 
problems (specific for the BP algorithm adopted) producing in output the standard 
planning problems equivalent to the input ones. 
The next section w i l l explain the details of the implementation of this system, 
which has been realized by taking into account the characteristics of the specific 
'host' planning system adopted. 
Finally, the last result of this section consists of a theorem which guarantees 
the correctness of the conversion of the specific I ( ) adopted into the set of rules 
Ro: this is proved by showing that the function C R o o C R i (S) calculates exactly 
the outer extension BP*(S) for any given state S. 
T h e o r e m 6.1 If S C Li be a state, Ri — {ii,... ,15 } and Ro = { o 1 ; . . . ,og}, then 
{CRo o C R i ( S ) ) = {UJ e Lo I BP(u, S) = True}. 
P r o o f In order to prove that S* = O, let us see that S* C O and vice versa. 
Part 1 (S* C O): Let S be a subset of Li, and consider an element s G S*. We 
have to show that s £ O. There are two possible cases: either s G Li or s £ Li. 
I f s G Li, then either s was already in S, or i t was added by a rule of Ri. In the 
first case, f rom s G S i t follows BP(s, S) = True (property 3.6. I f s was added by 
Ri, then i t w i l l be evaluated True by the BP, because of the presence of the same 
4Notice that the goal set G is always left unchanged by A l and A2. 
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inference rules i\-is in the algorithm. Hence, i f s G Li, then BP(s, S) is always 
true, and, therefore, s G O. 
Let us now consider s G S* such that s Li, i.e. s G (Lo \ Li). Since s G S* 
but also s 0 5 (as i t is not an inner expression) then i t must have been added by 
one of the rules in Ro. 
I f i t was added by o u then s=NOT(SR(e ' ) ) , and SR(e') 0 S: thus, the boolean 
funct ion - iS (SR(e ' ) ) , used to evaluate I(s), w i l l return True, which means s G O. 
Cases o 2 - o 3 are analogous to the previous one. 
I f s was added by 04-Oe, then the proposition p at the left-hand side of the 
inference rule used to add s is a belief which either belongs to S or was added by 
Ri or o\. In both cases, as the proof has shown so far, the BP w i l l evaluate p as 
True. Bu t for every possible consequence of 04~o6, i t can be seen, case by case, that 
the t r u t h of the premiss w i l l force the BP to evaluate as True also the consequence. 
Hence, being s one of the consequences, i t results BP(s, S) = True. 
Finally, i f s was added by one of the last two rules o 7 , o 8 , then the premiss 
which has caused its addit ion was a consequence of o 2 or 03. I n each of the two 
possible rules, the absence of the specific beliefs which have produced the addition 
of the default beliefs w i l l force the BP to evaluate s as True. 
Summarising, even when s ^ Li, s is evaluated True by the BP algorithm. 
Therefore, in both cases (s G Li and s $ Li) i t results s G O, which implies 
S* C O. 
Part 2 (O C S*): Let S be a subset of Li. Consider an element ui G O, where 
O = {u G Lo I BP(w, S) = True}. We have to show that u G S*. 
Let S' be the closure calculated by the BP through the inner rules which i t 
adopts. Since these rules are exactly Ri, then S' C S*, as C R i ( S ) C S* because of 
property 3.4. 
When the BP evaluates the expressions ui (and returns True), there are two 
possible cases: either a) u> is not modified by the syntactical transformations per-
formed to calculate T{UJ) in step 1 or b) i t is. Let us begin by considering the first 
case. 
Part 2.a) I f u; does not need to be simplified, then i t must match one of the 
expressions evaluated directly by the check() funct ion. In this situation, either 
i) the t r u th of u> is determined directly as B{ui), or ii) i t is associated to a more 
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complex boolean function. 
In case i), since BP(UJ,S) = True, then B{ui) = True, which means that 
UJ G 5", and, therefore, u G S*, as S' C S*. 
In case ii), to can be one of the following expressions: 1) NOT(SR(e)) , 2) 
SUND(e), 3) HUNK(e) or 4) N O T ( x ) . I f u = NOT(SR(e)) , then -.B(SR(e)) 
must be True, f rom the definition of the function check(). Hence, the proposition 
NOT(SR(e)) w i l l be added to S* because of ox. Therefore, u; € S*. Cases 2) and 
3) are analogous, considering the rules of 02-03. Case 4) requires a more careful 
analysis. I f to matches w i t h N O T ( x ) (and u is not of type < A > ) , then ui must 
be an outer expression which does not belong to the inner language. Therefore, 
the unification u ^ NOT(a;) w i l l produce either x = H B E L ( _ ) , or x = H U N D ( _ ) , or 
x=SUND(_) or x = H U N K ( _ ) . Since the t r u th value of u> (obtained as ->check(x)) 
is True, then check(x) must be False. Using this fact, and the restrictions which 
have been imposed on the model, for each of the previous cases i t is possible to 
prove that to G S*. Let us examine in details only the first the others can 
be proved in a similar manner. 
Since the funct ion check(x) = c/iecft(HBEL(e)) = 5 ( H B E L ( e ) ) returns False, 
then a;=HBEL(e) 0 5". Because of the restrictions imposed on the state, at most 
one of the two expressions H B E L ( N O T ( e ) ) , HUND(e) can be present in S'. I f one 
of them does belong to S', then one of the rules 05 or o^, respectively, w i l l add 
N O T ( H B E L ( e ) ) to S*, i.e. N O T ( x ) e S*. I f none of them holds, then o 3 w i l l add 
the default H U N K ( e ) , which, i n turn , w i l l cause o 8 to append N O T ( H B E L ( e ) ) . 
Therefore, in both cases, u = N O T ( x ) e S*. 
Summarizing, i f u is an expression which is not modified by the syntactical 
transformations of the BP algorithm, then u 6 S * . 
Part2.b) Consider now the final possibility, in which u> is changed into ui' by one 
of the transformations applied by the BP algor i thm 5 . 
Since check(u') = True, then, for what we have seen in the previous consid-
erations, u' € S*. On the other hand, for each of the four possible u>' (namely, 
H U N K ( e ) , SUND(e), HUND(e) and 'a ') , either there is a rule in o 2 - o 6 such that 
LO' h ui, or u>' and 00 must have been added together, as consequences of one of these 
rules. Therefore, also in this case, ui G S*. 
In conclusion, since every u> G O also belongs to S*, then O C S*. 
5Notice that if w is a correct < WFE1 > expression, it cannot need more than one syntactical 
transformation. 
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Since S* C 0 ( f rom Part 1) and O C S* (Part 2), then S* = O. 
• 
6.3 Implementation 
The actual implementation of the integrator system has been realized in ' C , a 
procedural language widely adopted for commercial applications and for which 
various compiling packages are available. 
The software has been developed by taking into account two elements: 1) the 
planning system which w i l l be used to solve the final standard problem , and 2) 
the specific characteristics of the application domain, namely, of the problem of 
discourse planning. 
The planner adopted is ' IPP ' [80], a system based on the Graphplan planning 
technique [15], which has been already introduced in Section 2.4. Apar t f rom 
presenting very competitive performances, IPP allows the use of operators w i t h 
conditional effects. This feature eliminates, in the process of integration, the need 
to convert the output of the last application of A l into an equivalent problem which 
does not contain conditional operators. 
On the other hand, one of the l imits of IPP consists of the fact that i t requires 
a finite planning language. This is due to the fact that every variable present in 
the given set of operators is automatically instantiated (in all the possible ways) 
at the beginning of the planning process. 
This l imi ta t ion constitutes an obstacle for the integration of the belief system 
developed, as the language <WFF1> contains an infini te number of expressions, 
due to the possibility of having SUP() expressions w i t h an arbitrary level of nesting. 
The solution to this problem has been developed by adopting a 'lazy evaluation' 
approach, together w i t h the exploitation of information derived f r o m the specific 
domain problem definit ion. 
In other words, the reduction of the general problem of planning to that of 
discourse planning allows to restrict the infinite sets of expressions generable by 
< WFF1 > to finite collections containing only expressions belonging to what could 
be identified as the 'discourse context. 
The discourse context can be intui t ively defined as the set of concepts, extracted 
f rom the entire knowledge base of an agent, which are 'relevant' for the current 
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discourse, and which might need to be accessed during the process of construction 
of the discourse itself. I n computer science terms, the discourse context can be 
thought to play the role of a 'buffer', or cache, between the discourse plan which 
is being bui l t and the whole knowledge base. 
The criterion used to select the concepts to include in this 'buffer ' is based on the 
relevance of the concepts in relation to the contents of the discourse; the contents 
of the discourse are, in tu rn , determined by the communicative intentions, i.e., by 
the goals which need to be achieved by the communication process. According to 
the overview given in Section 4.1, we have assumed the in i t i a l state I , given to 
the planner, to have been identified using this criterion of selection, based on the 
the goal set G, which drives the plan construction process. I n other words, I is 
supposed to contain all (and only) the relevant expressions which might be needed 
by the planning process itself to produce a complete discourse plan. 
A n example of algorithm for the selection of the relevant concepts to be included 
in I is described below, where G represents the set of (communicative) goals as-
signed to the specific discourse planning problem that the system is required to 
solve: 
In i t : i f g e G, the expression '#' concerns the hearer's opinion towards a specific 
pr imit ive event V (e.g., i f g = HUND(SR(E1)) , then e = E l ) : 
£ G, add the corresponding 'e' and '->e' to / 
1. Ve € / , search the knowledge base for support relations such as SUP(e',e) or 
SUP(e',->e), and include all the relations and supporting events found — and 
their negations — into J 6 ; 
2. apply step 1. recursively on the newly added events, un t i l either i) real events, 
or ii) events w i t h no support, or Hi) events believed by both speaker and 
hearer are reached, and I w i l l not be further extended. 
The termination of this procedure is ul t imately guaranteed by the fact that even 
the large knowledge base f rom which I is extracted must be finite, and thus contains 
a l imited number of events. 
Af te r the execution of this algorithm, the set I can be assumed to represent the 
current discourse context, and the domain of each variable can be restricted to its 
6Such events constitute the only ones which can be logically used to persuade the hearer about 
the validity or falsehood of 'e'. 
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intersection with / , which is a finite set. Therefore, the set of possible values of any 
variable of type lt' wil l simply consist of the (finite) collection of the expressions 
of type which appear in / . The same principle of 'restriction' has been applied 
for the process of calculation of the actual closure I* of the initial state / , which, 
otherwise, because of the presence of default rules in Ro, would have contained an 
infinite number of expressions (see Example 5.2, p. 128). 
Finally, i t should be pointed out that the integrator system implemented pro-
duces a grounded set of operators, by instantiating, initially, all the variables 
present in the set of schemes Op given in input. This strategy has been imple-
mented for the following practical considerations: 
• first of all, the instantiation of the variables of the operator schemes would 
have been automatically performed in any case by the planner IPP at the 
beginning of the planning process; 
• secondly, in this way, the preprocessor assumes complete responsibility of 
the process of variable instantiation: consequently, the system will be able 
to properly control and optimize the process of filtering of the operator in-
stances — through this process, the operator instances which are not useful 
for the specific discourse planning problem considered can be identified and 
eliminated in advance, before being considered for any plan; 
• thirdly, dealing with grounded operators simplifies the implementation of the 
transformation algorithms A l and A2. In fact, the presence of variables in 
the operator schemes would require the algorithms to consider every check 
for propositional matching (or inequality) as a condition of 'codesignation' 
(or 'non-codesignation') between variables and ground expressions of the lan-
guage. Such conditions should then be attached to the operator's description. 
Notice that the goal set G has actually been assumed to be already grounded. 
6.3.1 The operators 
In order to identify the 'tools' that the planner will be allowed to use for convincing 
the audience about the validity (or fallacy) of a specific argument, it is necessary 
to define the strategies of persuasion which can be employed in the discourse. 
Because of the Sincerity Axioms (see page 7), neither rhetorical fallacy nor 
insincerity is admitted; hence, the basic mechanism of persuasion will have to rely 
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upon the Modus Ponens inference rule, also adopted by other discourse planning 
systems (see Section 2.4.2): 
HBEL(a), HBEL(SUP(a,6)) HBEL(fr) 
In other words, the system will assume the hearer will conclude b from a and 
SUP(a, b). On the basis of this assumption, it is easy to deduce the 'Persuade' 
operator scheme, which was already introduced in Chapter 5 (Example 5.4): 
Persuade(?a,?b) 
Prec: HBEL(SUP(a,b)), HBEL(a), HUND(b), 
SBEL(SUP(a,b)), SBEL(a), SBEL(b) 
Add: HBEL(b) 
Del: HUND(b) 
Moreover, since the entire system of inferential beliefs of the hearer is expected to 
rely upon the same basic principle of supporting event, i t is possible to develop three 
different techniques of belief undermining, based on the concepts of 'undercutting' 
and 'rebutting' defeater (see Section 2.3.2). 
The first two techniques, belonging to the former category, consist of spoiling a 
belief which relies upon a specific supporting evidence. For example, suppose that 
HBEL(fc) relies on the two beliefs HBEL(a) and HBEL(SUP(a, b)). I f the hearer's 
confidence in either of the two beliefs a or SUP(a, b) is weakened, then also the 
confidence of the hearer in b wil l decrease, leading to an attitude of uncertainty 
( HUND(6) ). I f the belief in the argument a is weakened, we will talk of 1 spoil-
argument'' strategy, whereas the belief in SUP (a, b) will be undermined by a ''spoil-
support strategy. 
An example of combined application of these two techniques is shown in Fig-
ure 6.1. Suppose that, initially, the hearer believes the events E 1 ; E 2 and E 3 , and 
also the two support relations S U P ^ ^ E ^ and SUP(E 3, SUP(E 2,Ei) ). Assuming 
the goal of the speaker to be H U N D ^ x ) , one of the possible options would consist 
of undermining the relation of support of (the hearer's belief in) E i , i.e., of adopting 
the spoil-support strategy, which achieves HUND(Ei) through the achievement of 
the sub-goal NOT(HBEL(SUP(E 2,E!))). Such sub-goal, in turn, could be realized 
by employing the spoil-argument strategy, which would realize HUND(SUP(E2 ,E!)) 
through the achievement of a further sub-goal (namely, NOT(HBEL(E 3 ))) , and so 
forth, until the newly generated sub-goal can be achieved either i) by simple es-
tablishment (i.e. it was already true in the initial state), or ii) through the 'attack' 
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strategy (which will be explained in the following paragraphs) or Hi) cannot be 
achieved at all, in which case the plan construction will have to backtrack. 
Goal: HUND(El) 
^ Spoil-support 
Sub-goal: NOT(HBEL(SUP(E2,El))) 
^ Spoil-argument 
Sub-goal: NOT(HBEL(E3)) 
t 
I 
t 
Figure 6.1: Spoiling the 'support' and the 'argument'. 
The adoption of the previous two 'undercutting' techniques has led to the im-
plementation of the 'Spoil-sup' and 'Spoil-arg' operators, which differ exclusively 
for the point of application of the process of sub-goaling: in the former, the SUP() 
event is targeted, whereas in the latter, the supporting argument is undermined. 
By way of example, below is reported the 'Spoil-arg' operator scheme, in which 
the precondition NOT(HBEL(6)) constitutes the sub-goal to be achieved in order 
to allow the execution of this operator: 
Spoil-arg(?a,?b) 
Prec: HBEL(a), HBEL(SUP(b,a)), NOT(HBEL(b)), 
NOT(SBEL(a)), NOT(SBEL(b)), 
NOT(HBEL(HR(a))), NOT(HBEL(SR(a))) 
Add: HUND(a) 
Del: HBEL(a) 
The third undermining technique, mentioned above and equivalent to a 'rebuttal' 
of the argument, consist of attacking the belief in b by supplying the hearer with 
supporting evidence for the contrary event, NOT(6). The concept of 'attack' be-
tween two arguments has been also formalized by Dung in [32]. Presenting the 
hearer with evidence supporting the contrary of the current belief will lead to a 
'balanced' situation (as that of Figure 4.3), in which the attitude of H towards the 
event b should be of undecision. The 'Attack' operator is shown below: 
© E l 
A 
E3 
© E2 
A 
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Attack(?a,?b) 
Prec: HBEL(b), HBEL(a), HBEL(SUP(a,NOT(b))), 
NOT(SBEL(b)), SBEL(a), SBEL(SUP(a,NOT(b))), 
NOT(HBEL(HR(b))), NOT(HBEL(SR(b))) 
Add: HUND(b) 
Del: HBEL(NOT(b)) 
The complete list of the six operators developed for discourse planning is reported 
in Appendix A. In the actual specification of the operators, the variables £?a' and 
'?b' have been associated with specific types, so that they can be instantiated with 
any expression (which appears in / ) admitted in such positions by the syntax of 
the language. 
Let us dwell, for a moment, upon the characteristics of the operators introduced. 
First of all, as mentioned earlier, some of the terms of their precondition lists are 
supposed not to be true in the (planning) state which leads the operator itself 
to be chosen in order to realize a specific goal, but to be achieved as sub-goals by 
other operators. This happens, for example, for the precondition NOT(HBEL(E 3 )) 
of the 'Spoil-arg' operator, as described in the example illustrated by Figure 6.1. 
Such 'preparatory' process, producing a change in the hearer's opinion towards 
part of the supporting evidence, gives the operator the necessary persuasive force 
to succeed and achieve the expected perlocutionary effect. 
However, this behaviour cannot be explicitly imposed to the planning machinery 
without the use of a filter list and of an 'abstract' operator, encapsulating a body 
with sub-goal list. Alternatively, a further operator could be defined, in which the 
spoiling is 'prepared'. This new operator, having HBEL(b) as precondition, would 
simply have to enable the subsequent application of 'Spoil-arg' through the addition 
of a new proposition 'flag' to the state. Such 'flag' should then constitute one of 
the preconditions of 'Spoil-arg'. Nevertheless, this would require the introduction, 
in the language of beliefs, of an unnecessary new term completely 'extraneous' to 
the syntax defined. Considering the demonstrative aim of this implementation, as 
a first approximation, the operators 'Spoil-arg' and the analogous 'Spoil-sup' have 
been adopted simply as specified above. As it will be shown, this does not prevent 
the system from generating valid examples of persuasive discourse plans. 
Another interesting feature of the operators presented consists of the fact that 
their precondition lists contain conditions which specify the state of the speaker 
with respect to the beliefs which are involved in the scheme. Such conditions force 
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the operator to respect the requirement of sincerity of the speaker (Sincerity Axiom 
I)-
Moreover, it should be noticed that the 'Spoil' and 'Attack' operator schemes 
are applicable if and only if the belief which the speaker is trying to spoil (or attack) 
does not constitute, in the hearer's view, a real experience. In other words, an event 
derived from the sensorial experience of an agent is never spoilable. This condition 
is guaranteed by the presence of the term NOT(HBEL(HR(a))) in the precondition 
lists of the operators. Notice that the precondition NOT(HBEL(SR(a))) in the 
'Spoil' and 'Attack' schemes would not be strictly required, if not to avoid the 
possibility of contradiction. In fact, if such precondition were not present, the 
state could end up containing both the events HUND(a) and HBEL(SR(a)); but the 
latter belief would produce, through the inference rule z4, the addition of HBEL(a), 
which would be in conflict with the former. This would seem to imply that, once 
the hearer has come to believe that an event constitutes a real experience for the 
speaker, such conviction will never change, even if mistaken. Nevertheless, this is 
not so, as it is always possible to introduce a further operator in which the belief 
HBEL(SR(a)) is required in the preconditions and then explicitly deleted. 
Notice also that the operators implemented satisfy the condition of coherence, 
i.e., if the state to which they are applied is coherent (that is, i t does not violate the 
restrictions of mutual exclusivity imposed on the model), then also the resulting 
state will result to be coherent. 
Finally, the requirement of sincerity of the speaker during all the process of per-
suasion leads to an interesting property of the model, namely, the 1monotonicity' 
of the discourse. This means that during the same discourse plan, the speaker will 
never try to convince the hearer about the validity of two opposite events, e and 
NOT(e). In fact, in this implementation, the coherence of the state implies that 
explicitly contradictory events cannot be simultaneously believed; moreover, the 
speaker's attitudes towards the 'primitive' events do not change during the same 
discourse. Hence, on the basis of the first sincerity axiom, the speaker will not be 
allowed to try to convince the hearer of the validity of what (s)he does not believe 
to be true, that is, of two explicitly contradictory events E and NOT(E). 
The premisses upon which a persuasive discourse plan will rely are represented 
by the real experience events. These constitute the common 'ground' which need to 
be shared by the speaker and the hearer before any attempt of persuasion is carried 
out. A simple and direct way in which the speaker can make the hearer aware of 
his/her real experiences consists of telling the audience about them. Since the 
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audience is expected to believe in the speaker's sincerity (second Sincerity Axiom), 
asserting the fact that 'e' constitutes a real experience will force the hearer to accept 
such fact (and all the direct consequences). The specific speech-act operator which 
realizes this is the 'Assert-real' operator scheme, reported below: 
Assert-real(?a) 
Prec: SR(a), HUNK(SR(a)) 
Add: HBEL(SR(a)) 
Del: 
Notice the empty delete list: since the proposition HBEL(SR(a)) is added and noth-
ing is deleted, in order to guarantee the maintenance of coherence, the operator 
must verify that the default belief HUNK(SR(a)) hold at the moment of its appli-
cation. A further operator, with a different precondition — e.g., HUND(SR(a)) — 
could be introduced to allow the application of the same speech-act under different 
belief circumstances. 
An operator similar to 'Assert-real' has been adopted for the introduction, in 
the discourse, of an event (not necessarily a real experience) which has never been 
conceived before by the hearer (i.e., HUNK(a) ). The expected resulting attitude of 
the hearer towards a newly introduced concept is that of uncertainty (see operator 
'Assert' in Appendix A) . 
With the adoption of these quite simple operators it is already possible to show 
some interesting discourse plan construction. However, before moving on to the 
description of some examples, there are two final points which should be made, one 
concerning practical aspects of the implementation, the other concerning a more 
'theoretical' property. 
First of all, consider the process of transformation of the BP planning problem 
as described by the formula 6.1 of Section 6.2. In the actual implementation, the five 
inference rules i\-i^ have been divided into the two acyclic blocks Ri\ = { z i , . . . , i^} 
and Ri? = These two blocks are integrated in the operators through algorithm 
A l , during the first two steps of the process. Algorithm A l is expected to generate 
new sets of conditional operators; however, because of the specific characteristics of 
the operators and of the inference rules adopted, the sets of transformed operators 
resulting from the two initial steps will not contain any conditional effect. 
The reasons of this result lie in the definition of the algorithm A l : the addition 
of conditional effects during the transformation of an operator is due to two possible 
cases: 1) a proposition might not be deleted if it is a consequence of one of the 
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inference rules; 2) the deletion of a proposition which is a premiss of one of the rules 
might lead to the deletion of other propositions. The second condition never occurs: 
none of the delete lists of the operators matches with any of the premisses of the 
rules. The first condition can occur only in rules i4 and i5. For example, in 'Spoil-
arg', the proposition HBEL(b), which matches the consequences of both rules, is 
deleted. However, the conditions under which this deletion would be restricted (i.e., 
NOT(HBEL(SR(b))) for i4 and NOT(HBEL(HR(b))) for i 5 ) are already required 
by the main preconditions of the operator. Hence, the produced conditional effect 
can simply be 'inglobated' in the main effect of the operator. The same happens 
for the other operators, 'Spoil-sup' and 'Attack'. 
Therefore, in the actual implementation of the process of transformation, A l 
did not have to be extended in order to accept also conditional operators. Notice 
that since the planner IPP does actually allow the use of operators with conditional 
effects, the final application of A l is allowed to produce output containing condi-
tional operators. However, empirical results have also shown that if the algorithm 
A l is modified so that i t calculates the new add list A' not simply as CR(A) but 
as A' — CR(A) \ CR(P), then all of the conditional effects introduced by the last 
step of the transformation disappear. 
To sum up, the absence of conditional effects in the transformed operators 
seems to be linked with the property of coherence that the operators have to 
satisfy. In fact, this was the reason for the introduction of the precondition 
NOT(HBEL(SR(b))) in the 'spoil' and 'attack' operators. Although the symmetri-
cal precondition NOT(HBEL(HR(b))) has been added for the specific 'semantics' 
adopted by the model, its presence can also be justified on the same basis: the 
need to avoid contradiction and to maintain coherence. 
The second interesting point is represented by the following claim, which, some-
how, justifies the adoption of the more simple and restricted syntax < WFE1 > 
(which allows only one level of belief nesting) for the implementation of the dis-
course planning system: 
Claim (Hearer Model) / / the two Sincerity Axioms hold, planning 
successful communication does not require the speaker to maintain a 
representation of the hearer's model of the speaker's beliefs. 
The previous claim can be justified through the following argument: the neces-
sity of representing the hearer model of the speaker beliefs (using a second level 
of nested beliefs) arises iff the hearer's model of the speaker differs from the real 
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speaker's set of opinions. In fact, in absence of differences, the hearer's model 
simply coincides with the actual speaker's state of beliefs, and does not need to be 
explicitly represented. There are two symmetrical situations which require to model 
a difference between the hearer's opinion about the speaker's attitude towards an 
event and the speaker's own attitude towards the same event: 
1. Deception introduction: the speaker intends to tell the hearer a lie; 
2. Deception elimination: the speaker thinks that a 'misunderstanding' - or lack 
of information - in the hearer's beliefs is already present, and wants to rectify 
it . 
Under the assumption that the speaker is sincere (Axiom I) , the first situation shall 
never occur. With regards to the second case, in which an initial difference is given, 
it is interesting to show that the speaker is not required to model the situation in 
order to solve it , but needs only to assume the two sincerity axioms to hold. In 
fact, let's suppose the speaker's belief about the event E to be different from the 
hearer's model of it (e.g. SUND(E), HBEL(SBEL(E)) ). There are two possible 
cases: 
a) the event E is relevant for the current discourse (i.e. it is going to be used in 
the discourse which the speaker is planning); 
b) the event E is not relevant for the current discourse, and will not be men-
tioned. 
In the first case, building a discourse plan which makes use of the event while 
ignoring the initially given misbelief might lead to think that part of (or the whole) 
plan will fail, as based on wrong premisses. Nevertheless, when the speaker actually 
mentions E in the discourse, because of the first sincerity axiom, (s)he can only 
talk about E by asserting what is his/her real opinion about it (in the example, the 
speaker might try to achieve HUND(E), by asserting that (s)he, too, is undecided 
about E). In force of the second axiom, the hearer must believe the speaker to 
be honest and truthful: the immediate consequence of the assertion, then, is that 
the hearer will actually realize the misunderstanding, and correct the mistaken (or 
uncertain) opinion 7. Hence, in this case, the modelisation of the 'wrong' belief is not 
necessary: ignoring the situation does not affect the successful completion of the 
7 I n a real dialogue, this would probably involve a short interruption, in which the hearer would 
ask the speaker to confirm once more the assertion, before finally rectifying the belief. 
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plan, as the misunderstanding is automatically rectified as soon as the concerned 
event is mentioned in the discourse. 
In the second case, any misunderstanding about the event E will not affect the 
outcome of the speech, as E (and the speaker's opinion about E) will not be used in 
the discourse. Thus, even in this case, the speaker can ignore the initial misbelief, 
leaving its resolution to a future occasion in which it will be solved as in case a). 
6.4 Examples 
The discourse planning system implemented has been applied to twelve different 
examples, all of which adopted the same basic set of operators — introduced in 
the previous section — but different initial belief states, and to achieve different 
goals. For each example, the discourse plan has been produced by first applying 
the integrator to the initial state and operators, producing a new problem suit-
able for the IPP planner, and then running IPP on the planning problem obtained. 
The CPU execution time (on a SPARC workstation) for the transformation process 
varies from about ten seconds to a maximum of six minutes in the most complex 
example; the planning time varies from a minimum of 0.25 seconds to 22 seconds. 
Nevertheless, it should be noticed that the code executed to perform the trans-
formation is far from being optimised for speed: the program represents only a 
'prototype' system which has been developed for experimental and demonstrative 
purposes, rather than for competitive performances. 
Of the twelve examples, only the most representative have been reported here. 
Before illustrating the examples which have been chosen, though, i t is necessary 
to introduce the graphical notation adopted to represent the events contained in 
the initial state. Figure 6.2 contains the five basic 'units' used to represent the 
events which are objects of various attitudes of the speaker and hearer. Each basic 
representation has also been described by a proposition, which appears besides the 
corresponding graphical model. 
Structure (a) represents the basic relation of support between two events. A 
bold circle containing an event, as illustrated in case (b), qualifies the event itself as 
a real experience. Notice that the graphical representation does not clarify whether 
the event is 'real' from the speaker or from the hearer point of view. Case (c) 
shows how a bold 'arrow' is adopted to indicate that the support relation between 
two events is based on a real experience (i.e. on induction). Also in this case, the 
induction could be part of either the speaker's or the hearer's experience. Notice 
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E l 
A 
0 
SUP(E,E1) REAL(E1) REAL(SUP(E,NOT(E 1))) 
0 0 © 
(a) Support (b) Real Event (c) Real support 
© © 
A A 
SUP(E, NOT(El)) REAL(SUP(E, N0T(E1))) 
0 © 
(d) Attack (e) Real attack 
Figure 6.2: Graphical notation of beliefs justification and grounding. 
also the use of the abbreviation '-> E l ' for the expression NOT(El) . 
The dashed arrows in (d) and (e) have been adopted to underline the relation 
of attack between two events; notice that these two graphical symbols would not 
be strictly necessary, as already representable through cases (a)-(c). In fact, as it 
appears from the corresponding propositional forms, cases (c) and (e) represent the 
same situation. Summarizing, 'normal' events are represented with circles, support 
events with arrows, and 'attack' relations with dashed arrows; any of these can be 
qualified as 'real' adopting a bold graphic. 
Finally, i t should be pointed out that since support relations are events them-
selves, the graphical representation also allows 'arrows' in each of the positions 
occupied by 'circles' in Figure 6.2. 
The first, simple example examined, showed in Figure 6.3(a), is a variation 
of an example taken from Young and Moore [153], who adopted i t in order to 
illustrate a discourse plan analogous to that reported below, although using a 
more convoluted graphical representation. In the figure, some of the attitudes of 
the speaker and hearer have been added besides the events, in order to clarify the 
situation. For example, the event E l is a Speaker's real experience; also, the hearer 
believes (HBEL) the support relations between E3 and the other two events, but 
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is undecided about the validity of E3. Notice that where not otherwise specified, 
the hearer is assumed — by default — to 'unknow' the event (e.g., HUNK(E2), 
HUNK(El) , HUNK(SR(E1)), etc.). 
The set of propositions constituting the initial state given in input to the inte-
grator system (corresponding to the graphical representation of Figure 6.3(a) ) is 
reported below: 
I={ E3, E2, SR(E1), HUND(E3), SUP(E3,E2), SUP(E2,E3), SUP(E3,E1), 
SUP(E1,E3), SUP(E1,E2), HUND(SUP(E1,E2)), HBEL(SUP(E3,E2)), 
HBEL(SUP(E2,E3)), HBEL(SUP(E3,E1)), HBEL(SUP(E1,E3)) } 
The goals to be achieved are { HBEL(El) , HBEL(E2), HBEL(E3) } . I t is 
important to point out the 'circularity' of this example: first of all, the two pairs 
of events (E1,E3) and (E2,E3) have circular supporting relations — i.e., each event 
of a pair is supported by and supports the other one. This situation is acceptable 
only because one of the events (namely, E l ) is a real experience, and can be taken 
to be the 'basis' of such circular local structure of beliefs of the speaker. 
Secondly, since also the hearer believes those support relations, in order to plan 
a persuasive discourse to convince H about the validity of all of the three events, it 
wil l be sufficient to achieve such effect for one — any — of them, and the other two 
wil l follow through the application of the 1 Modus Ponens' (Persuade) operator. In 
this specific case, the initial basis upon which the rest of the persuasion will rely 
consists of the (speaker's) real experience E l , which will be 'shared' with the hearer 
at the beginning of the discourse. 
Indeed, after the transformed problem is given in input to IPP, the results 
produced are as follows: 
ipp: found plan as follows 
time step 0: assert-e2 
assert -rea l -e l 
time step 1: persuade-el-e3 
time step 2: persuade-e3-e2 
ipp: used 0.36 seconds total time 
The simple discourse plan found consists of four 'steps', but, as the result under-
lines, the first two can be applied 'simultaneously', as they do not interfere during 
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SR 
HUNK 
HUND 
HBEL 
H B E L 
H B E L 
HUND 
E l = "Lucentio has asked for Bianca's hand in marriage' 
E2 = "Bianca has always been 
Lucentio's preferred model for painting" 
E3 = "He considers her the fairest of 
Signor Baptista's daughters" 
Goals: { H B E L ( E l ) , HBEL(E2), HBEL(E3) } 
(a) 
H T J N D ( ^ ) 
HBEI 
E2 
HBEL-NOT 
H B E L 
HR © 
0 
HR 
(b) 
E l = " H will miss the 8am train to London" 
E2 = ' 'There is a traffic jam on the way to the station'' 
E4 = "H can drive very fast" 
E3 = " H is late for the 8am train" 
Goals: { HBEL(E1) } 
Figure 6.3: Graphical representation of two initial states. 
plan execution. This is why IPP indicates the plan as composed of only three steps. 
In other words, the order of application of the first two operators during the actual 
plan execution is not relevant for the achievement of the goals. 
The plan produced consists of introducing the hearer to the event E2, which 
was previously unknown, and asserting that the event E l is a real experience. After 
this premiss, the speaker will use the 'modus ponens' strategy on E l , exploiting the 
assumption that the hearer believes the support relations going from E l to E3, and 
from E3 to E2. Notice that the possibility of convincing the hearer about E2 using 
E l and the relation SUP(E1,E2) is 'prevented' by the fact that the speaker does not 
have supporting evidence to persuade the hearer about SUP(E1,E2). Nevertheless, 
the introduction of another operator of persuasion that assumes the hearer to 
believe the events for which no support can be provided would make possible the 
generation of such a plan. 
A possible natural language interpretation of this first simple plan could be as 
follows: 
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assert-e2 "Bianca has always been Lucentio's preferred model 
for painting. 
assert -real -e l As a matter of fact, I was present when he asked for 
her hand in marriage: 
persuade-el-e3 this clearly implies that he considers Bianca the fairest 
of Signor Baptista's daughters. 
persuade-e3-e2 Hence, no wonder that she has always been his preferred 
model for painting." 
The 'cue words' added to the structure have been outlined in bold; apart from 
such parts, which can be deduced directly from the meaning of the operators ap-
plied, the discourse has been obtained simply by substituting the semantic material 
to the corresponding primitive events E1,E2 and E3. 
In the second example, showed in part (b) of Figure 6.3, the support relation 
SUP(E3,E1) is attacked by the event E4 (which is a hearer's real experience), and 
supported by event E2 (which is a speaker's real experience of which the hearer 
is not aware). Because of the attack, which relies on the hearer's ability to drive 
fast, the hearer (H) believes that NOT(SUP(E3,El)), i.e. that the fact that (s)he 
is late does not imply that (s)he will miss the train. The plan produced to achieve 
HBEL(El) is reported below: 
ipp: found plan as follows 
time step 0: assert-real-e2 
time step 1: attack-e2-not-sup-e3-el 
time step 2: persuade-e2-sup-e3-el 
time step 3: persuade-e3-el 
ipp: used 0.42 seconds total time 
In order to convince H that E l is true (i.e., that (s)he will actually miss the 
train) the speaker asserts that E2 is real, and that this undermines H's believe 
in NOT(SUP(E3,El)), since SUP(E2, SUP(E3,E1)) 8 . As a result of the attack, 
the H is expected to assume an attitude of undecision towards the support event. 
After that, the speaker uses E2 again, this time to persuade the hearer that not 
only was the belief in NOT(SUP(E3,El)) wrong, but, also, that SUP(E3,E1) is 
8Notice that the formula 'attack-e2-not-sup-e3-el' should be interpreted as 'E2 attacks 
NOT(SUP(E3,El) ) ' . 
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Goals: { H U N D ( E l ) } 
H B E L ( E l J = " H will go to swim in the 
^ r - ' river in the afternoon." 
0
A 
E3 = ' 'The river level is 
dangerously high. 
© 
0 SR is E3 
H B E L 
H B E 0 It is a good day for a swim H B E L E 2 E 2 
in the river. 
A 
SR 
E7 = ' 'It has been 
raining for the 
past few days.' 
SR E 5 J S R I E6 1 = "It is Autumn." 
E5 = "It is cloudy. 
Figure 6.4: Planning problem leading to 'spoil' plan. 
actually true. This can be done because H is expected to believe that SUP(E2, 
SUP(E3,E1)). Finally, using the support now believed by both, the speaker con-
cludes that H should also believe E l . 
Notice that in this example, the plan consists of four steps which are not ex-
ecutable in parallel, as the consequence of each operator is a necessary condition 
for the application of the subsequent one. 
Having examined the functioning of the 'Persuade' and 'Attack' operators, the 
following example has been chosen to illustrate how the 'Spoil' scheme can be 
applied. The initial situation and corresponding goal are shown in Figure 6.4. 
Essentially, the discourse plan produced for this case consists of convincing 
the hearer that the support relation SUP(E2,E1) is not valid, and, therefore, the 
belief in E l , based upon such support, should be abandoned. This is exactly what 
happens in the last two steps of the plan found by IPP: 
Chapter 6: A Persuasive Discourse Planning System 198 
time step 0: assert-real-suprnotr-sup-e3-e2-el 
assert-real-e7 
assert-e3 
time step 1: persuade-e7-e3 
time step 2: attack-e3-sup-e2-el 
time step 3: spoil-sup-el-e2 
ipp: used 3.36 seconds total time 
The 'spoil-sup' operator is based on the state of undecision produced in the 
hearer by the previous attack on SUP(E2,E1) coming from E3. Notice, in step 0, 
the expression lsuprnotr-sup-e3-e2-el', which corresponds to the 'linearisation' of 
the predicative form SUP( E3, NOT(SUP(E2,El)) ), representable with a binary-
tree structure. The linearised form is obtained by 'visiting' the tree according to a 
'node-left-right' order of precedence, and then by shifting all the primitive events 
to the ending part of the expression 9 . 
I t is interesting to note that, for this example, there exists a second valid plan, 
which achieves the spoiling of E l through the attack of E2 (the supporting argu-
ment) instead of SUP(E2,E1) (the support relation). This alternative plan would 
consist of i) persuading H that SUP(E5,NOT(E2)); ii) attacking E2 from E5; and 
Hi) spoiling E l on the basis of lack of confidence in the argument E2 ('spoil-arg' 
instead of 'spoil-sup'). The final plan, however, would contain the same number of 
steps of the previous one. 
A richer example, in which the 'spoil-arg' operator is actually chosen, is given 
in Figure 6.5. Also in this case, the goal consists of 'shaking' the hearer's belief in 
an event (El) by undermining its basis. 
9 The linearisation also attaches the 'NOT' appearing inside a support directly to the SUP 
predicate in form of a desinence. E.g., 'supnotr' is obtained from SUP(_ , NOT(_)), the character 
V indicating that the right branch should be negated. Similarly, 'supr' means that the right 
branch of the SUP will consists of a further support event. 
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Goals: { HUND(El) } 
H B E L f E l J = "H should immediately leave Kosovo and move 
yjy into nearby Albania." 
H B E L 
"It won't be difficult to cross the Kosovo-Albania 
borders." 
"Thousands of people are fleeing from Kosovo." 
E4 = "One of Kosovo's 
nearest safe countries is 
Albania." 
E6 = "Most inhabitants of Kosovo 
are ethnic Albanians." 
Figure 6.5: Situation leading to a 'spoil-arg' plan. 
The plan found in this case is the only one possible; it proceeds, as usual, from 
the 'basis' of the structure (asserting real events, i.e., the premisses of the dis-
course), and then persuading the hearer of a support event — SUP(E4, NOT(E2)) 
— which leads to the final attack of E2, with consequent spoiling of E l : 
0 i E 2 H B E L E2 
A 
0 10 
SR 
E5 HR E4 
A 
H B E L 
N ^ 0 E7 0 SR SRI E6 - "Serbs have been persecuting ethnic Albanians in Kosovo." 
time step 0: assert-real-supr-supnotr-e5-e4-e2 
assert-e5 
assert-real-e6 
assert-real-e7 
assert-sup-e6-e5 
assert-supnotr-e4-e2 
time step 1 persuade-e7-sup-e6-e5 
time step 2 persuade-e6-e5 
time step 3 persuade-e5-supnotr-e4 
time step 4 attack-e4-e2 
time step 5 spoil-arg-el-e2 
ipp: used 2.98 seconds t o t a l time 
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HUND ^E10j= "H should abandon his/her moral principles." 
E9 = "H could commit 'bad' actions 
SR / 
SUND(EH^ 
E l l = "H is 'good'.' 
HBEL 
i E7 J ="H is able to distinguish between 
/' ^ —s 'good' and 'bad'." 
H B E L 
E l ) HBEL V * / = ^ h a s a v a l ' d moral guide." 
po L H B E L 
SR / HBEL 
H B E L 
HR E4 
HBEL 
E4 = "H has never felt 
God's love." 
"H relies upon 'reason' to 
distinguish between 'good' and 'bad'." 
SR ( E6 ) = "S feels no love from God when (s)he 
is 'bad'." 
E5 = "S feels God's love 
when (s)he is 'good'." 
Goals: { HBEL(E10), HUND(E7) } 
Figure 6.6: A more complex discourse planning problem. 
The example shown in Figure 6.6 completes this section. This example differs f rom 
the others in the sense that i t contains many more events, part of which are not 
actually necessary for the construction of the plan. The presence of more elements 
notably increases the number of grounded operators to be processed, and makes the 
search space bigger, producing a longer time of problem transformation (around 
six minutes) and planning. 
I t is interesting to notice that the final plan, which achieves both of the two 
goals HBEL(EIO) and HUND(E7) , consists of an in i t i a l part — up to step 2 — 
aimed at convincing H about the lower and central 'area' of the structure, and of 
two subsequent parts, based on the previous, in which first the right and then the 
left-side branches are used to produce the expected goals. 
The plan produced by IPP for this example is reported below. 
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time step 0: a s ser t -e9 
a s s e r t - r e a l - s u p r - s u p - e l - e 4 - e 9 
a s ser t - e2 
a s s e r t - r e a l - e 5 
a s s e r t - r e a l - e 6 
assert -sup-e5-e2 
a s s e r t - r e a l - s u p r - s u p - e 4 - e 2 - e l 
a s s e r t - s u p - e 2 - e l 
assert -sup-e4-e9 
a s s e r t - s u p - e l - e l O 
time step 1 persuade-e4-sup-e2-e1 
persuade-e6-sup-e5-e2 
time step 2 persuade-e5-e2 
time step 3 a t tack-e2 -not -e l 
time step 4 s p o i l - a r g - e 7 - n o t - e l 
persuade-e2-el 
time step 5 persuade-el-sup-e4-e9 
time step 6 persuade-e4-e9 
time step 7 persuade-e9-sup-el -e l0 
time step 8 persuade-el -e lO 
ipp: used 22.34 seconds t o t a l time 
In contrast w i t h all of the previous examples, this one contains also events and 
relations which are not str ict ly necessary to identify and bui ld the discourse plan 
that achieves the specific communicative goals. However, since the in i t ia l state / 
is regarded as the equivalent of the current 'discourse context' (see Section 6.3) 
and is supposed to have been 'extracted' f r o m an underlying, larger knowledge 
(or belief) base, such unnecessary elements are most likely to be included in i t , 
because of their alleged relevance, which could have been assumed on the basis of 
their connection w i t h the two assigned goals. 
Chapter 7 
Evaluation 
This chapter performs the evaluation of the results of this thesis according to 
the criteria specified in Section 2.5. Each of the three parameters adopted — 
expressiveness, efficiency and correctness — is considered in respect to the two 
different aspects of the results of this work, that are i) the discourse planning 
system obtained f rom the integration of a belief system w i t h a planner and ii) the 
belief system evaluated as a stand-alone module. 
7.1 Expressiveness for Discourse Planning 
The first point required by the expressiveness of the discourse planning system 
consists of its abi l i ty to represent the intentional structure of the discourse which 
is being constructed. The model developed adopts the planning technique as the 
basis for such representation, where the communicative goals which lie behind 
the formation of the discourse segments are represented by the goals which the 
operators achieve. 
The operators schemes specifically adopted in the system (listed in Appendix A) 
can be divided into two different categories, namely, abstract operators and primi-
tive operators. To the first class belong the 'Attack ' , 'Persuade' and 'Spoil ' opera-
tors, whereas 'Assert' and 'Assert-real' constitute the second group. The abstract 
operators are aimed at achieving perlocutionary goals, whereas pr imit ive operators 
can be seen as representing locutionary speech acts 1. 
x The illocutionary effects, as defined by Searle [128], consist of the hearer understanding the 
content of the message, and belong to a lower level of plan refinement. In fact, they involve 
the choice of the specific 'surface features', such as the terminology adopted and the linguistic 
register, which are necessary for the actual realisation in NL of the message. However, as declared 
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SUP(E,ED 
© 
SUP(E,E2) 
(a) DIVERGENT 
0 
SUP(E3,E) 
E3 = E l A E2 
SUP(El ,E) y VSUP(E2,E) 
(b) LINKED 
© 
SUP(E1,E2) 
SUP(E,E1) 
© 
(c) CONVERGENT 
SUP(E1,E) © 
SUP(E2, SUP(E1,E)) 
(d) SERIAL (e) TOULMIN'S 
Figure 7.1: The five basic argument structures realized w i t h 'sup'. 
For each operator, the communicative goal is identified by the (single) proposi-
t ion which appears in the Add list. For example, in case of the 'Persuade' operator, 
the communicative goal is 'HBEL(p) ' , where 'p' is a specific proposition. Hence, the 
intentional structure of the discourse is captured by the plan which is being con-
structed, which contains all the elements necessary to derive the relations between 
the various operators, and, thus, between the different intentions which generate 
the different discourse segments. Such information is of enormous importance in 
case of a replanning due to a part ial plan failure. 
The second characteristic required to the model consists of its abi l i ty to rep-
resent the functional relations which exist between different parts of a persuasive 
discourse as accounted by the standard analysis and by the Toulmin schema (see 
Figures 2.2 and 2.3). 
Figure 7.1 shows how each of these relations can be expressed through 'support' 
events, which are elements of the language adopted in the model. I t should be 
noticed that the linked structure (Fig. 7.1(6) ) has been realized by assuming an 
event, E 3 , to be equivalent to the conjunction of the two events E j A E 2 . 
I f the two events E i and E 2 which constitute E 3 need to be considered sepa-
at the beginning, these aspects have not been treated in this work. 
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rately, because, for example, they have separate supports, then i t is possible to 
add, beneath E 3 , a Toulmin-like structure, in which E i and E2 are interchangeable 
premisses which support the event conjunction E 3 = E ] A E 2 . Such a situation can 
be formalised by the logical expression 
E 2 - > ( E x - > ( E 2 A E i ) ) 
in which the order of the two premisses E 2 and E1 can be inverted without losing 
the validity of the formula. 
The th i rd and four th features required to the expressiveness of the model consist 
of the abi l i ty to represent, for the speaker and for the hearer, support and attack 
relations, the latter including rebutt ing and undercutting defeaters. 
A support relation is obviously represented by a support event SUP(E,E') . A 
rebutt ing attack can be represented simply by SUP(E, N O T ( E ' ) ) , that is, by a 
support for the negated event. A n undercutting attack consists of an event which 
attacks (directly, i.e. as a rebuttal) the relation of support between two events. 
This can be formalised in terms of support events as 
SUP( E, NOT(SUP(E ' ,E") ) 
The subjective, non-strictly logical character of such relations results f rom the 
fact that there are no specific requirements on the contents of the events E, E' and 
E" in any of the previous expressions. This means that the speaker could believe 
that a certain event constitutes a support for another event, even though such 
support is not logically valid. 
In order to separate the hearer model f rom the speaker's attitudes, i t is sufficient 
to place the prefix ' H B E L ' in front of the specific event, support or attack relation. 
Notice that in the more complex < WFE> syntax, the model of the hearer can, in 
turn , embed a (hypothetical) model of the speaker, allowing expressions wi th two 
levels of belief nesting such as H B E L ( S B E L ( . . . ) ) . 
7.2 Expressiveness of the Belief System 
The first requirement of expressiveness to be satisfied by the belief system consists 
of allowing the model to deduce new beliefs f rom others using specific rules of 
inference. Ample evidence of this abil i ty has been given in Chapters 3, 4 and 6, 
where the paradigm for belief systems has been, respectively, defined, implemented 
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and integrated. 
Section 3.1 clearly pointed out the similarities between the model and the formal 
theories in logic. A possible objection to this analogy consists of the fact that the 
modus ponens inference rule, adopted by most of the formal logics, contains two 
premisses, whereas the formal correctness of the process of integration described in 
Chapter 6 is based on the assumption that the inference rules pre-processed contain 
only a single premiss (or, alternatively, the negation of a disjunction of premisses, 
for default rules). Hence, the classical propositional logics could not have been 
integrated in any planner; not, at least, using the specified method. 
Nevertheless, the requirements imposed on the inference rules adopted by the 
belief system have been introduced explicit ly to allow the system to be integrated 
into a planning framework. In such framework, i t is possible to specify operators 
which can easily replace the modus ponens rule, or even other rules of inference. 
For example, below is presented a pr imit ive version of a modus ponens operator 2: 
Preconditions: SBEL(a), SBEL(SUP(a, a')) 
Add: SBEL(a') 
Delete: SBEL(NOT(a ' ) ) 
Notice that this operator could be correctly applied also to the situation where 
SUND(a') holds, for such belief would not be explici t ly represented in the state, 
and would not need to be deleted, either. 
The adoption of this k ind of operators allows the model to perform inference 
and to represent i t dynamically, that is, wi thout the need to explicit ly add to the 
current set of beliefs the conclusions which the application of the inference rules 
has led. Therefore, this strategy represents also a possible way of approaching to 
the problem of logical omniscience: in this perspective, the beliefs of the agent are 
not closed under logical consequence, as only the deductions which are useful for 
the plan are considered. In other words, the system is supplied w i t h the tools to 
deduce, potentially, any possible logical consequence, but the actual deduction of 
new beliefs depends entirely on the development of the plan, which is driven by 
the specific goals and, possibly, subject to t ime or space constraints. 
The second parameter specified by the criteria for the evaluation of the expres-
2 A n analogous version of this operator has been presented by Reed et al. in [123] for the 
hearer model of beliefs. 
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siveness of the belief system consists of the abil i ty to tolerate contradiction and 
uncertain information. 
I f two opposite events, E i and N O T ^ ) , are believed, the contradiction w i l l 
not necessary spread through the rest of the system, unless the logical formula 
(p A ->p —> q) {ex falso quodlibet) is explicitly adopted by the system through an 
'inference' operator which models such rule of deduction. Al though two contradic-
tory events can lead to contradictory conclusions, the propagation is l imited to the 
contexts in which such events have a relevance, and restricted to situations where 
these events can be used as premisses for others. 
I n presence of contradictory information, however, the model allows also to 
suspend the judgement, and simply adopt the at t i tude of undecision towards the two 
conflictual beliefs. For example, i f E i and NOT(Ex) bo th have supporting evidence, 
the expected at t i tude of a rational agent w i l l be that of temporary suspending the 
judgement un t i l further decisive evidence has been brought to light; in the model, 
this is realized by adopting the att i tude S U N D ( ) towards bo th of the contradictory 
events. 
This also illustrates how the system can deal w i t h uncertainty. The att i tude 
of undecision is normally adopted also in case of events for which no evidence at 
all has been collected yet, neither positive nor negative. This occurs, for example, 
when a new event or concept is simply formulated i n an agent's mind, originated 
by an external input or by an internal ' in tu i t ion ' . 
Finally, the model allows a subjective and context-dependent structure of belief 
just if icat ion and grounding. In fact, no specific requirements have been imposed 
on the level of regress of justif ication. Such level can be decided subjectively, 
according to the context or to the specific characteristics of the audience addressed. 
The representation allows an event to be believed wi thout any support, or to be 
accepted only i f the hearer (hypothetically) does so, or to be believed on the basis 
of real (sensorial, as required by Armstrong) experiences. 
The flexibility of the model enables the definit ion of a belief system based on the 
coherence theory, on the foundations theory, or on both theories; for example, the 
model can adopt a foundations approach whenever i t is believed to be appropriate 
for the specific context, and be generally based on a coherence view, in which a 
belief does not need further support i f i t is not (supposedly) questioned by the 
audience. This would be in line w i t h the idea of locality and 'isolated' grounding of 
beliefs, put forward by Doyle in [31] and discussed in the last part of Section 2.2.2. 
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7.3 Efficiency of Discourse Planning 
The efficiency of the belief system considered as a module to be integrated into a 
planning system to produce persuasive discourse plans is evaluated according to 
the two parameters defined in Section 2.5, namely, the efficiency of the integration 
(integrability) and the efficiency of the f inal product. Let us begin by evaluating 
the former. 
7.3.1 Integrability 
The evaluation of the integrability of the model is based on the complexity of the 
process of integration and on the range of systems into which the belief system can 
be integrated. 
C o m p l e x i t y of the integration 
The integration process is divided into a sequence of separate phases; the complex-
i ty of the entire process is the result of the composition of the complexities of the 
various phases. Let us examine each of them separately. 
The very in i t ia l part of the process consists of converting the interpretation 
funct ion J ( ) into the set of (acyclic) inference rules i t o , as explained in Theorem 
5.1 (Composed Closure). 
I f the" funct ion X ( ) is defined simply as a list of explicit^associatidris between 
propositions of Lo \ Li and boolean functions of inner propositions, this procedure 
can be carried out automatically, and its complexity is simply proportional to the 
number of associations employed to define X ( ) entirely. 
I f the definit ion of I ( ) is not explicit, the conversion of the interpretation func-
t ion I ( ) into the set of acyclic rules Ro w i l l be assumed to be performed by the user. 
The first algori thm applied to transform the BP-planning problem is A l . The 
part of A l which appears to be the most computationally expensive is the calcu-
lation of f2 i ( I ) = C f i j U C O N S _ ( C f f i ( / ) \ I ) . However, because of the property of 
acyclicity of the set Ri, the complexity of this calculation is simply linear in the 
number of propositions present in the set I. 
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In fact, the closure C R i ( I ) can be calculated directly as / U K, where 
K = {c £ Lo \ c g I , 3r £ Ri: r = (p h c), p £ I } 
The set K contains only the collection of the consequences of the rules which have 
their premiss already in / , for the addition of K to the closure w i l l not 'activate' 
any other rule. 
Notice that the coefficient of proportionali ty which relates the number W of 
operations necessary to calculate the closure of / to the number of propositions 
in / contains the cardinality of the set of rules Ri. In other words, there exists a 
constant '&' such that 
N < k • (#Jtt) • (#/) 
The set of inference rules Ri can be considered as a 'f ixed' parameter of the problem. 
I n fact, for the problem of discourse planning, the set of rules adopted should not 
be influenced by the dimension of the discourse, that is, by the dimension of the 
set / . Hence, the cardinality of Ri can be assumed to be constant, w i t h respect to 
the number # / . 
Since the calculation of f i i ( J ) requires essentially only to identify the set K 
defined above, its computational load NQ1 can be estimated as 
N a i < k' • ( # / ) 
where k! is a constant which depends on 
The rest of the algorithm A l applies the transformation I \ to the set of op-
erators Op. This procedure appends a list of conditional effects to each operator 
O = (P, A, D); the length of this list is directly proportional to the number of 
propositions in the original add and delete lists A, D, since # C ^ ( 5 ) < k • # i ? • # 5 
for any set S i f R is a set of acyclic inference rules. 
However, as for the set of inference rules, in this context the set of operators Op 
can be considered as a 'f ixed' parameter of the problem. In fact, the complexity 
of the problem is proportional to the dimension of the belief set (and of the set 
of goals); even i f the state grows, the set of operators available for planning a 
persuasive discourse remains, in general, unaltered. Since for any given in i t ia l set 
of operators Op there exists a number ' / ' such that the length of any A or D list 
is never bigger than /, then the computational load required to transform a single 
operator w i l l be always smaller than a certain constant, c. 
Moreover, i f the set Op is fixed, its cardinality # O p can also be considered 
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constant; consequently, the whole transformation r \ , requiring a number NTl of 
operations proportional to c- ( # O p ) , has a computational load l imi ted by a constant 
k". 
In conclusion, a single application of the algorithm Al to a BP-planning problem 
requires a number of operations N^i which can be estimated as 
N A l = N n i + NTl < k' • ( # / ) + k" 
where # / is the cardinality of the set / , and the two constants k',k" depend on 
the dimensions of the sets Ri and Op. 
Notice that the algorithm A l could be applied, in the in i t i a l phase, more than 
once, i f the given set Ri is not already acyclic. 
The analysis for the transformation A2, which is applied during the following 
phase of the process of the integration, is in every respect analogous to the above 
one 3. However, i t should be pointed out that the rules integrated by A2 are of a 
different kind; more precisely, they all have the fo rm 
r) - (ql V . . . V qk) h c 
Hence, the t r u t h of the boolean function representing the premiss requires, in the 
worst case, the check for the absence, in the set / , of k expressions. This means 
that a rule w i th k terms in the premiss might require k • ( # / ) matches — instead 
of # / , as in A l — in order to be evaluated applicable. 
Assuming the constant W to be the maximum number of terms which appear 
in the premisses of the rules of the set Roa, the number of operations executed by 
A2 s t i l l grows linearly w i t h the growth of the cardinality of the in i t i a l set / : 
NA2 = N C R o a + Nr2 < k'2 • ( # / ) + kl 
where k'2 a m • ( # i ? o a ) . 
The new BP-planning problem in output f rom A2 w i l l be re-transformed by 
A l , in the th i rd and final phase, in order to integrate the rest of the rules of Ro in 
the f o r m p h c. 
3 Notice that also the set Ro, deduced from the interpretation I ( ) , can be assumed to be an 
invariant parameter of the problem. 
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In conclusion, considering the 'preparatory' conversion of the interpretation 
funct ion T{) performed either automatically (and therefore w i t h a procedure of 
linear complexity) or 'by hand' (when the definition of X ( ) is not explicit) , the 
whole process of integration of a BP algorithm into a planning system requires a 
number of operations N which does not grow more than linearly at the growth of 
the number of propositions present in the in i t i a l state / : 
N < k • ( # / ) 
R a n g e of integrabil i ty 
The second issue related to the evaluation of the integrabili ty concerns the range 
of planning systems into which the belief system can be integrated. 
Since the belief system is not actually 'integrated' into the planner, but simply 
'pre-processed' into the planning problem through a transformation of the in i t i a l 
state and of the set of operators, there are basically no restrictions on the range of 
possible 'host' planning systems, so long as they offer the few standard character-
istics which have been assumed, consisting, essentially, of operators w i t h precon-
ditions, add and delete lists. Hence, any planner which is able to solve a standard 
planning problem (as defined in Section 5.1.1) w i t h ' P - A - D ' operator schemes, be i t 
partial-order, non-linear, or causal-link, can be adopted as the basis of the discourse 
planning system. 
Notice that the presence of the P-A-D lists in the operators is required but 
does not constitute an 'upper' l i m i t to the complexity of the formalism. In other 
words, the operators can be more sophisticated and s t i l l be suitable for the same 
process of ' integration'. For example, i f the operator schemes contain, besides a 
precondition list, a list of filters (specifying conditions which must be verified for the 
application but which are not used for subgoaling), the process of transformation 
remains unaltered. This is because the precondition list of an operator is actually 
left unchanged by the process which the operators undergo. 
Exploi t ing this property, i t is also possible to use, for example, abstract opera-
tors (and, thus, adopt hierarchical planners) in which a scheme consists of a 'shell' 
— specifying a list of filters — and a 'body', containing a list of subgoals (cf., for 
example, Fox and Long's A b N L P [45]). 
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7.3.2 Efficiency of the final product 
The evaluation of the efficiency of the entire system for discourse planning is based 
on the evaluation of the impact that the integration process has on the efficiency 
of the planner, and of the complexity of the process of maintenance (e.g., addition 
of new features, extension of the language, etc.) of the final product. 
W i t h regards to the impact of the integration, as the analysis of the compu-
tational complexity has revealed, the effects of the process consist essentially of 
i) extending the in i t i a l state / w i th new propositions (in both algorithms A l and 
A2); ii) extending the add and delete lists of the operators (A2); and Hi) adding 
lists of conditional effects — of length proportional to the dimension of the add 
and delete lists — to the operators ( A l ) . 
Al though these effects undoubtedly increase the dimension of the search space 
for the specific problem considered, the inherent complexity of the planning prob-
lem is not altered. I n fact, as Erol et al. point out in [35], i f the problem specifies a 
fixed set of operators, " . . . for any given planning domain that can be described w i t h 
STRIPS operators, the complexity of planning is at most in PSPACE, and [ . . . ] 
there exist such domains for which planning is PSPACE-complete". Moreover, Erol 
et al. also confirm that i f the planning operators are extended to allow conditional 
effects, the overall complexity is not affected. This contradicts a widespread be-
lief that planning w i t h conditional operators is harder than planning w i t h regular 
STRIPS operators. However, as they point out, " . . . conditional operators are use-
f u l only when we have incomplete information about the in i t i a l state of the world, 
or the effects of the operators [ . . . ] . Otherwise, we can replace the conditional oper-
ators w i t h a number of ordinary STRIPS-style operators, to obtain and equivalent 
planning domain." [ibid., p.84] 
As far as the maintenance of the system is concerned, the main advantage offered 
by adopting a pre-processing approach lies in the higher level of modularity. The 
'integrator' system for the transformation of the planning problem is completely 
separated f rom the planning system. This relieves the programmer f rom any need 
to understand and modify the code of the host planner, both in i t ia l ly and in case 
of subsequent releases of new versions. Moreover, the integrator module can be 
modified independently f rom the planning system adopted: in this way, the phase 
of testing and debugging is notably facili tated, allowing the output of the problem 
transformation to be examined directly and before any plan is searched for. 
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7.4 Efficiency of the Belief System 
The efficiency of the belief system as a stand-alone module is evaluated in terms 
of run-time efficiency and maintenance efficiency. In order to evaluate the run-
time efficiency, the computational complexity of the BP algori thm lA\ constituting 
the core of the belief system specified in Chapter 4, is analysed. A n equivalent 
analysis can be carried out for the belief system actually adopted for the discourse 
planning system described in Chapter 6, which constitutes a simplified version of 
the algori thm A. 
7.4.1 Run-time efficiency 
The BP algori thm lA' is composed of two main steps (see page 96): 
1 Calculate S' = CR{S); 
2 result:= T(w) \s>. 
The first step consists of the calculation of the deductive closure of the state S 
using the set R of inference rules. The second step uses the result of the first one 
to evaluate the t r u t h of any given expression w :: <WFE>. 
Let us begin by examining the complexity of step 1. 
The specific inference rules adopted present a common characteristic: their pre-
misses contain only one proposition. This feature allows the following simplified 
analysis: consider a state S containing m propositions; the closure S' can be cal-
culated by matching each expression p E S against the premisses of each rule, and 
collecting the consequences of each rule which produced a successful match in an 
additional set C\. Repeating this operation for each proposition of S w i l l produce 
a final set C\ containing all the possible consequences which can be derived f rom 
S. 
The same process w i l l have to be repeated for C i , which might contain some 
proposition generating further consequences: C\ w i l l then produce a new set C%, 
whose elements, in turn , w i l l be matched against the rules to possibly produce a 
new set C 3 , and so for th . 
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This process w i l l terminate when a set Cn generates an empty set of conse-
quences Cn+i = 0. The termination is guaranteed by Theorem 4.1, since S can be 
assumed to be finite. The closure S' can eventually be obtained as the union 
S1 = S U C i U C2 U . . . u Cn 
The tota l amount of operations Ni required to calculate the set S' can be assumed 
proportional to the number of 'matches' performed to identify all the consequences. 
This number can be obtained as the product between the number of propositions 
contained in S' and the number r of inference rules present in R: 
Nx a (#S + # d + # C 2 + # C 3 + . . . ) • r 
where # C j represents the cardinality of C\. I f we count the maximum number 
of different direct consequences (that is, obtained through a 'one-shot' derivation) 
which R can produce f rom any proposition, and call 'c' this number, since every 
expression p £ S cannot generate more that 'c' consequences, we can put an upper 
l imi t to the number of consequences present in C\. 
# C i < c • m 
where m = # 5 . Also, # C 2 < c • #C\ = c 2 • m. Hence, in general, 
Because of the specific characteristics of the rules adopted by the algorithm A, i t 
can be shown that the maximum number of iterations of the process, for the given 
set R, is equal to three. I n other words, Ci = 0 for i > 3. 
This can be seen by following, for each inference rule, the consequences which i t 
can generate. For example, consider rule ig (and in, which has the same premiss), 
and suppose that the proposition p = HBEL(SBEL(SR(e)) ) belongs to S, w i th 
e :: <Ei>. 
Because of ig-in, the set C\ w i l l contain 
Ci = { H B E L ( S B E L ( e ) ) , H B E L ( S R ( e ) ) } 
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The first proposition of C\ does not match any premiss (since e :: <Ei>); the 
second one matches i 5 and produces 
C 2 = { H B E L ( e ) } 
Finally, C 3 = 0, as HBEL(e) does not 'activate' any other rule. The same analysis 
can be repeated for each inference rule in R. 
Therefore, for the BP algorithm A, the number Ni of operations required by 
step 1 can be evaluated as 
Nx a (m + # C i + # C 2 ) • r 
that is 
Ni < k • (1 + c + c 2 ) • m • r 
where c represents the maximum number of different direct consequences which can 
be produced by any expression of <WFF>, and k a certain constant. This for-
mula indicates that the complexity of step 1, for the specific BP algorithm adopted, 
is linear in both the number of propositions in the state S and the number of in-
ference rules i n R. 
Let us now analyse the computational complexity of step 2 of the BP algorithm 
A, consisting of the evaluation oiI(w) \s>-
The first part, concerning the simplification of the expression w, always requires 
a number of operations smaller that a certain constant. I n fact, no <WFE> 
expression w i l l ever undergo more simplifications than a specific number 4 , since the 
number of nested modalities which the syntax allows in an expression is l imited, 
and the simplifications can either eliminate one modal operator f r o m the expression 
or substitute one w i t h a different one (notice that the simplifications do not produce 
infini te 'cycles' of substitutions). 
A similar reasoning can be applied for the second part of step 2, containing the 
evaluation of the function check(). The association between an expression w' and 
the f inal boolean function check(w') = X(w) is based exclusively on the analysis 
of the most 'external' levels of w', which are l imi ted in number and combinations. 
A l l the possible cases are considered by the function check(), and every expression 
is eventually evaluated as a boolean function of a set of inner language terms, as 
For the given simplifications, this number is three. 
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the formal definition of interpretation stated. 
For example, f rom the definition of check(), i t follows 
check(NOT(SUND(e))) = B{e) V £ ( N O T ( e ) ) 
c / iec&(HBEL(NOT(HBEL(e)))) = 5 ( H U N D ( e ) ) V B ( H B E L ( N O T ( e ) ) 
Even though the number of terms defining the final boolean function varies ac-
cording to the in i t i a l expression w', this number is always smaller than a certain 
constant k', because of the l imited number of modal operators admitted by the 
syntax <WFE>. 
There are, however, two exceptions to this rule. I f the expression w' contains 
one of the predicate forms 
H U N K ( s ) , HBEL(SUNK(s ) ) 
w i t h s :: <Su>, the associated boolean function w i l l contain a number of terms 
equal to the number of events of type <Ei> which are present i n the argument s. 
This is due to the integration of Equation 4.3 (and following one) in the interpre-
ta t ion function. In f fact, because of Equation 4.3, the boolean funct ion associated 
w i t h an expression such as 
w = H U N K ( SUP( N O T ( E i ) , SUP(E 2 , SR(E 3 ) ) ) ) 
is 
I{w) = H U N K ( E i ) V H U N K ( E 2 ) V H U N K ( E 3 ) 
Notice that the number of events e :: <Ei> present in a support event increases 
exponentially w i t h the number of levels of support nesting of the expression. How-
ever, only in the worst case i t w i l l be necessary to evaluate the t r u t h of all of these 
terms: since the boolean funct ion is a disjunction of propositions, its evaluation 
w i l l terminate as soon as a term evaluated True is encountered. 
The maximum number of terms present in the final boolean funct ion associated 
to a query w can be used to estimate the maximum number N2 of operations 
required for the evaluation of T(w) \s>. In fact, each term (at most) w i l l have to 
be searched for in the current (completed) state S', and evaluated True or False 
according to the result of the search. 
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According to the previous analysis, if we exclude the two mentioned exceptions, 
the computational load for the evaluation of the function check() can be considered 
smaller than or equal to a number proportional to the number m' of propositions 
present in the state S': 
N2 < k2 • m' 
where k2 is a constant determined according to the maximum number of terms 
appearing in a boolean function associated to an expression w not containing the 
arguments ai=HUNK(s), a 2=HBEL(SUNK(s)). 
If the expression w does contain one of the two specific forms HUNK(s) or 
HBEL(SUNK(s)), with s::<Su>, the estimated number of operations required 
becomes 
N2 < k'2-2l • rri 
where k'2 is a constant and / is the level of support nesting of the argument V in 
w (e.g. s=SUP(E!,E 2) has level 1 = 1). 
Summarizing, for the steps 1 and 2 of the BP algorithm A the following com-
putational complexities have been deduced: 
to calculate S': N\ < ki • m • r 
to evaluate X{w) \s>. N2 < 
k'2 • 2l • m' if w contains a\ or a2 
k2 • m' otherwise 
where k' is a constant, m is the cardinality of the state S, m' is the cardinality of 
5' and r is the number of inference rules in R. The expression k\ = k(l + c + c 2) 
—• or the value of the constant c — could vary if the set of inference rules R is 
modified. I t should be noticed that in the belief system adopted for the implemen-
tation of the discourse planning system of Chapter 6, the two exceptions which can 
give rise to exponential complexity have not been endowed in the BP algorithm. 
Hence, in such system, the run-time computational complexity is essentially linear 
in the number of propositions in the state and in the number of inference rules of R. 
If repeated queries w', w", to '", . . . are given to the belief prover while the state S 
is left unaltered, the calculation of the closure set S' does not need to be repeated 
every time, and the real computational load of the algorithm is represented by 
step 2. However, considering the generality of the formal definition of an inference 
rule V V c (given in Chapter 3), in which V can be any boolean function of the 
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language, the process of calculation of the deductive closure S' could result to be 
much more complex, in presence, for example, of rules containing premisses with 
more than one term. Such type of inference rules would not be, in general, suitable 
for the application of algorithms A l and A2, which 'pre-encode' the belief system 
into the operators and allow a localized updating of the state, as realized in the 
discourse planning system. 
In such cases, it wil l be necessary either to develop more sophisticated algo-
rithms of transformation (as described by Garagnani in [53]), or to develop a mech-
anism for the updating of the current closure S' = CR(S) based on a system of links 
which keep track of the relations of dependency between different propositions of 
the closure 5", as implemented — for testing purposes — in the actual realization 
of the belief system of Chapter 4. 
7.4.2 Maintenance efficiency 
The efficiency of the process of belief revision and reason maintenance depends 
on the type of belief system which the user chooses to implement. For example, 
if a foundational approach is adopted, the process of revision after the change 
of one attitude or the addition or deletion of a belief could involve, potentially, 
the reconsideration of the entire set of beliefs currently present in the state. The 
complexity of such revision would be proportional to the level of 'depth' of the 
change effected; the closer to the 'basis' of the system is the change, the bigger the 
propagation i t will produce on the rest of the system. 
On the other hand, if a coherence approach is adopted, the complexity of belief 
revision depends on the level of belief justification maintained in the system, which 
can be subjective and context-dependent. A low level of belief justification (that 
is, most of the beliefs of the system lack a supporting evidence) would reduce 
the procedure of revision to the minimal changes necessary to maintain the global 
coherence. 
The use of the belief system in conjunction with a planner allows the definition of 
operators which can carry out the operations of belief revision on the current state. 
According to the specific contents of such operators, the process of revision will be 
either propagated through the system to all of the beliefs related to the changes or 
simply limited to the beliefs which are involved in the construction of the plan. The 
latter approach has been adopted for the actual implementation of the discourse 
planning system, in which the revisions are restricted to the beliefs of the system 
which are relevant to the discourse which is being planned. This method is in line 
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with the idea of 'local' coherence described in the work of Doyle [31], presented in 
Section 2.2.2. 
Moreover, this approach is also in accordance with the main framework into 
which the discourse planning system has been assumed to fit, as described in Sec-
tion 4.1. In such view, the process of discourse planning is seen as performed in 
a 'hypothetical' space, in which a temporary, limited representation of the beliefs 
is built, 'on the fly', from an underlying, larger knowledge base. After the effects 
that the discourse actually produces on the hearer's beliefs have been determined 
with certainty, the knowledge base will have to be updated accordingly. However, 
such process is not part of the activity of discourse planning in itself, as it has been 
intended throughout all this work. 
7.5 Correctness 
As required by the criteria specified in Section 2.5, the belief system implemented 
satisfies the formal specifications which have been given in Chapter 4. 
It is interesting to notice that although such formal specifications require the 
beliefs of the speaker (and of the hearer model) not to be openly contradictory 
(cf. restrictions imposed on S1S3, p. 87), that is, not to actually contain two 
beliefs 4> and -></>, the system developed allows the kind of logical inconsistency 
described by Konolige, also related to the concept of locality introduced by Doyle 
(see Section 2.2.2). In fact, this situation may occur when the set of beliefs contains 
two formulae 4> and ip such that a contradiction could be derived, but the inference 
rules are not strong enough to discover it; in other words, the agent is not aware 
of holding beliefs which result to be contradictory. Similarly, in the context of 
the integration of the belief system with a planner, the reasoning process which is 
carried out during planning performs only the deductions which are necessary for 
the construction of the discourse plan. Hence, the derivation of contradiction (or, 
in general, of new beliefs) is entirely goal driven, as one would expect when dealing 
with bounded-resources reasoning agents. 
Section 4.3 has illustrated how the implementation has been actually realized, 
and how the correct functioning of the system has been verified through its perfor-
mance on various crucial tests. 
The correctness of the discourse planning system is based on the correctness 
of the belief system and on the formal proof of the correctness of the process of 
integration. The formal proof of the correctness of the process has been given 
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in Chapter 5. Although these elements are sufficient to guarantee the correct 
functioning of the system, empirical evidence of its validity has been given at the 
end of Chapter 6, where a number of discourse plans generated in response to 
different examples of discourse planning problems have been illustrated. 
7.6 Conclusions and Further work 
As stated in Section 1.3, the central problem addressed in this thesis consisted of 
the formalization, implementation and integration (with a planning system) of a 
belief system for persuasive discourse structure generation. The three main results 
which have been presented as a solution for this problem consist of: 
1. a general paradigm for the specification of belief systems (not necessarily 
discourse-generation oriented), given in Chapter 3; 
2. the formal specification and realization of a belief system (defined according 
to the given paradigm) for persuasive discourse planning, given in Chapter 4; 
3. the description, formal proof of correctness and implementation of an algo-
rithm (consisting of the pre-processing of the given planning problem) for the 
integration of any belief system built according to the paradigm requirements 
(Chapter 5). 
Notice that a simpler version of the belief system described in Chapter 4 has been 
used to produce an example of a system for the automatic generation of persuasive 
discourse plans (Chapter 6). 
The three main results have been evaluated in the preceding sections of this 
chapter, where it has been shown that the specific requirements of expressiveness 
and correctness set up in Section 2.5 have been met, and an indication of the 
efficiency of the solution proposed has been given. More precisely, because of 
the acyclicity of the inference rules used to calculate the closure of the initial 
set, the belief system integrated in the actual implementation presents linear run-
time computational complexity. The process of integration itself presents, also, a 
complexity which is linear in the dimension of the initial state, if the set of operators 
and the characteristics of the belief system are considered as fixed parameters of the 
problem. Even when this is not so, and, for example, the number of operators, or 
the number of inference rules, or of premisses of an inference rule, is increased, the 
resulting computational load still undergoes simply a linear or polynomial growth 
of the constant of proportionality. 
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In the belief system defined in Chapter 4, because of the specific definition of 
function of interpretation I ( ), the complexity of the evaluation of two specific 
types of queries is exponential in the level / of support nesting of the argument of 
the query (see page 216); however, it seems plausible to hypothesize the existence 
of a certain maximum level of support nesting in the queries, so that the number 
of operations can be considered smaller than a constant. These considerations, 
nevertheless, underline the significant impact that the specific characteristics of the 
interpretation function have on the complexity of the process of query evaluation, 
as i t would be natural to expect. 
Finally, in relation to the impact that the process of transformation proposed 
has on the planning phase, it has been shown that the pre-processing of the initial 
BP-planning problem does not inherently increase the computational complexity 
of the planning problem. Moreover, the formal correctness of the transformation 
algorithm is based upon a set of hypotheses (summarized in Section 5.3.5) which do 
not constitute necessary conditions for the pre-processing of a general BP-planning 
problem: in other words, such hypotheses have been 'contingently' adopted for 
the specific algorithms A l and A2, and could be relaxed if a more sophisticated 
transformation procedure were adopted (as indicated in Section 5.3.1). 
One of the limitations of the integrator system implemented in Chapter 6 lies in 
the fact that i t instantiates all the variables present in the set of operator schemes 
given in input, producing a ground set of operators on which the transformation 
algorithms A l and A2 are then applied. However, these algorithms are suitable to 
be implemented also as a transformation of operators with variables: as suggested 
in Section 6.3, such a system could be actually realised if the formalism for the 
definition of the preconditions of operators allows the presence of codesignation 
and non-codesignation constraints. 
With regard to possible developments of the present work, one of the features of 
the paradigm for the belief system specification consists of the fact that it has been 
defined 'on top' of an hypothetical 'belief base' representation having the concept 
of event as fundamental semantic unit (see Section 3.1). This characteristic allows 
the system implemented to be used in conjunction with a large variety of knowl-
edge/belief base systems which adopt this kind of representation, such as event-
based semantic networks and conceptual graph theories (e.g. [4] [149] [134] [133]). 
Secondly, an important feature of the transformation algorithm described in 
Chapter 5 (already pointed out in the last part of Section 7.3.1) consists of the 
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fact that the precondition lists of the operators are left unchanged by the pre-
processing phase. This leaves open the possibility of implementing more sophis-
ticated discourse planning systems, employing, for example, hierarchical planners 
which allow the adoption of abstract operators, such as those developed by Reed 
in [118]. 
Thirdly, a natural extension of the discourse planning system described in Chap-
ter 6 consists of actually realizing in NL the persuasive discourse specified by the 
plan produced. This will mean, in a first approximation, substituting each primi-
tive event E, with its corresponding semantic content (i.e., the proposition it rep-
resents), and using the 'meaning' of the operators to identify the 'cue words' which 
should be added to relate the different propositions of the discourse. 
For example, the 'Attack(E;, E j ) ' step of any of the plans presented at the end 
of the previous chapter could be translated into something on the line of 
"Although you believe that E j , the fact that E j supports the thesis that 
-> Ej. Hence, this raises a question over whether or not it is the case 
that Ej- ." 
Similarly, a Tersuade(Ej, E j ) ' could become 
"Since you believe that Ej, and also that this fact is a sufficient reason 
to believe that E j , then you should also believe that i t is true that 
E j . " 
The primitive events E j should obviously be replaced by the corresponding NL 
expressions. An analogous realization in NL is shown in [51]. 
However, i f the discourse plan contains many steps, this simple substitution 
might be not completely satisfactory, as the global intentional structure of the dis-
course — composed of segments and sub-segments having specific communicative 
goals — would not have been conveyed to the audience. Even if such intentional 
structure does not need to be always included in the message, i t constitutes a fun-
damental element for the process of replanning of part of the discourse, and a useful 
basis for dealing with the issues concerning the attentional state of the audience 
and the specific linguistic register adopted. 
In order to identify the intentional structure underlying the specific plan pro-
duced it will be necessary to trace back the links between the various parts of the 
discourse plan and the way in which the communicative goals have been decom-
posed and achieved. Such links are not explicitly handled by the IPP planning 
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system, whereas they would be directly accessible in a causal link planner, such as 
DPOCL [153]. 
Taking this kind of 'surface' aspect into account during the actual NL realization 
of the discourse might involve the re-ordering of some of the 'parallel' sub-steps of 
the plan produced by IPP, or the insertion of specific cue words aimed at informing 
the audience of the decomposition of the discourse into various segments (generated, 
for example, by different communicative goals). 
Focus and order have been considered in the design of the architecture pre-
sented by Reed in [118] (already discussed in Section 2.4.2), where the problem 
of the discourse structure generation and refinement has been tackled through the 
development of a hierarchy of discourse operators having decreasing level of ab-
straction. As mentioned above, such hierarchy could, in principle, be adopted for 
this framework, and transformed using the integrator system implemented. This 
would allow the operators, initial state and goals to be endowed with the belief 
system and language specified in Chapter 6, or with any other belief system built 
in accordance with the theoretical paradigm developed. 
To conclude, this thesis has treated the problem of the automatic construction 
of the logical structure of persuasive discourses through the analysis, formalisa-
tion, implementation and integration of a belief system. The work presented does 
not pretend to be exhaustive, nor free from imperfections; however, i t is hoped to 
represent a contribution towards the solution of some of the issues related to this 
problem. In particular, we feel that one of the main objectives of this research 
has been achieved: namely, the realisation of a framework for the implementation 
of discourse planning systems easy and natural to use, and able to efficiently in-
tegrate formal belief systems which are flexible and expressive enough to model 
characteristics that are typically human. Such characteristics include the ability to 
deal with uncertainty and inconsistency, to represent belief deduction, justification 
and grounding, and suitability for the integration in systems which make use of 
only limited amounts of resources. 
Appendix A 
Discourse Planning Operators 
Persuade(?a,?b) 
Prec: HBEL(SUP(a,b)), HBEL(a), HUND(b), 
SBEL(SUP(a,b)), SBEL(a), SBEL(b) 
Add: HBEL(b) 
Del: HUND(b) 
Spoil-sup(?a,?b) 
Prec: HBEL(a), HBEL(b), NOT(HBEL(SUP(b,a))), 
NOT(SBEL(a)), NOT(SBEL(SUP(b,a))), 
NOT(HBEL(HR(a))), NOT(HBEL(SR(a))) 
Add: HUND(a) 
Del: HBEL(a) 
Spoil-arg(?a,?b) 
Prec: HBEL(a), HBEL(SUP(b,a)), NOT(HBEL(b)), 
NOT(SBEL(a)), NOT(SBEL(b)), 
NOT(HBEL(HR(a))), NOT(HBEL(SR(a))) 
Add: HUND(a) 
Del: HBEL(a) 
Attack(?a,?b) 
Prec: HBEL(b), HBEL(a), HBEL(SUP(a,NOT(b))), 
NOT(SBEL(b)), SBEL(a), SBEL(SUP(a,NOT(b))), 
NOT(HBEL(HR(b))), NOT(HBEL(SR(b))) 
Add: HUND(b) 
Del: HBEL(NOT(b)) 
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Assert (?a) 
Prec: HUNK(a), SBEL(a) 
Add: HUND(a) 
Del: 
Assert-real(?a) 
Prec: SR(a), HUNK(SR(a)) 
Add: HBEL(SR(a)) 
Del: 
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